James F. Diamond

The appellants appealed the judgment of the application judge, arguing he failed to invalidate actions taken at a national convention in December 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly treated the issue as collateral because it was not specifically addressed in argument.

Furthermore, a prior unappealed order had specifically permitted the convention and elections to proceed.

The appellants' remedy was to appeal the refusal of the injunction or put the issue squarely before the application judge.

The appellant, a resident of the United States, appealed the dismissal of her motion to dismiss or stay an action on a debt for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent, an Ontario resident, sued the appellant for repayment of a loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contract was made in Ontario when the respondent received telephone confirmation of the acceptance of her offer to lend funds.

This established a presumptive connecting factor for jurisdiction simpliciter under the Van Breda framework, which the appellant failed to rebut.

Following an application and counter‑application relating to an agreement of purchase and sale, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis exceeding $45,000.

The court found the successful party had prevailed entirely, including obtaining an order that the deposit be paid and establishing liability for breach of contract.

However, the issues were primarily contractual interpretation and the facts were largely non‑controversial.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principle from Boucher v. Public Accountants Council, the court declined substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis against two opposing parties jointly and severally.

Following a trial in a construction lien matter, the court determined the issues of costs and the disposition of cash security posted to vacate the liens.

The court declined to award costs to either party due to divided success and the conduct of the parties, including the plaintiff's deliberate preservation of expired lien rights and exaggerated claims.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's request to have the cash security paid into court as a 'specific fund' under Rule 45.02, finding no evidence that the balance of convenience favoured the order.

The cash security was ordered returned to the defendant MJR.

During a family law proceeding, a non-party corporation sought clarification regarding whether earlier disclosure and examination orders were stayed pending a forthcoming motion to set them aside.

The court considered whether it retained jurisdiction to grant or clarify a stay despite an appeal having been initiated, examining conflicting authorities interpreting Rule 63.02.

Adopting the view that the amended rule grants concurrent jurisdiction to both the trial court and the appeal court to grant a stay, the court held it retained jurisdiction.

Applying a balance of convenience analysis, the court found that requiring the non-party to comply with onerous disclosure obligations before the motion was determined would cause disproportionate prejudice.

The court ordered a stay of the prior orders until the motion to set them aside or change them is decided.

Two competing applications concerned governance of a national non‑profit organization and ownership of real property administered by one of its local branches.

The court considered whether a trust agreement purporting to grant beneficial ownership of property to the branch was valid and whether the organization’s executive board lawfully removed the branch president and dissolved the branch.

Interpreting the organization’s constitution, the court held that branches could not own property and that all real property was owned beneficially and legally by the national organization.

The purported trust agreement was therefore invalid.

However, the executive board’s decisions removing the branch president and dissolving the branch were quashed for breach of natural justice because adequate notice and opportunity to respond were not provided.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring moneys to be paid into court in the context of matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the appellant's interest in the funds.

The appellant was granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Ontario corporations sought to discharge notices of unsecured interests registered on title to their Toronto properties by an individual who was engaged in family law litigation in California against the corporations’ owner.

The respondent sought a stay of the application, arguing forum non conveniens and requesting that the Ontario court decline jurisdiction in favour of the California proceedings.

The court held that by filing a Notice of Appearance the respondent had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court, rendering forum non conveniens inapplicable.

The respondent had not obtained recognition or enforcement of any foreign order and the corporate applicants were not parties to the foreign litigation.

The court dismissed the motion to stay and granted the application discharging the notices from title.

Following the dismissal of a motion by the defendants to dissolve a Mareva injunction, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $22,170.43 inclusive of disbursements and HST, while the defendants argued the amount should be reduced to $15,000.

The court rejected the defendants’ criticisms of the time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel, noting the absence of comparative information about defence counsel hours and characterizing the challenge as unsupported.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that a costs award of $22,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST was appropriate.

The moving defendants were ordered to pay the amount within 30 days, failing which the receiver was authorized to pay the award and charge it to the receiver accounts.

The defendants moved to set aside earlier ex parte orders granting a Mareva injunction and appointing a receiver over corporate assets allegedly used to shield property from enforcement of a substantial fraud judgment.

They argued that changed circumstances following a partial appellate reduction of the judgment, the alleged inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ undertaking as to damages, delay in prosecuting the action, and the balance of convenience justified dissolving the orders.

