Douglas H. Christie

In a criminal appeal, the accused challenged appellate convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from an attempted circumcision of a four-year-old child.

The appellate court had set aside acquittals on those counts and stayed a conviction for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The Court held that all elements of the charged offences were established on the record.

It declined to address whether the assault-with-a-weapon count should have been stayed because that issue was not raised.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a hard-fought application for judicial review, the successful respondent sought costs of $57,647.20.

The applicant argued for a range of $12,000 to $14,000.

The Divisional Court found the respondent's claimed amount excessive for a one-day application, but the applicant's suggested amount too low.

The court fixed costs at $25,000 payable by the applicant to the respondent.

The court determined a forfeiture application under section 491(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following firearms convictions.

It held forfeiture was warranted for most seized firearms and for ammunition that was actually in improperly loaded firearms.

The court rejected a broad constitutional challenge to mandatory forfeiture on these facts, while recognizing that property-right concerns and due process principles can constrain application in proper cases.

It found no basis to forfeit ammunition that was merely readily available to unloaded firearms where both were stored in a locked room compliant with the storage regulation.

A disposition order issued in accordance with Schedule 1, with substantial forfeiture but targeted exemptions and transfers.

The applicant, a postgraduate medical resident in Cardiac Surgery, sought judicial review of a university Senate Appeals Committee decision requiring her to enter a six-month remediation period before advancing to the next year of her program.

She argued the decision was unreasonable and that she was denied procedural fairness due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, an inability to cross-examine witnesses, and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the academic decision was reasonable and that the requirements of procedural fairness were met, noting courts should only interfere in university academic affairs in cases of manifest unfairness.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a decision by the University of Ottawa's Senate Appeals Committee dismissing him from the neurosurgery residency program for unprofessional and disruptive behaviour.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness, the decision was unreasonable, and his Charter right to freedom of expression was violated.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeals Committee's de novo hearing cured any earlier procedural defects, the decision to dismiss was reasonable given the applicant's pattern of inflammatory emails and absenteeism, and the Charter did not apply to the university's internal academic disciplinary process.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his libel action against the CBC and Warren Kinsella.

The trial judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the appellant failed to provide notice within six weeks after the alleged libel came to his attention, as required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant could reasonably have known of the libel earlier and failed to act diligently to ascertain the facts after learning the gist of the broadcast.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $25,000.

The appellant was convicted of tax evasion after failing to disclose income or pay taxes from 1993 to 1997, based on his belief that federal income tax was unconstitutional.

He appealed his conviction and his sentence of one year in jail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding he had the requisite mens rea and the trial judge properly handled a juror issue.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by treating the absence of a conditional sentence in tax evasion cases as an absolute rule and by mischaracterizing aggravating factors.

The jail sentence was varied to a one-year conditional sentence.

The appellants were convicted of numerous firearms offences after police seized over 200 firearms and 20,000 rounds of ammunition from their home.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the firearms legislation violated their constitutional right to possess firearms for self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, confirming that Canadians do not have a constitutional right to bear arms.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the mandatory minimum sentences and the 18-month global sentence as fit and not constituting cruel and unusual punishment.

The accused was charged with income tax evasion.

At his second trial, he argued that he was not obligated to pay taxes because the Income Tax Act did not apply to him as a 'natural person'.

The trial judge put this defence to the jury, and the accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the accused's belief that the Act did not apply to him was a mistake of law that did not constitute a defence to tax evasion.

The trial judge erred in putting this unavailable defence to the jury.

A new trial was ordered.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission sought an interlocutory injunction from the Federal Court to prevent the respondents from communicating telephonic hate messages pending a human rights tribunal decision.

The Federal Court granted the injunction, but the respondents subsequently set up a new phone line in the US and referred callers to it, leading to a contempt of court finding.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the injunction for lack of jurisdiction but upheld the contempt finding.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal Court does have jurisdiction to issue an injunction under s. 44 of the Federal Court Act, and affirmed the contempt finding because the respondents knowingly violated a valid court order.

A public school teacher publicly made anti-Semitic statements during his off-duty time.

A Jewish parent filed a human rights complaint alleging the school board discriminated by failing to discipline the teacher, thereby condoning his views and creating a poisoned educational environment.

The human rights board of inquiry found discrimination and ordered the school board to place the teacher on leave, appoint him to a non-teaching position if available, or terminate his employment, and to terminate him immediately if he published anti-Semitic materials in the future.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the school board discriminated and that the order to remove the teacher from his teaching position infringed his freedom of expression and religion but was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

However, the permanent ban on publishing was not minimally impairing and was severed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that had ordered a new trial for the accused on charges of inciting hatred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal regarding the trial judge's handling of jury requests.

The Court also reaffirmed its previous ruling that the reverse onus in s. 319(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, while infringing s. 11(d) of the Charter, is justified under s. 1.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right based on a dissent in the Court of Appeal, which had quashed the accused's conviction for wilfully promoting hatred and ordered a new trial.

The accused subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal on constitutional and non-constitutional grounds.

The Crown moved to quash the accused's application for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Crown's motion, holding that under the dual proceedings approach, either party may seek leave to appeal rulings on constitutionality regardless of whether the ruling on culpability is appealed.

However, the Court ultimately dismissed the accused's application for leave to appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges arising from the confinement, robbery, deportation and deaths of Jewish civilians in wartime Hungary, prosecuted in Canada under the war crimes provisions of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that Canadian courts had jurisdiction only where the acts constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity, and that these international elements, including the requisite subjective awareness of the surrounding facts, formed integral aspects of the offences for jury determination.

The Court also held that superior orders and peace officer defences remained available subject to manifest illegality and the absence of moral choice, and upheld the admission of key hearsay evidence and the trial judge’s decision to call certain witnesses.

The Crown appeal was dismissed and the respondent’s Charter cross-appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged his conviction for spreading false news arising from publication of a pamphlet denying the Holocaust.

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that s. 181 of the Criminal Code infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter because it criminalized a broad range of expression, including false statements, and that the provision could not be justified under s. 1.

The majority found the provision lacked a pressing and substantial objective demonstrably tied to Parliament's intent and was overly broad and disproportionate in its reach.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered, and the dissent would have upheld the provision as a justified limit aimed at preventing serious harm caused by deliberate injurious lies.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act after repeated antisemitic recorded telephone messages led to a human rights cease and desist order and contempt proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), but the majority found the infringement justified under s. 1 because the objective of preventing harm caused by hate propaganda and promoting equality was pressing and substantial.

The majority also held that the tribunal order was sufficiently clear and that any apprehension of bias challenge had been waived and could not be raised collaterally in contempt proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed, with a partial dissent that would have struck down the provision while still upholding the contempt convictions.

Criminal appeal concerning the constitutionality of the hate propaganda provisions in the Criminal Code after a high school teacher was convicted for communicating anti-semitic statements to students.

The majority held that s. 319(2) infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, but that the infringement was justified under s. 1 because the provision targeted the wilful promotion of hatred, a form of expression only tenuously connected to core free-expression values, in pursuit of the pressing objective of combating the harms of hate propaganda.

The majority also held that the reverse onus in the truth defence under s. 319(3)(a) infringed s. 11(d), but was similarly justified under s. 1.

The appeal was allowed and the provisions were upheld as constitutional.