Ira Edward Book

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to serve a supplementary affidavit of documents and to disclose correspondence with Weichart Workforce Mobility Canada ULC and Ford Motor Company, relating to the sale of the property and relocation benefits.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to serve a supplementary affidavit and to make best efforts to disclose the requested records, finding them relevant to damages and mitigation.

The court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action for non-disclosure, finding such a sanction disproportionate.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, fixed at $9,500, to be paid at the conclusion of the proceeding.

The defendants, Darren Hendren and Delaxan Ithayaneesan, brought a motion to vary a Mareva injunction to access frozen proprietary assets for living expenses and legal fees, citing reduced income due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants failed to provide frank disclosure of their assets, income, and expenses, and did not demonstrate that they had no other available assets.

The court also found that a balancing of interests favored the plaintiff, given the strong prima facie case of wrongdoing and the risk of asset dissipation.

The plaintiff sought costs following the dismissal of the defendant's motion.

The plaintiff claimed $13,795.55 on a full indemnity basis or $9,456.35 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant argued the costs were excessive and should be reserved in the cause.

The court found the motion was unnecessary and awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $9,000 plus HST.

The applicant, Lilia Chvartsman, brought a motion seeking the release of funds held in trust from the sale of a condominium.

These funds were the subject of ongoing litigation between the applicant and the respondent, Roman Chernyak, concerning the beneficial ownership of the property.

The respondent opposed the release, arguing that entitlement had not yet been determined.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the funds, being the very subject of the dispute, could not be released until the question of entitlement was resolved.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer undertakings given during examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking production of the police investigation file related to an arson charge against her that was later withdrawn.

The court ordered the defendant to produce the police file and its investigator's file, as they were relevant to the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to answer undertakings regarding the sale price of her home and the name of a doctor who treated her for a brain injury, but found other requested information irrelevant.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant sought relief from a forfeiture order under s. 20(4) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in relation to residential property found to have been used as offence-related property in a marijuana trafficking investigation.

The court held that the applicable standard of proof was the civil balance of probabilities and applied the statutory criteria requiring a true and valid interest, apparent innocence of complicity, and proof of all reasonable care.

The court found the applicant had not established a true and valid interest because the evidence overwhelmingly supported nominee ownership for her father, and her credibility was significantly undermined by false mortgage and tax-related representations.

Although the court was not prepared to find likely complicity on the record, it concluded the applicant exercised no reasonable care in screening or supervising tenants.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

They argued the motion judge failed to properly apply the summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, as the judge had properly identified genuine issues of credibility regarding alleged undue influence and elder abuse, and correctly concluded that fact-finding powers could not resolve the dispute fairly.

The court also found the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general public importance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action alleging undue influence and coercion in the transfer of an investment portfolio and real property.

The defendants also sought summary judgment on their counterclaim for defamation.

The court found that there were serious issues of credibility and conflicting evidence that could not be resolved on the documentary record.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04, concluding that a full trial was necessary to assess witness demeanour and the human dynamics involved.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding parties.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to add a claim for malicious prosecution after related criminal charges had been withdrawn.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing the limitation period had expired and the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action.

The court held that the amendment did not introduce a new cause of action because the material facts supporting malicious prosecution had already been pleaded, except for the favourable termination of the criminal proceedings.

The amendment merely added the subsequently occurring fact of withdrawal of the charges and an alternative legal claim arising from the same factual matrix.

Leave to amend was granted and the plaintiff was awarded nominal costs.

The applicant sought directions in advance of a hearing under s. 20(4) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for relief from forfeiture of residential property previously ordered forfeited in related criminal proceedings.

The applicant requested that the upcoming hearing be treated as de novo and that the record be purged of references to the earlier Ontario Court of Justice decision ordering forfeiture.

The court held that the s. 20 application was a fresh proceeding in which the judge would not be bound by earlier findings, particularly given the Crown’s concession not to rely on estoppel or res judicata.

However, the earlier ruling remained part of the court record and there was no legal basis to expunge it.

Allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias arising from unrelated comments by the earlier judge in a different case were rejected.

Following the discontinuance of a civil action seeking enforcement of alleged trust agreements relating to several properties, the defendant brought a motion for costs under Rule 23.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs and requested that the plaintiff’s solicitor be personally liable for those costs under Rule 57.07.

The court held that although the action met the minimal threshold of a bona fide claim, the plaintiff’s refusal to provide particulars upon demand unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding.

The court declined to impose costs personally against counsel and rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendant against the plaintiff for the unnecessary motion for particulars.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add a new cause of action.

The defendant argued the new claim was time-barred and relied on Rule 62.02(4), asserting the motion judge's decision conflicted with other cases on discoverability under the Limitations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that a failure to apply established principles does not constitute a conflicting decision requiring resolution under the Rule.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application from a forfeiture order.

The Crown conceded that the application judge erred in failing to address the matter on the merits and agreed not to argue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice to be dealt with on the merits.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing an application under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The parties agreed that the matter needed to be remitted to a trial judge for a proper hearing under section 20(4) of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his occupiers' liability action arising from injuries sustained when he rode his bicycle into ropes strung across a driveway.

He argued that the jury charge was fatally defective because it misstated the relevance of unusual use of the premises and effectively removed from the jury the role of a neighbouring for sale sign as an attraction to the property.

The court held that, read as a whole, the charge correctly focused the jury on whether the respondents maintained the premises in a reasonably safe condition and did not create reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the contingent cross-appeal on damages was dismissed without costs.