Patrick G. Foy

The Lax Kw'alaams Indian Band claimed an Aboriginal right to the commercial harvesting and sale of all species of fish within their traditional waters, arguing this right evolved from their pre-contact practices.

The trial judge found that while the pre-contact society relied heavily on fishing for sustenance, their only significant trade was in eulachon grease, and trade in other fish was not integral to their distinctive culture.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a modern commercial fishery in all species lacked sufficient continuity and proportionality with the pre-contact trade in eulachon grease.

The Court also affirmed that Aboriginal rights claims must be characterized based on the pleadings, rejecting a 'commission of inquiry' approach to determining pre-contact practices.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and awarded damages.

The trial judge reduced the management fee award by 50 percent to account for a predicted increased return from investment counselling, and deducted the respondent's legal fees and house purchase from the amount used to calculate management fees and tax gross-up.

The Court of Appeal reversed these deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory discount rate is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by reducing management fees.

Furthermore, damages are assessed as a lump sum, and how a plaintiff chooses to spend the award (e.g., on a house or legal fees) is irrelevant to the calculation of management fees and tax gross-up.

The respondent Indian bands began logging on Crown land without authorization, claiming aboriginal title.

The Minister of Forests issued stop-work orders and commenced enforcement proceedings.

The bands argued they lacked funds for a complex trial and sought an order for interim costs (costs in advance and in any event of the cause).

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision to grant interim costs, establishing a three-part test for such awards in public interest litigation: the party must be genuinely impecunious, the claim must be prima facie meritorious, and the issues must transcend individual interests and be of public importance.

The appellant First Nation challenged the constitutionality of provisions in British Columbia's Heritage Conservation Act that allowed the Minister to issue permits authorizing the alteration or destruction of aboriginal heritage objects, specifically culturally modified trees.

The appellants argued the provisions were ultra vires the province as they intruded on the federal power over Indians and lands reserved for Indians.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions were valid provincial legislation falling within the province's jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Court found the legislation did not single out aboriginal peoples or impair their status, but rather established a balanced scheme for heritage conservation that applied generally across the province.

The respondent company deposited a large pile of soil on its leased property, prompting complaints from neighbours about dust and noise.

The appellant municipality passed resolutions under s. 936 of the Municipal Act declaring the soil a nuisance and ordering its removal.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the municipality had the jurisdiction to declare the soil a nuisance, interpreting the statute purposively.

The Court further held that while jurisdictional questions of municipalities are reviewed on a standard of correctness, their intra vires decisions are reviewed on a deferential standard of patent unreasonableness.

The municipality's decision was found not to be patently unreasonable.