John J. L. Hunter

The Ontario Securities Commission brought a motion requesting that the adjudicator recuse herself from the merits panel due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The adjudicator had a social relationship with a key witness for the Commission, having previously worked with the witness's spouse and attended their wedding.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the capital markets community is small and such connections are common.

The adjudicator granted the motion and recused herself, finding that a reasonable person would conclude the social relationship could influence her assessment of the witness's credibility.

In an enforcement proceeding alleging false sales communications regarding ESG factors, the respondent Som Seif brought a motion for further disclosure and particulars.

The Capital Markets Tribunal dismissed the motion for disclosure, finding the requested correspondence with other fund managers and internal Commission documents irrelevant to the allegations.

The Tribunal also declined to order the Commission to produce a privilege log.

The motion for particulars was dismissed after the Commission undertook to clarify which specific statements Seif allegedly reviewed, edited, or provided quotes for, with the Tribunal finding the remaining allegations sufficiently particularized.

The applicant, a 12-year-old child, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review her emergency admission to a secure treatment program.

The respondent facility argued that the admission was justified due to the child's history of behavioural difficulties and threats of self-harm.

The Board found that the respondent failed to establish that the child had a mental disorder at the time of admission, as required by subsection 171(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The evidence provided was largely historical, hearsay, or from professionals who had not assessed the child at the time of admission.

Consequently, the Board granted the application and ordered the child's release.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the appellant incapable of making treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medications and a Community Treatment Plan.

The appellant challenged the Board's findings on three grounds: error in appreciating foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions, misapprehension of evidence, and error in finding likelihood of substantial mental deterioration without treatment.

The court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant's inability to recognize the severe psychotic symptoms of her condition prevented her from appreciating the consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence and confirmed the Board's assessment of the likelihood of deterioration based on the Mental Health Act criteria, dismissing the appeal on all grounds.

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.

The plaintiff, Shawn Panacci, brought a motion to certify a class action against Volkswagen and Audi entities concerning an alleged widespread defect in the timing chain mechanism of EA888-type engines in vehicles sold or leased in Canada between 2007 and 2012.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and waiver of tort, claiming the defect posed a risk of catastrophic engine failure and personal injury.

The court granted certification, finding that the requirements under the Class Proceedings Act were met, including identifiable class, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.

However, only three of the six proposed common issues were certified: duty of care and breach of duty of care, breach of express and implied warranties, and the availability of punitive damages.

Claims related to unjust enrichment, waiver of tort (due to lack of predicate liability finding), and aggregate damages (due to need for individualized assessments) were not certified as common issues.

The applicant was struck by a police vehicle while walking in a parking lot and sought non-earner benefits and medical benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claims, arguing the applicant's impairments stemmed from a prior 2010 motor vehicle accident and a physical assault that occurred immediately before the 2011 accident.

The arbitrator found that the applicant failed to establish that the 2011 accident caused an impairment that continuously prevented him from engaging in substantially all of his pre-accident activities.

The arbitrator noted the applicant's expert admitted his diagnosis might have changed had he known about the applicant's prior chronic pain.

The application for benefits and a special award was dismissed.

The Court considered the scope of appellate review of a commercial arbitration award under British Columbia's Arbitration Act in a forestry compensation dispute.

A majority held that courts had jurisdiction only over the legal component of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation or statutory application issues characterized as mixed questions, and that reasonableness was the applicable standard.

Applying that framework, the majority found the arbitrator's chosen valuation approach reasonable and restored key parts of the arbitral award.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs throughout.

On a statutory interpretation appeal concerning reserve land taxation, the appellant argued that a bylaw clause permitting consideration of restrictions placed on land use “by the band” excluded a lease restriction created in a Crown lease.

The Court held that the assessor could consider the golf-club use restriction when valuing the leased reserve lands for assessment purposes.

Reading the bylaw text, purpose, and legislative context together, the Court found the 1996 amendment narrowed qualifying restrictions but did not bar this restriction.

The Court also held the Crown’s historical statutory role in reserve leasing did not negate that the restriction was placed by the band in context.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court held that core search-and-seizure and record-keeping provisions in the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing scheme, as applied to lawyers and law firms, unjustifiably infringed Charter protections.

It confirmed sections 62, 63, 63.1 and 64 of the Act violated section 8 in this context, and that related regulatory obligations infringed section 7 when combined with inadequate privilege safeguards.

The appeal was allowed in part: findings against sections 5(i) and 5(j) were set aside, while the remaining constitutional relief largely stood.

The appeal addresses the governing legal test and its application to the record before the appellate court.

The Court clarifies the proper analytical framework, applies it to the disputed issues, and resolves the appeal accordingly.

The reasons emphasize principled interpretation and consistency with established jurisprudence.

The disposition determines the parties' rights on the issues raised in the appeal.

The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes.

The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability.

Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims.

The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability.

Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, which allows the government of British Columbia to sue tobacco manufacturers to recover health care costs related to tobacco exposure.

The appellants argued the Act was ultra vires due to extra-territoriality, violated judicial independence, and offended the rule of law.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Act's pith and substance is property and civil rights in the province, it does not interfere with the adjudicative role of the courts, and it does not violate the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in the care of the provincial government.

She sued the Crown for vicarious liability and breach of non-delegable duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its companion decision in K.L.B. v. British Columbia, held that the Crown was not vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents and did not owe a non-delegable duty to ensure no harm came to foster children.

The Court also held that social assistance benefits received by the respondent must be deducted from her damage award for past loss of earning capacity to avoid double recovery, and that prejudgment interest on such an award should be calculated incrementally.

The appellants suffered physical and sexual abuse while placed in two successive foster homes by the government.

They sued the government for direct negligence, vicarious liability, breach of non-delegable duty, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government was directly negligent in its placement and supervision of the children, it was not vicariously liable for the torts of the foster parents, nor did it breach a non-delegable or fiduciary duty.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal because the appellants' claims were statute-barred under the Limitation Act, as they had acquired sufficient awareness of the facts to start the limitation period running more than two years before commencing their actions.

The respondent, a former provincial cabinet minister, faced sexual harassment complaints before the British Columbia Human Rights Commission.

The proceedings were delayed for over 30 months.

The respondent sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the delay violated his section 7 Charter rights to liberty and security of the person due to the severe stigma and psychological stress he suffered.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Charter applies to the Commission, the respondent's section 7 rights were not engaged because the state did not interfere with his fundamental life choices or psychological integrity in a manner protected by section 7.

Furthermore, under administrative law principles, the delay did not compromise the fairness of the hearing and was not so inordinate as to amount to an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was lifted.

The respondent logging company obtained an interim injunction prohibiting named defendants and 'John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown' from blocking roads to its logging operations.

The appellants, environmental protesters, appealed the order, arguing that courts lack jurisdiction to grant injunctions against non-parties or the general public in private civil litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts of inherent jurisdiction have the power to make orders binding on non-parties to protect private rights from mass obstruction.

Non-parties who violate such orders with notice may be found guilty of contempt of court.