Vincent Ross Ignatius Morrison

The applicant sought an order declaring a holograph codicil to be a valid testamentary document.

The deceased had written the codicil entirely in her own hand and wrote her name in the attestation clause, but left blanks for the date and the executor's name.

The court found that while the document was wholly handwritten, the deceased did not intend her handwritten name in the attestation clause to serve as her signature to give legal effect to the document.

The application was dismissed, and the codicil was not admitted to probate.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which upheld a Hearing Panel's decision regarding the use of a prior civil judgment in disciplinary proceedings against him.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review to the merits and a correctness standard to the issue of abuse of process.

Finding no error in the Hearing Panel's reasons, the court dismissed the appeal and awarded agreed costs of $4,000 to the respondent.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court from an order of the Law Society's Appeal Division.

The Appeal Division had quashed his appeal of a Hearing Division Tribunal order admitting findings of fact from a civil trial into his conduct proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Appeal Division's order was not a final decision under s. 49.38 of the Law Society Act, as there had been no final determination of professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming.

The applicant, a registered representative, sought a review of an IIROC decision finding he facilitated off-book share purchases for two clients without his firm's knowledge and approval.

The central issue was whether the purchasers were 'clients' at the time of the transactions.

The Commission applied a contextual approach, finding that the applicant gave investment advice, directed the transaction through his firm, and the purchasers reasonably believed they were clients.

The Commission concluded the IIROC panel correctly found a client relationship existed and dismissed the application for review.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against a Texas lawyer and an Ontario lawyer for conduct related to Texas litigation and subsequent Ontario enforcement proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the claims of conspiracy, intentional infliction of harm, and interference with contractual relations were misconceived and disclosed no cause of action.

The court also found no merit in the appellant's argument that the motion judge should have recused himself for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant bean sprout producer sued a public health inspector for negligence and defamation following a salmonella outbreak investigation that led to a product recall.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the inspector was protected by statutory immunity under s. 95(1) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act and there was no evidence of bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the appellant failed to provide any evidence of bad faith, recklessness, or gross negligence to displace the statutory immunity.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action alleging undue influence and coercion in the transfer of an investment portfolio and real property.

The defendants also sought summary judgment on their counterclaim for defamation.

The court found that there were serious issues of credibility and conflicting evidence that could not be resolved on the documentary record.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04, concluding that a full trial was necessary to assess witness demeanour and the human dynamics involved.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding parties.

A real estate brokerage sought commission after the seller refused to complete a residential sale despite entering an agreement of purchase and sale.

The seller argued the brokerage was not entitled to commission because its agent failed to disclose an existing buyer agency relationship with the purchasers before presenting the offer, contrary to the listing agreement and fiduciary duties.

The court held that the agent failed to make the required written disclosure of the dual agency relationship prior to presenting the offer.

This non‑disclosure constituted a material breach of the listing agreement and the agent’s fiduciary obligations.

As a result, the brokerage was disentitled from recovering commission under the agreement.

The moving parties sought to quash the opposing parties’ attempt to revive and schedule a previously raised motion concerning an alleged breach of a Mareva injunction.

The earlier trial reasons and subsequent appellate decision left unresolved whether the injunction had been breached.

The court found that the trial judge had deferred the issue and that a later email from the trial judge declining to amend the judgment did not constitute a formal endorsement or order under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the absence of a final adjudication and the lack of reasons, the issue remained open.

The court exercised its discretion to permit the matter to proceed so the alleged breach of the Mareva injunction could be determined.

Following the dismissal of a motion by the defendants to dissolve a Mareva injunction, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $22,170.43 inclusive of disbursements and HST, while the defendants argued the amount should be reduced to $15,000.

The court rejected the defendants’ criticisms of the time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel, noting the absence of comparative information about defence counsel hours and characterizing the challenge as unsupported.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that a costs award of $22,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST was appropriate.

The moving defendants were ordered to pay the amount within 30 days, failing which the receiver was authorized to pay the award and charge it to the receiver accounts.

