Barbara Kulaszka

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for internet defamation, awarding $42,000 in damages, and a trial judge's orders granting a permanent injunction and substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding defamatory meanings or malice.

The Court upheld the permanent injunction, noting the appellants' continued publication of the defamatory statements and refusal to remove them.

The jury's awards for aggravated and punitive damages were also upheld as reasonable.

The plaintiff sued over an online political message board post describing him as one of the Taliban’s more vocal supporters.

The court held that the words referred to the plaintiff, were published by both the original poster and the forum operators, and were prima facie defamatory in the context of an active armed conflict involving Canadian forces.

However, applying the modern fair comment framework, the court found the statement was recognizable as comment on a matter of public interest, grounded in the plaintiff’s well-known public advocacy concerning Omar Khadr and Afghanistan, and capable of being honestly expressed by a prejudiced or exaggerated commentator.

Allegations of malice and spoliation were rejected.

The action was dismissed, with each side bearing its own costs.

Following a jury verdict in a defamation action, the court addressed the final terms of the judgment and injunction.

The court confirmed that the draft judgment should include a chart specifying the total amount owing by each defendant.

It also approved an injunction restraining the defendants from publishing statements and innuendos found by the jury to be defamatory.

The court declined to alter the jury’s damages awards by reducing the amounts payable by certain defendants based on damages assessed against others.

The jury’s separate findings on damages and costs were left intact.

Following a jury verdict in an internet defamation action, the court determined costs and related remedies.

The jury had found the defendants liable for numerous defamatory postings on an online political forum and awarded aggravated and punitive damages.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on Rule 49 offers to settle and the defendants’ malicious conduct.

The court held that the plaintiff had been entirely successful and that the defendants’ conduct and refusal to accept reasonable settlement offers justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs of $85,000 were awarded and apportioned among several defendants, and a permanent injunction was granted restraining republication of the defamatory statements.

The appellants, medical residents, sued the university and several individuals in contract and tort after being dismissed or not promoted in their programs.

The motion judge struck their statement of claim as an abuse of process, finding it was an attempt to relitigate facts already determined through the university's internal academic appeal process and upheld on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the abuse of process doctrine applies to prevent relitigation of issues determined in administrative proceedings where the process directly affected the appellants' academic and professional standing.

Following a successful motion dismissing a statement of claim as an abuse of process, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $177,000.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be limited to $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis and contended that certain work related to alternate arguments on the motion should not be compensated.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate due to unfounded allegations of serious misconduct against the defendants and the finding that the proceeding constituted an abuse of process.

While accepting the accuracy of the defendants’ bill of costs and the complexity and importance of the litigation, the court found the amount claimed excessive.

Costs were therefore fixed at a fair and reasonable level significantly below the amount requested.

The appellant, a left-wing political blogger, sued the respondents for defamation after one of the respondents posted a comment on a right-wing blog describing the appellant as 'one of the Taliban's more vocal supporters'.

The action was brought under the simplified procedure.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the words were not capable of being defamatory, lacked the sting of libel in the context of a political blog, and constituted fair comment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the novel issues surrounding internet defamation in the political blogosphere required a full factual record and were not appropriate for summary judgment, particularly under the simplified procedure where cross-examination is limited.

Following a hard-fought application for judicial review, the successful respondent sought costs of $57,647.20.

The applicant argued for a range of $12,000 to $14,000.

The Divisional Court found the respondent's claimed amount excessive for a one-day application, but the applicant's suggested amount too low.

The court fixed costs at $25,000 payable by the applicant to the respondent.

The applicant, a postgraduate medical resident in Cardiac Surgery, sought judicial review of a university Senate Appeals Committee decision requiring her to enter a six-month remediation period before advancing to the next year of her program.

She argued the decision was unreasonable and that she was denied procedural fairness due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, an inability to cross-examine witnesses, and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the academic decision was reasonable and that the requirements of procedural fairness were met, noting courts should only interfere in university academic affairs in cases of manifest unfairness.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a decision by the University of Ottawa's Senate Appeals Committee dismissing him from the neurosurgery residency program for unprofessional and disruptive behaviour.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness, the decision was unreasonable, and his Charter right to freedom of expression was violated.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeals Committee's de novo hearing cured any earlier procedural defects, the decision to dismiss was reasonable given the applicant's pattern of inflammatory emails and absenteeism, and the Charter did not apply to the university's internal academic disciplinary process.

The applicant, a medical resident dismissed from the respondent's neurosurgery program, brought an application for judicial review alleging breaches of natural justice and his Charter right to freedom of expression.

He brought a motion to amend his Notice of Application to add a request for a Charter declaration and to admit fresh affidavit evidence.

The court granted the amendment, finding it was not an independent claim but a request for a declaration regarding the decision under review.

The court partially admitted the affidavit evidence, allowing portions that demonstrated a potential breach of natural justice or met the test for fresh evidence, while excluding irrelevant or repetitive paragraphs.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the administrators of a message board and several anonymous John Doe defendants.

The plaintiff successfully moved for an order requiring the administrators to disclose the e-mail and IP addresses of the anonymous defendants.

The administrators appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that where a disclosure order engages Charter values such as freedom of expression and privacy, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of defamation and the court must balance the public interest in disclosure against these Charter rights.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the statements were defamatory and that the defence of fair comment failed because the statements could not be distinguished as opinion rather than fact, and because the trial judge's finding of malice was soundly based in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges arising from the confinement, robbery, deportation and deaths of Jewish civilians in wartime Hungary, prosecuted in Canada under the war crimes provisions of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that Canadian courts had jurisdiction only where the acts constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity, and that these international elements, including the requisite subjective awareness of the surrounding facts, formed integral aspects of the offences for jury determination.

The Court also held that superior orders and peace officer defences remained available subject to manifest illegality and the absence of moral choice, and upheld the admission of key hearsay evidence and the trial judge’s decision to call certain witnesses.

The Crown appeal was dismissed and the respondent’s Charter cross-appeal was also dismissed.