Mona T. Duckett

The appellant pleaded guilty to explosives and weapons offences arising from possession of an arsenal capable of causing mass destruction, against a background of significant mental illness and prior weapons-related conduct.

The appeal concerned whether a conditional sentence could lawfully be imposed where the offender would reside in a locked psychiatric treatment unit under psychiatric supervision.

The majority held that the dangerousness inquiry under s. 742.1 focuses on the risk posed while serving the sentence in the community, taking account of proposed conditions, and that the risk here was no greater than under penal incarceration.

The majority also held that s. 742.3 permits a conditional sentence requiring residence in a secure psychiatric facility as a genuine community-based alternative to incarceration.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge’s sentence restored.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside the accused's conviction for second degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of an overheard statement by the accused saying 'I killed David'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the meaning of the evidence was so speculative and its probative value so tenuous that the trial judge ought to have excluded it because its prejudicial effect overbore its probative value.

The accused shot and killed a woman sleeping in his apartment while suffering from a paranoid delusion that she was part of a conspiracy to kill him.

At trial, he raised the defence of insanity under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted him of second degree murder, finding that while he subjectively believed his act was justified, he retained the general capacity to know right from wrong.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 16(1) exempts an accused from criminal responsibility if a mental disorder deprives them of the capacity to rationally apply their knowledge of right and wrong to the specific act committed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a new trial and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years under transitional provisions.

He appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus, arguing he was sentenced under the wrong law, relying on R. v. Gamble.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the detention was lawful under a transitional provision whose constitutionality could not be attacked without a retrospective application of the Charter.

The appellant was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution after offering sexual services to an undercover police officer.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the Criminal Code provision violated freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting its reasoning from a companion reference case to hold that while the provision infringes freedom of expression, it is a demonstrably justified reasonable limit, and it does not violate the right to life, liberty, and security of the person on grounds of vagueness.