Mitchell Worsoff

The Law Society alleged that the respondent paralegal engaged in professional misconduct by fabricating a client's signature on an affidavit, improperly commissioning it in her absence, and misleading the court by relying on it.

The paralegal admitted to the misconduct via an agreed statement of facts.

The Tribunal found the allegations substantiated.

Weighing mitigating factors including the paralegal's lack of discipline history, cooperation, and pro bono representation of the client against the serious nature of the integrity breach, the Tribunal ordered a three-month suspension and $4,000 in costs.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his daughter.

The complainant testified that the accused engaged in repeated sexual contact with her between 2018 and 2023, beginning when she was nine years old.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on all counts after assessing the credibility of both witnesses.

The judge rejected the accused's evidence as deliberately misleading regarding his work schedule and the timing of an apology message.

The judge accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, finding her account plausible and consistent on salient matters.

The offender was convicted of conspiring to import 300 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15 to 16 years, while the defence argued for a significantly lower sentence based on the offender's limited role and the principle of parity with co-conspirators.

The court found that the offender played a minor role in the conspiracy and noted that co-conspirators with greater involvement received or were facing sentences of 5 to 6.5 years.

Applying the principles of proportionality and parity, the court determined a fit sentence was 8 years, reduced to 7.5 years to account for strict pre-sentence bail conditions.

This criminal trial concerned charges of sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose against the defendant, the complainant's stepfather.

The case hinged on the credibility and reliability of the complainant's and the accused's evidence, as there was no independent corroboration.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, particularly between her initial police statement and later statements/trial evidence, and accepted a defence witness's evidence that the complainant had expressed a desire to fabricate allegations to remove the accused from the home.

Despite concerns about the accused's credibility due to his criminal record and poor judgment, the inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all charges.

Giedrius Kesminas was tried on two counts: conspiracy to import cocaine (Count 7) and conspiracy to utter forged documents (Count 11), stemming from "Project Southam." The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence.

Kesminas denied participation, claiming he only pretended to agree to the cocaine importation scheme.

The court applied the two-step Carter analysis for conspiracy membership, rejecting Kesminas's "pretence" defence and finding him an enthusiastic participant.

Kesminas was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt on Count 7.

However, the court reserved its decision on Count 11 due to a material discrepancy between the indictment's particularization (registering a property in Helen Lauro's name) and the evidence presented (obtaining a mortgage for Hans Lauro), citing the principle from R. v. Saunders that the offence as particularized must be proved.

The Law Society brought proceedings against the defendant for practicing law without a licence in breach of a court order.

The defendant previously consented to a contempt order and was penalized with community service and costs.

After failing to comply with the terms of the penalty order, a case conference was held.

The court gave the defendant one final opportunity to comply, setting new deadlines for obtaining approval for his community service organization and paying the balance of the costs.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion for contempt against Mr. Sutharsan for breaching a 2021 injunction that prohibited him from providing unauthorized legal services.

Mr. Sutharsan consented to the contempt order, and the matter proceeded to a penalty hearing.

The LSO sought 30 days incarceration.

The court, applying the five-factor test for civil contempt sanctions, found Mr. Sutharsan remorseful and his breaches not egregious enough to warrant incarceration.

The court imposed a penalty of 100 hours of community service and ordered Mr. Sutharsan to pay $6,000 in costs to the LSO, payable at $300 per month.

Daniel Dubajic, a first offender, was convicted on 73 counts related to possessing colossal amounts of drugs (106 kg cocaine, 5 kg fentanyl, 30 kg crystal methamphetamine, 4 kg MDMA) for trafficking and numerous firearms (57 handguns, 8 long guns, 15,000 rounds of ammunition) for transfer.

The Crown sought a 25-year sentence, while the defence proposed 15 years.

The court imposed an 18-year sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, but also considering the law of diminishing returns and the offender's rehabilitative potential as a first offender, finding his role was not at the top of the trafficking hierarchy.

After applying 3 years and 1 month of credit for pre-sentence custody (including Summers and Duncan credits), the remaining sentence to be served is 13 years and 10 months.

The accused was charged with numerous drug and firearms offences after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found large quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, crystal methamphetamine, MDMA, 57 handguns, long guns, and ammunition.

The accused admitted to possessing a small amount of cocaine but denied knowledge of the rest, claiming he rented the room where the contraband was found to an acquaintance.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unbelievable and found that the circumstantial evidence, including the immense value of the drugs, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and constructive possession of all the items.

The accused was found guilty on all 73 counts.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (s. 7 and 11(b)) due to a 23-day delay in his bail hearing.

The court declined to hear the application at this interlocutory stage, emphasizing that such Charter applications are best resolved by the trial judge on a full record, except in extraordinary circumstances not present in this case.

The court noted that a stay is a remedy of last resort and that other remedies, such as a reduction in sentence, might be available at trial.

The application was adjourned to be considered by the trial judge.

