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The appellants, members of the Tsartlip Indian Band, were convicted under provincial wildlife legislation for hunting at night with an illuminating device.

They appealed, arguing the legislation infringed their right to hunt under the North Saanich Treaty of 1852.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the treaty right to hunt includes the right to hunt at night with illumination.

The Court found that while the province can regulate safety, the absolute prohibition on night hunting was overbroad and constituted a prima facie infringement of the treaty right.

Consequently, the provincial law could not be incorporated under s. 88 of the Indian Act and was inapplicable to the appellants.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The respondent Indian bands began logging on Crown land without authorization, claiming aboriginal title.

The Minister of Forests issued stop-work orders and commenced enforcement proceedings.

The bands argued they lacked funds for a complex trial and sought an order for interim costs (costs in advance and in any event of the cause).

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision to grant interim costs, establishing a three-part test for such awards in public interest litigation: the party must be genuinely impecunious, the claim must be prima facie meritorious, and the issues must transcend individual interests and be of public importance.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was charged with a serious disciplinary offence and faced potential solitary confinement.

He applied for legal aid for his disciplinary hearing, but the Legal Services Society refused, claiming such hearings were not covered under the Legal Services Society Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was entitled to legal services under the Act because the proceedings could lead to confinement.

However, the Court ruled that the Society retains the discretion to determine the appropriate level of legal services required, which may not necessarily include full legal representation at the hearing.

Appeal in a major Aboriginal title claim involving hereditary chiefs asserting rights over a large area of British Columbia.

The Court held that Aboriginal title is a sui generis right in land protected by s. 35(1), conferring exclusive use and occupation for a variety of purposes subject to an inherent limit against uses irreconcilable with the group’s attachment to the land.

The Court also held that oral histories must be given due weight in Aboriginal litigation and that the trial judge erred in his treatment of such evidence, requiring a new trial.

On the cross-appeal, the Court held that the province lacked constitutional authority after 1871 to extinguish Aboriginal rights, either directly or through s. 88 of the Indian Act.

The appellant sought full tort recovery against employees who negligently damaged a transformer while performing warehousing services under a storage contract containing a $40 limitation of liability clause.

The Court held that the employees owed a duty of care to the customer, but also held that the doctrine of privity should be relaxed to permit employees to rely on their employer's contractual limitation clause where the clause expressly or impliedly extends to them and they were acting in the course of employment while performing the contracted services.

Applying that framework, the employees' liability was limited to $40.

The appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed, with one judge dissenting on the cross-appeal and concluding no duty of care existed.

The respondent, declared a criminal sexual psychopath in 1953, served almost 37 years in prison under an indeterminate sentence.

Despite numerous psychiatric recommendations for his supervised release and the unavailability of necessary treatment, the National Parole Board repeatedly denied him parole based on minor infractions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the dangerous offender provisions are constitutional, the Parole Board erred in applying the statutory criteria for release.

The inordinate length of the respondent's incarceration had become grossly disproportionate to his circumstances, violating his right against cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming his release.