I. G. Whitehall

The Beaver Band surrendered the mineral rights on its reserve to the Crown in 1940 to lease for its benefit.

In 1945, the Band surrendered the reserve to the Crown to sell or lease.

The Crown subsequently sold the land to the Director of The Veterans' Land Act, inadvertently including the mineral rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown did not breach its fiduciary duty regarding the surrender and sale of the surface rights.

However, the Crown breached its fiduciary duty by transferring the mineral rights and failing to correct the error when it learned of it.

The action was not barred by limitation periods as the running of time was postponed until the Band discovered the facts.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed decisions finding that section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, which disqualified prisoners from voting, was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the provision contravened section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the provision was drawn too broadly and failed the minimal impairment component of the proportionality test under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a new trial and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years under transitional provisions.

He appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus, arguing he was sentenced under the wrong law, relying on R. v. Gamble.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the detention was lawful under a transitional provision whose constitutionality could not be attacked without a retrospective application of the Charter.

The respondent, declared a criminal sexual psychopath in 1953, served almost 37 years in prison under an indeterminate sentence.

Despite numerous psychiatric recommendations for his supervised release and the unavailability of necessary treatment, the National Parole Board repeatedly denied him parole based on minor infractions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the dangerous offender provisions are constitutional, the Parole Board erred in applying the statutory criteria for release.

The inordinate length of the respondent's incarceration had become grossly disproportionate to his circumstances, violating his right against cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming his release.

The appellants appealed a decision striking out their statement of claim, which sought a declaration that various federal and provincial statutes were unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the test for striking out a statement of claim was not met, as the outcome was not 'plain and obvious' or 'beyond doubt'.

The Court found that the issues regarding the interpretation of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and the Constitution Act, 1871 were better determined at trial with a proper factual base, and that the subject matter was justiciable.