Gregory J. McDade

The government of British Columbia sought the British Columbia Utilities Commission's approval of a 2007 Energy Purchase Agreement between BC Hydro and Alcan.

The respondent First Nations asserted that the agreement should be subject to consultation under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, due to historical and ongoing impacts of the dam project on the Nechako River.

The Commission found it had jurisdiction to consider consultation but concluded the agreement would not adversely affect any Aboriginal interest, thus no duty to consult arose.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the Commission's decision, holding that while the Commission had the power to assess the adequacy of consultation, its finding that the agreement caused no novel adverse impacts was reasonable.

MiningWatch Canada appealed a decision regarding the federal environmental assessment of a proposed copper and gold mine.

The responsible authorities had scoped the project to exclude the mine and mill, thereby conducting a screening rather than a comprehensive study.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the environmental assessment track must be determined by the project as proposed by the proponent, meaning a comprehensive study was required.

However, the Court limited the remedy to a declaration, declining to order the proponent to repeat the assessment process.

The respondent logging company obtained an interim injunction prohibiting named defendants and 'John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown' from blocking roads to its logging operations.

The appellants, environmental protesters, appealed the order, arguing that courts lack jurisdiction to grant injunctions against non-parties or the general public in private civil litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts of inherent jurisdiction have the power to make orders binding on non-parties to protect private rights from mass obstruction.

Non-parties who violate such orders with notice may be found guilty of contempt of court.

The appellant, a 16-year-old juvenile, was charged with a delinquency relating to an indictable offence under the Criminal Code.

He refused to consent to fingerprinting, and a police officer used reasonable force to obtain his fingerprints.

The appellant brought a civil action for assault, raising the preliminary question of whether the Identification of Criminals Act authorized the use of force in these circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a delinquency relating to an indictable offence is an indictable offence within the meaning of the Identification of Criminals Act, and therefore the use of reasonable force to fingerprint the juvenile was lawful.