Youssef Messoudi was found guilty of importing 754 grams of methoxyacetyl fentanyl, an analogue of fentanyl with an estimated street value of $23-38 million, and occupying a vehicle with a prohibited weapon.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15-20 years, while the defence proposed 8 years.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation as paramount for fentanyl offences, acknowledging the drug's extreme danger and societal impact.

While considering the offender's youth (23 years old) and rehabilitative efforts (completing high school), the court found him to be involved beyond a simple street trafficker.

A Charter s. 10(a) breach (failure to promptly inform of arrest reason) was found but did not warrant a sentence reduction due to lack of deliberate police misconduct.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 years for importing fentanyl and 3 years concurrent for the firearms offence, with a credit of 1 year for pre-trial custody and house arrest, resulting in a total sentence of 11 years imprisonment.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to vacate a Justice of the Peace's release order for the respondent, Daniel Dubajic, and to detain him pending trial.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law and that the decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly regarding the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in assessing the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences (specifically the "use" of firearms), and the potential sentence.

The court also found the proposed release plan inadequate.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ordering Dubajic's detention on secondary and tertiary grounds, while agreeing with the Justice of the Peace's assessment on the primary ground (flight risk).

The defendant, Youssef Messoudi, brought an application to exclude evidence in a criminal prosecution for drug and firearm offences, alleging infringements of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) (right to be promptly informed of reasons for detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found a serious breach of section 10(a) because police officers initially detained and handcuffed Messoudi for 15-20 minutes without informing him of the reasons for his detention.

However, the court found no breach of section 10(b), accepting that a subsequent officer informed Messoudi of his right to counsel immediately upon taking custody, and Messoudi chose to wait to speak to his lawyer at the police station.

Applying the section 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that the police conduct, while serious, was not deliberate misconduct, and the evidence sought to be excluded (gun, controlled delivery observations) was not directly linked to the section 10(a) breach.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant, Ahmed Mohamed Marzouk, was charged with robbery contrary to s. 343 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that a robbery occurred as described by the complainant, Mr. Hinds.

The central issue was the identification of the perpetrator.

The defendant presented an alibi, claiming he was in class at York University, but failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence and was found to have lied on the witness stand.

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis and, after discrediting the defendant's testimony, found strong corroborating evidence identifying the defendant as the robber, including phone contact, meeting location near his residence, physical description, and subsequent location of the stolen vehicle.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was found highly intoxicated in the driver's seat of his vehicle at a shopping plaza.

He was arrested for impaired driving and care or control of a motor vehicle.

The Crown proved that the accused's blood alcohol concentration was between 220 and 316 mgs/100ml.

The defence raised Charter breaches regarding the adequacy of the reasons for arrest and challenged whether the accused was in care or control of the vehicle, arguing there was an alternate plan for pickup.

The court found no Charter breaches and determined the accused was in care or control of the vehicle.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the Over 80 count stayed.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an application brought by Vladimir Levine, which was dismissed.

Levine had sought a declaration that he was the sole client for an accounts assessment of Michael S. Deverett, Deverett Law Offices.

The court dismissed Levine's application and granted Deverett's request that Mikhail Titkine, a co-signatory, also be considered a client.

Deverett sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing Levine continued to make unfounded allegations of criminal conduct.

The court awarded Deverett $45,000 in all-inclusive costs, reducing the requested amount due to Levine's partial success on an earlier motion to strike.

Vladimir Levine brought an application to determine if Mikhail Titkine, a non-party to the underlying family law litigation, was also a 'client' for the purpose of assessing the respondent lawyer's accounts under section 3 of the Solicitors Act.

The court applied the broader definition of 'client' from section 15 of the Solicitors Act, which includes a person liable to pay the solicitor's bill.

Based on evidence that Titkine signed the retainer agreement, accepted financial responsibility, and made payments, the court found Titkine was indeed a client.

Levine's application for a declaration that he was the only client was dismissed, and the respondent's request that Titkine be considered a client was granted.

Following a judge-alone trial on a charge of sexual assault arising from sexual intercourse in a university residence room after a fraternity party, the court found the complainant did not consent and was in a severely intoxicated, vomiting, and intermittently unconscious state.

The court applied the Criminal Code consent provisions and rejected any notion of implied consent, finding the accused took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent and knew, or was wilfully blind to, the complainant's incapacity and non-consent.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the complainant's evidence, rejected the accused's account as fabricated and implausible, and relied in part on the physical evidence of the torn costume to confirm the complainant's version.

A finding of guilt was entered on the charge of sexual assault.

Sentencing of four offenders convicted of multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, money laundering, and committing offences for a criminal organization.

The offenders orchestrated a sophisticated, multi-million dollar fraud scheme targeting the Canada Small Business Financing Program and several major banks using sham construction companies.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from 14 months to 8 years, along with significant restitution orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and money laundering, sought to bring a second s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay the day before his scheduled sentencing hearing.

His first application had been dismissed during the trial for failure to perfect.

The court dismissed the second application, finding it was an attempt to delay sentencing, failed to comply with the Practice Direction requiring such applications to be brought 60 days before trial, and was not perfected with the necessary transcripts.