McIntyre

The accused was charged with second degree murder but committed for trial on first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown filed an indictment for first degree murder.

The accused challenged the committal by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mere filing of an indictment does not bar an accused from challenging a committal; an indictment is only 'preferred' when lodged with a trial court ready to proceed.

Furthermore, a preliminary inquiry judge only has jurisdiction to commit an accused for the specific charge laid in the information or an included offence, not for any other offence disclosed by the evidence.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The respondent corporation was charged with an offence under the Canada Grain Act.

At trial, the Crown attempted to call the manager of the respondent's elevator as a witness.

The trial judge ruled the manager was not compellable, equating his testimony to compelling the corporation itself, and acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that an employee or officer of a corporation, even if considered its 'directing mind and will', is a compellable witness for the prosecution.

The privilege against self-incrimination applies to the accused corporation, not to its individual employees testifying at trial.

The appellants sold their manufacturing business to the respondents and signed a restrictive covenant prohibiting them from competing for five years after the sale or after terminating their employment, whichever was later.

Nine years later, the appellants resigned and started a competing business.

The respondents sued for breach of the covenant.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the covenant was clear, unambiguous, and enforceable.

The Court found the covenant reasonable between the parties and in the public interest, rejecting the appellants' arguments that the respondents' alleged monopolistic practices rendered the covenant void.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, where the underlying offence was indecent assault.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding drunkenness and the mental elements of constructive murder, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the jury's verdict indicated they were satisfied the appellant had the capacity to commit the indecent assault.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a business manager, sued the respondent for unpaid commissions based on an oral agreement.

The trial judge allowed the action, giving oral reasons that were not transcribed in time for the appeal.

Without the benefit of these reasons, the Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence de novo and reduced the award.

The appellant subsequently located the trial judge's oral reasons and appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the Court of Appeal's substitution of its opinion for that of the trial judge on findings of fact and credibility was an unwarranted intrusion.

The respondent, a casual employee of the Quebec government, claimed $168 for vacation, holidays, and sick leave in the Provincial Court, Small Claims Division.

The Provincial Court allowed the claim.

The appellant sought a writ of evocation, arguing the Provincial Court lacked jurisdiction because the employment relationship was statutory, not contractual, and alternatively, that the claim was a grievance subject to arbitration under a collective agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the employment relationship was contractual and the collective agreement did not apply to casual employees.

Therefore, the Provincial Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim.

The appellant's husband, a police officer, was struck and killed by a vehicle while investigating an accident on a well-lit highway.

The trial judge found the driver solely responsible and awarded $195,000 in damages under the Fatal Accidents Act.

The Court of Appeal found the officer 25% contributorily negligent and reduced the damages by applying a fixed 7% discount rate based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's findings on liability and damages.

The Court clarified that the discount rate is a factual issue to be determined on the evidence in each case, not a fixed rule of law, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose under s. 423(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, specifically to prevent members of a union from participating in lawful union activities under s. 110(1) of the Canada Labour Code.

The Provincial Court quashed the information, but the Supreme Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal ordered the matter to proceed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'unlawful purpose' in s. 423(2)(a) means contrary to law (prohibited by federal or provincial legislation).

Since preventing participation in union activities is not explicitly prohibited by legislation, the information did not disclose an offence known to law.

The appellants, husband and wife, appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that reduced their damage awards from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge awarded the husband $30,000 in general damages for physical and severe emotional injuries, and the wife $10,000 for loss of consortium under s. 35 of the Domestic Relations Act.

The Court of Appeal reduced these to $15,000 and $100 respectively.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an appellate court cannot interfere with a trial judge's damage award unless there is a palpable error or wrong principle applied.

The Court also held that s. 35 created a new statutory cause of action for loss of consortium that should be assessed realistically, not trivially.

The respondents, taxi drivers, filed an unfair labour practice complaint against the appellant taxi company.

The Board of Industrial Relations determined that an employer-employee relationship existed.

The appellant applied for certiorari to quash the decision, which was dismissed by the lower courts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the privative clause did not bar certiorari for errors of law on the face of the record.

The Court found the Board erred in law by ignoring the exhaustive statutory definitions of 'employer' and 'employee'.

Because the drivers leased their vehicles and received no wages from the company, they were not employees within the meaning of the Act.

The respondents appealed a CRTC decision approving a telephone rate increase to the Governor in Council under s. 64(1) of the National Transportation Act.

