Alvin Martin Meisels

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $25,000 for fraudulent misrepresentation in a share purchase agreement.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding fraudulent misrepresentation and that the claim was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the appellant's failure to disclose material facts about the company's financial status and inability to issue free-trading shares.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding on the date of discoverability for limitation purposes.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to prevent the administrative dismissal of their defamation action for delay.

The defendants opposed the continuation, arguing actual prejudice and seeking dismissal.

The court found the plaintiffs provided a passable explanation for the delay, largely due to solicitor misapprehension regarding file carriage, and that the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted, the action was permitted to continue, and a timetable was set for remaining steps.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims in their entirety, arguing there were no genuine issues for trial.

The plaintiffs opposed, asserting that significant credibility issues and allegations of conspiracy, breach of confidentiality agreements, and fiduciary duties required a full trial.

The court found numerous and significant credibility issues, particularly concerning the misappropriation of business opportunities (Kubota, Hyundai clients) and the circumstances surrounding the hiring of former employees by a competitor.

Given the conflicting evidence and the nature of conspiracy allegations, the court determined that a fair and just determination could not be made on a summary judgment motion.

The motion was dismissed, and the action was ordered to proceed to discoveries and trial.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an application brought by Vladimir Levine, which was dismissed.

Levine had sought a declaration that he was the sole client for an accounts assessment of Michael S. Deverett, Deverett Law Offices.

The court dismissed Levine's application and granted Deverett's request that Mikhail Titkine, a co-signatory, also be considered a client.

Deverett sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing Levine continued to make unfounded allegations of criminal conduct.

The court awarded Deverett $45,000 in all-inclusive costs, reducing the requested amount due to Levine's partial success on an earlier motion to strike.

Vladimir Levine brought an application to determine if Mikhail Titkine, a non-party to the underlying family law litigation, was also a 'client' for the purpose of assessing the respondent lawyer's accounts under section 3 of the Solicitors Act.

The court applied the broader definition of 'client' from section 15 of the Solicitors Act, which includes a person liable to pay the solicitor's bill.

Based on evidence that Titkine signed the retainer agreement, accepted financial responsibility, and made payments, the court found Titkine was indeed a client.

Levine's application for a declaration that he was the only client was dismissed, and the respondent's request that Titkine be considered a client was granted.

The applicant, a minority shareholder and employee, alleged constructive dismissal due to reduced compensation (loss of personal expense reimbursement via corporate cards) and corporate oppression under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, seeking payment for lost benefits and an order for Metcom to purchase his shares.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the card privileges were an informal shareholder arrangement personal to the previous majority shareholder and the applicant, not an employee compensation entitlement, and were subject to the corporation's financial capacity.

Furthermore, the applicant's expectation for share repurchase lacked a legal basis, as there was no shareholders' agreement or other binding arrangement.

The applicant property owner sought an order under s. 61(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act to modify restrictive covenants registered against its commercial property for the benefit of the adjoining Home Depot lands.

The restrictions prohibited the sale of various home improvement products to prevent competition with Home Depot, subject to an 'incidental sale' exception.

The applicant argued the restrictions were spent because a previously planned 'big box' development did not proceed, and sought to expand the 'incidental sale' square footage allowance to facilitate its current commercial condominium development.

The court dismissed the application, holding that under the strict test in *Re Lime*, s. 61(1) only permits modification or discharge where a restriction is spent or of no practical value, and cannot be used to reallocate rights between parties based on a balance of convenience or economic efficiency.

The appellants, vendors of a property, appealed a decision granting partial summary judgment and specific performance to the respondent purchasers.

The transaction failed to close on the extended closing date because the appellants had not provided required documents.

The motion judge found that the 'time is of the essence' clause had been waived and that the appellants were not ready to close.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's factual findings or her conclusion that there were no genuine issues requiring a trial, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Hryniak supported the expeditious resolution.

The plaintiffs brought an action for breach of contract regarding a Consulting Services Agreement (CSA) and a Transitional Consultant Fee Agreement (TCFA).

The defendants argued the CSA should be set aside due to fraudulent misrepresentation by the plaintiff consultant regarding a competing offer.

The court found that the plaintiff knowingly made a false representation that induced the defendants to enter the CSA, and therefore rescinded the CSA.

However, the court found the TCFA remained valid and enforceable, awarding the plaintiffs $150,000 under that agreement.

The defendants' counterclaim for damages was dismissed.

Costs decision following motions for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and for partial summary judgment in a real estate dispute.

The plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis based on an earlier offer to settle.

The court held the plaintiffs were entitled to costs for both motions due to their success but declined to award substantial indemnity costs for the CPL motion because the offer to settle was made after that motion was determined.

However, substantial indemnity costs were awarded for the partial summary judgment motion because the plaintiffs had made a reasonable settlement offer that, if accepted, would have resolved the litigation.

The court fixed costs at $55,000 plus HST and disbursements.

In a defamation action arising from letters published in a newspaper criticizing veterinary services, the defendants brought a motion seeking production of additional documents before examinations for discovery.

The court considered the relevance and proportionality of the requested records under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It ordered production of appointment records for the key date, client files relating to 33 clients allegedly lost due to the publication, and financial and client records underlying the plaintiffs’ damages expert report.

Requests for predecessor financial records and a mailing list were denied as premature or irrelevant.

The court rejected claims of confidentiality over client records due to lack of evidence establishing privilege and ordered the plaintiffs to serve a fresh affidavit of documents and proceed under a litigation timetable.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property.

The transaction failed to close on the agreed-upon date of August 3, 2012.

The court found that the parties had waived the 'time of the essence' provision by their conduct.

Furthermore, the defendants were not ready, willing, and able to close on that date and therefore could not rely on the provision to terminate the agreement.

The court granted partial summary judgment and ordered specific performance.

The appellant purchased a coin car wash business from the respondent and gave a vendor take back mortgage.

The appellant later sued for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding business revenues and breach of warranty regarding a pylon sign.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and allowing the respondent's counterclaim on the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial given the entire agreement clause and the lack of evidence supporting the claims.