Bruce G. McEachern

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to prevent the administrative dismissal of their defamation action for delay.

The defendants opposed the continuation, arguing actual prejudice and seeking dismissal.

The court found the plaintiffs provided a passable explanation for the delay, largely due to solicitor misapprehension regarding file carriage, and that the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted, the action was permitted to continue, and a timetable was set for remaining steps.

The parties sought a consent order regarding funds paid into court to vacate a construction lien claim.

The Divisional Court granted the order, directing that $17,056.00 be paid out to the respondent in full satisfaction of the Master's Report and all subsequent proceedings, with the balance and accrued interest paid to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Motions Judge that refused to confirm a Master's report regarding a construction contract dispute.

The Master had found an oral contract existed for construction costs but rejected the respondent's claim for a 20% management fee.

The Motions Judge set aside the report, finding no contract existed, and awarded the respondent the management fee on a quantum meruit basis.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Motions Judge erred in law by treating the motion as a de novo hearing and failing to defer to the Master's factual findings.

The Master's report was confirmed.

The defendant moved for an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from a decision setting aside a Master's report in a construction lien action.

The defendant missed the appeal deadline due to his former lawyer's inadvertent error regarding the applicable deadline under the Construction Lien Act.

The court applied the test for extending time and found that the defendant had formed an intention to appeal, the delay was short and explained, there was no prejudice to the plaintiff, and the appeal raised a real issue regarding the standard of review applied by the lower court.

The motion was allowed.

The plaintiff sued for unpaid costs and a management fee related to a home renovation project.

The Master found a cost-plus contract existed but denied the management fee, awarding the plaintiff $31,556.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 54.09 opposing the confirmation of the Master's report.

The Superior Court found the Master made a palpable and overriding error in concluding a contract existed, as there was no meeting of the minds on essential terms.

The court set aside the Master's report and awarded the plaintiff $106,060.19 on a quantum meruit basis for services rendered.

The court issued an endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion on a mortgage guarantee.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion and the plaintiff's subsequent request for a mini-trial or expedited trial.

The court reserved the costs of the summary judgment motion to the trial judge, finding it more just given that the claims and defences remained live and the work done would reduce trial costs.

The plaintiff's request for a mini-trial was denied, as it would not allow for proper development of defences due to prior evidentiary deficiencies and lack of discovery.

The court reiterated the need for a case conference to address the action's progress, particularly in light of a key individual's failing health, and to consider an expedited trial.

The plaintiff, 2383431 Ontario Inc., sought summary judgment against individual defendants who guaranteed a mortgage for Rose of Sharon (Ontario) Retirement Community.

The defendants argued the guarantee was limited to interest only and raised equitable defences related to construction defects and the relationship between the original mortgagee (IWOK) and the builder (Unimac).

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the complex factual matrix, including the disputed scope of the guarantee and the relationships between the parties, presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

The judge emphasized that the record did not allow for confident findings of fact or a proportionate resolution of the dispute.

The appellants appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The action, arising from a construction contract dispute, was dismissed after the appellants failed to set it down for trial by the court-ordered deadline.

The Divisional Court found no error in the Master's application of the Reid test, noting the appellants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and bore the primary responsibility to move the litigation forward.

The appeal on the merits was dismissed, but leave to appeal costs was granted and the costs awarded below were reduced to ensure proportionality.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their defamation claims for failure to comply with the notice provision in s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellants had sent a notice to the respondent newspaper regarding articles that alleged the appellants fabricated criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider the notice in the context of all surrounding circumstances.

The Court held that the notice sufficiently conveyed the essence of the matter complained of, allowing the respondents to take appropriate steps to mitigate damages.

A commercial tenant sought relief from forfeiture after failing to take possession and pay rent under a replacement lease following a court‑ordered surrender of its prior premises.

The landlord cross‑moved to vary an earlier order regarding payment of a lease inducement that had been withheld after the tenant vacated the premises leaving substantial damage and removing fixtures.

Applying s. 20(1) of the Commercial Tenancies Act and equitable principles governing relief from forfeiture, the court considered the tenant’s conduct, the gravity of the breaches, and whether the landlord could be compensated in money.

Although the tenant’s conduct contributed to the dispute, the court held the landlord had no right to withhold inducement funds as security for potential damages.

Relief from forfeiture was granted on conditions, including payment of utility arrears and application of funds held in trust toward rent and renovations at the replacement premises.

Following a motion in which the plaintiffs obtained an injunction but the defendants succeeded in securing an order requiring payment of $112,500 related to lease arrangements, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $48,000.

While the court found the bill of costs reasonable, it held that the defendants achieved partial success on the motion and therefore reduced the plaintiffs’ recoverable fees and corresponding HST by half while allowing full recovery of disbursements.

The court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $26,897.51 in costs, subject to set-off depending on whether the previously ordered $112,500 payment had already been made.

The tenant sought an interlocutory injunction restoring possession of leased premises after the landlord locked it out pursuant to a surrender of lease agreement tied to a relocation to replacement premises.

The tenant argued the agreements should be rescinded due to mutual mistake regarding zoning and building code requirements for operating a hot yoga studio.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald, the court held the tenant failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm.

The zoning and regulatory requirements were readily ascertainable and did not constitute a fundamental mistake undermining the agreements, and any losses were compensable in damages.

The court therefore refused the injunction, ordered the tenant to vacate the original premises, and required the landlord to pay the remaining inducement payment while permitting the tenant to occupy the replacement premises under the replacement lease.

The appellant, an immigration consultant, sued a Korean-language newspaper and its reporter for libel over an article concerning a scheme that left South Korean truck drivers stranded in Canada.

At trial, the jury found that the article did not defame the appellant.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was perverse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury acting judicially could have reached it, as it was open to the jury to conclude that the ordinary reader would not understand the article to discredit the appellant.