Jack Watson

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, causing bodily harm while committing a sexual assault, and threatening to cause bodily harm.

He argued that the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on his criminal record.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion under the Corbett framework and gave careful and correct limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of the prior convictions.

The appellant was acquitted of manslaughter at trial, but the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The Court found that the appellant should have been rewarned of his right to counsel when there was a substantial change in his jeopardy, which occurred when the police officer concluded he had committed the offence and advised him accordingly.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that had ordered a new trial for the accused on charges of inciting hatred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal regarding the trial judge's handling of jury requests.

The Court also reaffirmed its previous ruling that the reverse onus in s. 319(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, while infringing s. 11(d) of the Charter, is justified under s. 1.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to lift a mandatory publication ban protecting the identity of a sexual assault complainant.

The trial judge had revoked the ban on his own motion after acquitting the accused, citing the complainant's lack of credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the trial judge lacked the authority to revoke the mandatory publication ban without the consent of the Crown or the complainant.

The appeal was allowed and the publication ban was restored.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that reversed his acquittal on a charge of obstruction of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant undertook to advise police officers when they would be needed as witnesses.

The Court held that the appellant did not make a false statement to the court or withhold information he was legally obliged to disclose, although his conduct was ethically inexcusable.

The appellants were charged with break and enter and theft.

Prior to trial, they requested the Crown to disclose whether they were targets of any wiretap authorizations unrelated to the current charges.

The Crown confirmed there were no wiretaps pertaining to the current investigation but refused to confirm or deny the existence of other authorizations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where the Crown disputes the existence of requested material, the defence must establish a basis to conclude that potentially relevant material exists before the Crown is required to justify non-disclosure.

As the appellants' request was purely speculative, the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside the accused's conviction for second degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of an overheard statement by the accused saying 'I killed David'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the meaning of the evidence was so speculative and its probative value so tenuous that the trial judge ought to have excluded it because its prejudicial effect overbore its probative value.

The appellant was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution after working at an escort agency.

He challenged the constitutionality of s. 195(2) of the Criminal Code, which creates a presumption that a person living with or habitually in the company of prostitutes is living on the avails of prostitution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the presumption infringes the right to be presumed innocent under s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The provision targets the exploitative activity of pimps and represents a minimal impairment of the presumption of innocence given the difficulty of obtaining evidence from vulnerable prostitutes.