John J. L. Hunter

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the appellant incapable of making treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medications and a Community Treatment Plan.

The appellant challenged the Board's findings on three grounds: error in appreciating foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions, misapprehension of evidence, and error in finding likelihood of substantial mental deterioration without treatment.

The court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant's inability to recognize the severe psychotic symptoms of her condition prevented her from appreciating the consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence and confirmed the Board's assessment of the likelihood of deterioration based on the Mental Health Act criteria, dismissing the appeal on all grounds.

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.

The plaintiff, Shawn Panacci, brought a motion to certify a class action against Volkswagen and Audi entities concerning an alleged widespread defect in the timing chain mechanism of EA888-type engines in vehicles sold or leased in Canada between 2007 and 2012.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and waiver of tort, claiming the defect posed a risk of catastrophic engine failure and personal injury.

The court granted certification, finding that the requirements under the Class Proceedings Act were met, including identifiable class, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.

However, only three of the six proposed common issues were certified: duty of care and breach of duty of care, breach of express and implied warranties, and the availability of punitive damages.

Claims related to unjust enrichment, waiver of tort (due to lack of predicate liability finding), and aggregate damages (due to need for individualized assessments) were not certified as common issues.

The Court considered the scope of appellate review of a commercial arbitration award under British Columbia's Arbitration Act in a forestry compensation dispute.

A majority held that courts had jurisdiction only over the legal component of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation or statutory application issues characterized as mixed questions, and that reasonableness was the applicable standard.

Applying that framework, the majority found the arbitrator's chosen valuation approach reasonable and restored key parts of the arbitral award.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs throughout.

On a statutory interpretation appeal concerning reserve land taxation, the appellant argued that a bylaw clause permitting consideration of restrictions placed on land use “by the band” excluded a lease restriction created in a Crown lease.

The Court held that the assessor could consider the golf-club use restriction when valuing the leased reserve lands for assessment purposes.

Reading the bylaw text, purpose, and legislative context together, the Court found the 1996 amendment narrowed qualifying restrictions but did not bar this restriction.

The Court also held the Crown’s historical statutory role in reserve leasing did not negate that the restriction was placed by the band in context.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court held that core search-and-seizure and record-keeping provisions in the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing scheme, as applied to lawyers and law firms, unjustifiably infringed Charter protections.

It confirmed sections 62, 63, 63.1 and 64 of the Act violated section 8 in this context, and that related regulatory obligations infringed section 7 when combined with inadequate privilege safeguards.

The appeal was allowed in part: findings against sections 5(i) and 5(j) were set aside, while the remaining constitutional relief largely stood.

The appeal addresses the governing legal test and its application to the record before the appellate court.

The Court clarifies the proper analytical framework, applies it to the disputed issues, and resolves the appeal accordingly.

The reasons emphasize principled interpretation and consistency with established jurisprudence.

The disposition determines the parties' rights on the issues raised in the appeal.