The defendants moved to set aside earlier ex parte orders granting a Mareva injunction and appointing a receiver over corporate assets allegedly used to shield property from enforcement of a substantial fraud judgment.

They argued that changed circumstances following a partial appellate reduction of the judgment, the alleged inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ undertaking as to damages, delay in prosecuting the action, and the balance of convenience justified dissolving the orders.

The court held that although the Court of Appeal reduced and modified aspects of the original fraud judgment, the defendant remained liable for over $12 million and the underlying factual basis for asset preservation had not materially changed.

The court also rejected arguments concerning the undertaking as to damages and delay, noting the extensive appellate proceedings that reasonably delayed progress.

The Mareva injunction and receivership orders therefore remained justified to preserve assets pending trial.

The tenant of a commercial lease remained in the premises after the expiration of the term, relying on an overholding clause that stated the tenancy would become month-to-month if the tenant continued to occupy without further written agreement.

The landlord, who had secured a new tenant and demanded vacant possession, locked the tenant out.

The application judge found the tenant was validly overholding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the landlord's appeal, holding that an overholding clause requires the landlord's consent (usually evidenced by acceptance of rent) to create a month-to-month tenancy, and does not grant the tenant a unilateral right to remain.

The moving parties sought to review and set aside an order refusing to grant a stay of proceedings of a Court of Appeal judgment pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The moving parties sought the stay to prevent the responding parties from moving to alter or discharge a receivership order in a separate Superior Court proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the request did not relate to a proceeding with respect to the judgment from which leave to appeal was being sought, as the receivership order was made in a distinct proceeding.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

The moving parties (respondents on appeal) brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from an order dismissing their motion to strike a statement of claim.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that because the motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion to strike the entire action for lack of jurisdiction, the order finally determined a substantive right and was therefore a final order.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for over $20 million in damages for improperly placing a paving company, Osler, into bankruptcy as part of a fraudulent scheme to deprive the respondents (the Alfano family trusts) of their 87 percent equity interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of liability against Mr. Piersanti, agreeing that he orchestrated a fraudulent scheme, including concocting a fake shareholders' agreement and assigning the company into bankruptcy.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the appellants' expert witness for lacking independence and acting as an advocate.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the liability finding against Ms. Piersanti, reducing the compensatory damages to $14,391,807 based on adjustments conceded by the respondents' expert at trial, and setting aside orders requiring a related company to pay $2.5 million into court and declaring an interest in certain properties.

Following release of reasons in a prior motion, the court invited submissions on costs.

The plaintiff and defendants consented that the costs of the motion would be assessed by the trial judge in the cause rather than determined immediately.

Two non-parties involved in the motion waived any entitlement to costs.

The court ordered that no costs were payable to those non-parties.

The defendants sought relief from a non-disclosure agreement and production of documents and financial statements to support a pleaded defence in a debt action.

The responding party and non-parties resisted production on relevance grounds and requested confidentiality protection if disclosure were ordered.

The court held the pleaded defence raised issues making the requested materials relevant and ordered production.

Applying the Sierra Club framework, the court granted a sealing order over the NDA documents and financial statements, limited to preserve openness and subject to reconsideration by the trial judge.

The appellants, an architect and his firm, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario Association of Architects finding them guilty of professional misconduct.

The misconduct involved affixing a seal to a design not prepared under the architect's personal supervision and knowingly misrepresenting to a building inspector that construction complied with the Building Code despite the presence of non-compliant French doors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's jurisdiction, its interpretation of the regulations, and its conclusion that peer evidence was not required to find the conduct dishonourable.

The penalty of a four-month suspension and costs was also upheld.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding no negligence by the respondent radiologist and ultrasound technician regarding a fetal ultrasound that failed to detect a congenital abnormality.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by reserving on a motion to strike the jury, failing to instruct the jury on the 'wrongful life' claim, and excluding OHIP billing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to reserve on the jury motion, holding that the jury's finding of no negligence rendered the legal distinctions between wrongful birth and wrongful life moot, and agreeing that the OHIP billing evidence was irrelevant.