The court held that although the Court of Appeal reduced and modified aspects of the original fraud judgment, the defendant remained liable for over $12 million and the underlying factual basis for asset preservation had not materially changed.

The court also rejected arguments concerning the undertaking as to damages and delay, noting the extensive appellate proceedings that reasonably delayed progress.

The Mareva injunction and receivership orders therefore remained justified to preserve assets pending trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a joint and several continuing guarantee securing demand promissory notes.

The defendant argued the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that liability should be limited to half the indebtedness because there were two guarantors.

The court held that the limitation period for enforcing a continuing guarantee begins only after a clear and formal demand on the guarantor, which occurred in 2010, making the action timely.

The court further held that a joint and several guarantee permits recovery of the entire indebtedness from any guarantor.

Summary judgment was granted for the full amount of the debt with interest and costs.

The respondent settled a third-party claim of $2.25 million for $100,000 using a Rule 49 offer and sought to enforce indemnity agreements against the appellants.

The application judge allowed the enforcement.

On appeal, the appellants argued the agreements lacked consideration and the settlement was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unfair to allow the appellants to raise lack of consideration at the last minute after previously conceding the agreements' validity.

The Court also upheld the application judge's finding that the settlement was reasonable given the litigation risks and potential costs.

The applicant condominium corporation appealed a Tarion Warranty Corporation decision disallowing claims regarding the construction of second-floor decks.

The builder had unilaterally changed the deck design from an open wood deck to a membrane-covered deck without obtaining a revised building permit.

The Tribunal found that the as-built decks were not of equal or better quality than the original design and suffered from numerous defects, including building code violations, improper moisture content, rusting steel, and a leaking membrane.

The Tribunal ordered the builder to perform extensive warranty repairs and provide the required warranties to the condominium board.

The moving parties sought to review and set aside an order refusing to grant a stay of proceedings of a Court of Appeal judgment pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The moving parties sought the stay to prevent the responding parties from moving to alter or discharge a receivership order in a separate Superior Court proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the request did not relate to a proceeding with respect to the judgment from which leave to appeal was being sought, as the receivership order was made in a distinct proceeding.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

A lawyer sought enforcement of an indemnity agreement executed by former clients in relation to claims arising from the release of disputed trust funds.

After a third-party action was commenced against the lawyer, his professional insurer settled the claim for $100,000 and sought reimbursement under the indemnity agreement.

The respondents argued the settlement was improvident and unreasonable.

The court held that the settlement was reasonable in the circumstances, particularly given the uncertainty of a pending Rule 21 motion and the risks of continued litigation involving a multi‑million‑dollar claim.

The respondents were found jointly and severally liable to reimburse the amounts paid under the indemnity agreement.

The moving parties (respondents on appeal) brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from an order dismissing their motion to strike a statement of claim.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that because the motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion to strike the entire action for lack of jurisdiction, the order finally determined a substantive right and was therefore a final order.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for over $20 million in damages for improperly placing a paving company, Osler, into bankruptcy as part of a fraudulent scheme to deprive the respondents (the Alfano family trusts) of their 87 percent equity interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of liability against Mr. Piersanti, agreeing that he orchestrated a fraudulent scheme, including concocting a fake shareholders' agreement and assigning the company into bankruptcy.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the appellants' expert witness for lacking independence and acting as an advocate.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the liability finding against Ms. Piersanti, reducing the compensatory damages to $14,391,807 based on adjustments conceded by the respondents' expert at trial, and setting aside orders requiring a related company to pay $2.5 million into court and declaring an interest in certain properties.

The appellant, an immigration consultant, sued a Korean-language newspaper and its reporter for libel over an article concerning a scheme that left South Korean truck drivers stranded in Canada.

At trial, the jury found that the article did not defame the appellant.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was perverse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury acting judicially could have reached it, as it was open to the jury to conclude that the ordinary reader would not understand the article to discredit the appellant.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

At the hearing, the Court of Appeal refused to allow the appellants' agent to make representations because a previous panel had already barred him from doing so and he was a witness in the proceeding.

After reviewing the factum of the appellants' former counsel and the application judge's reasons, the Court found no merit to the appeal and dismissed it with costs.