The Governor in Council denied the petitions without providing the respondents an opportunity to respond to submissions from government officials and the CRTC.

The respondents sought a declaration that the Governor in Council owed them a duty of fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Governor in Council was exercising a legislative function and was not subject to a duty of fairness or natural justice in these circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant tenant was habitually late in paying rent, issuing twelve NSF cheques over 24 months.

The landlord applied for eviction under the Conciliation Act.

Because the tenant paid the arrears before the hearing, eviction under section 25(a) for non-payment was unavailable.

The administrator and Rental Commission instead ordered eviction under section 25(b), characterizing the late payments as behaviour on the leased premises constituting a serious annoyance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by misinterpreting the statute to create a new ground for eviction not provided by law.

The appeal was allowed and the writ of evocation authorized.

The appellant was injured when his bicycle hit a pothole on a municipal road.

He sued the municipality for negligence.

The trial judge found the municipality liable for failing to maintain a constant inspection system.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Municipal Act, the municipality had the power but not the duty to maintain highways.

The frequency of road inspections was a matter of policy, and absent operational negligence in carrying out that policy, the municipality could not be held liable.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The appellant bid for a construction contract and provided a certified cheque as a performance guarantee.

The owner deposited the cheque with the respondent bank, and the funds were eventually transferred to the owner's collateral account and used to reduce its debt to the bank.

When the owner went bankrupt, the appellant sued the bank for breach of trust.

The trial judge found the bank liable as a constructive trustee, but the Court of Appeal apportioned fault equally under the Contributory Negligence Act, finding the appellant negligent for not tracing the funds sooner.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judgment.

The Court held that the bank was put upon inquiry and breached its trust, and that a cestui que trust owes no duty to its trustee to ensure the trust is observed, making contributory negligence inapplicable.

Appeal concerning Nova Scotia succession duties assessed against resident grandchildren following an estate-planning scheme using Alberta parent and subsidiary corporations to receive the residue of a Nova Scotia estate.

The majority held that the non-resident parent corporation was "beneficially entitled" to the estate property within the meaning of s. 2(5), because it had complete control over the named subsidiary beneficiary and could compel transfer of the residue.

The majority further held that the combined effect of ss. 2(5) and 8(2) imposed a valid in personam tax on resident successors and was intra vires the provincial legislature under s. 92(2).

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, holding that "beneficially entitled" carried its established equitable meaning and did not extend through the corporate structure.

The Province of Manitoba assessed Air Canada for retail sales tax on its aircraft, repair parts, and services used during overflights through Manitoba airspace and temporary stopovers, as well as on liquor served to passengers.

Air Canada successfully challenged the assessment in the Manitoba courts.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the mere entry of aircraft into the airspace over Manitoba does not give the aircraft a situs within the Province to support a tax under section 92(2) of the British North America Act.

The Court further found that the taxing statute itself did not capture overflights or temporary stopovers, as there was no bringing of property into the Province or consumption within it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(2) of the Fisheries Act after spilling 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into tidal waters.

The appellant sought an order of prohibition, arguing that s. 33(2) was ultra vires the federal Parliament as it related to general water pollution rather than fisheries, and that the information was multiplicitous.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 33(2) is intra vires as its true nature and character is the protection and preservation of fisheries, a valid exercise of federal power under s. 91(12) of the B.N.A. Act.

The Court also found the information was not multiplicitous, as the accused was not prejudiced in preparing a defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, operators of sugar refineries in eastern Canada, were charged with conspiracy to enhance the price of sugar unreasonably and to lessen competition unduly under the Combines Investigation Act.

The trial judge acquitted them, finding that while there was a tacit agreement to maintain traditional market shares, it was not intended to lessen competition unduly but rather to avoid a price war.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal on the second count.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not err in law in concluding that the Crown failed to prove an agreement to lessen competition unduly.

The Court affirmed that conscious parallelism or a tacit agreement to maintain market shares does not necessarily amount to an undue lessening of competition.

The appellant struck a fellow student with a rock after reading a letter in which she referred to him as a 'nothing'.

At trial, he advanced the defence of non-insane automatism, arguing he was in a dissociative state caused by a psychological blow.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding he was not insane and had acted in a state of automatism brought about by an external cause.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal, holding that the psychological blow was not an externally originating cause and that the dissociative state constituted a disease of the mind.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the ordinary stresses and disappointments of life do not constitute an external cause, and that the appellant's condition was a disease of the mind.