Vincent Ross Ignatius Morrison

The appellants appealed a decision denying them defence cost coverage under a Professional Liability Insurance Policy provided by LawPro.

The motion judge found that the appellant acted as an intermediary between the parties in arranging mortgage transactions, triggering the mortgage broker exclusion.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the appellant's actions as a middleman in arranging the mortgages meant the claim fell within the exclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The testator left a specific bequest of a Florida property to her sister.

Prior to her death, while she was incapable of managing property, her attorneys under a continuing power of attorney sold the property, which was held by a corporation she wholly owned.

The residuary beneficiaries argued the gift adeemed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the anti-ademption provision in s. 36(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 applied, preserving the gift for the sister's estate.

The Court also affirmed the finding of incapacity and awarded costs against the unsuccessful appellants, departing from the traditional rule that estate litigation costs are paid from the estate.

The appellants appealed an order striking their pleading against a law firm for failing to disclose the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's determination that the pleading lacked the necessary elements of an intention to injure the appellants and the use of unlawful means.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, and in view of the disposition of related appeals, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in accordance with the consent terms set out in the filed draft order, without expressing any view on the correctness of the judgment appealed from.

The respondents, having been largely successful on the main appeals concerning the interpretation of seizure and detention remedies under the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act and the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act, sought costs totaling over $631,000.

The court declined to award costs to any party.

The court reasoned that the proceedings raised novel issues of statutory interpretation that engaged the public interest, the respondents were not completely successful as their cross-appeals were dismissed, and the appellant airport authorities acted reasonably in bringing the appeals given the lack of established jurisprudential authority.

The parties reached a settlement on the appeal from the judgments of Justice Susan E. Greer.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the $1.5 million held in trust pursuant to a prior order be transferred forthwith to Goldman Sloan in trust pending further order, and that necessary consents be filed to give effect to the Minutes of Settlement.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a search warrant and declare s. 487 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional regarding law office searches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 487 is constitutional in respect of law offices provided the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lavallee are followed.

The court also found no evidentiary basis to support the appellant's alternative argument that the Lavallee principles were not complied with in this case.

On a criminal appeal concerning a search warrant executed in connection with a law office, the appellant challenged the warrant on solicitor-client confidentiality grounds.

The court held that although the issuing justice had turned his mind to whether the items to be seized were privileged, he failed to attach terms of execution designed to protect the confidentiality of the lawyer's clients as much as possible.

Applying the framework governing law office search warrants after the invalidation of s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code, the court quashed the warrant.

The Crown was nevertheless permitted to retain the sealed documents for 20 days to seek a new warrant.