Ian Valentine Horwood Godfrey

The appellant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court from an order of the Law Society's Appeal Division.

The Appeal Division had quashed his appeal of a Hearing Division Tribunal order admitting findings of fact from a civil trial into his conduct proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Appeal Division's order was not a final decision under s. 49.38 of the Law Society Act, as there had been no final determination of professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming.

The appellant cement manufacturer proposed substituting alternative fuel derived from post-recycling and post-composting materials for conventional fossil fuel.

The respondent municipality argued this constituted a new land use as a 'waste disposal area' under its zoning by-law, requiring an amendment.

The application judge agreed with the municipality.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the productive use of these materials as fuel in an existing cement manufacturing process does not constitute dumping, destroying, or storing waste, and therefore does not create a new land use.

The applicant sought costs following a successful application to enforce a New York judgment in Ontario concerning the sale of a painting.

The court had previously permitted enforcement of the foreign judgment but stayed execution pending the outcome of an appeal in New York.

The applicant requested costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the respondent had repeatedly attempted to relitigate issues already decided and had engaged in delay tactics through multiple proceedings and appeals.

The court agreed that the respondent’s conduct justified substantial indemnity costs but reduced the amount claimed due to concerns about the involvement of multiple senior counsel.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the amount of $94,298.28 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The appellant employee and respondent employer entered into a framework agreement containing four sub-agreements to resolve various disputes.

The employer breached the employment sub-agreement by terminating the employee, who then sued for wrongful dismissal and claimed the entire framework agreement was voided.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for wrongful dismissal but held the sub-agreements were severable, dismissing the employee's claims under the other sub-agreements and staying execution of the wrongful dismissal judgment pending the employer's counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the conclusion that the sub-agreements were independent and severable, nor in the discretionary decision to grant a stay.

Following the release of its reasons on appeal, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

The successful respondent, the Municipality of Clarington, was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellants appealed an order permanently enjoining them from operating a scrap yard and storing white goods on their property, arguing they had a legal non-conforming use.

On appeal, they raised new arguments based on the Supreme Court's decision in Saint-Romuald and accessory use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that these issues were not raised at trial and the evidentiary record was incomplete, making it unfair to the municipality to order a new trial.

The respondent claimed damages for breach of an Exclusive Selling Agreement after the appellant withdrew its business from sale.

The trial judge awarded damages based on a transaction fee calculated from a rejected Letter of Intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the agreement limited compensation to circumstances where an accepted agreement of purchase and sale existed.

Since no such transaction occurred, no fee was payable.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The Municipality of Clarington appealed a judgment allowing an application by Newcastle Recycling Ltd. and others for a declaration that they had the right to continue operating an auto wrecking, scrapyard, landfill, and garbage collection business on certain property.

Clarington also appealed the dismissal of its counter-application for an injunction.

The respondents cross-appealed the finding that they did not have the right to carry on their business on other portions of the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed Clarington's appeal in part, finding the application judge erred by resolving material credibility issues on affidavit evidence instead of directing a trial of an issue.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, and a permanent injunction was granted in respect of portions of the property.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award dismissing a grievance regarding holiday and overtime pay for work performed on Remembrance Day.

The arbitrator had concluded that there was an apparent contradiction between two articles of the collective agreement and interpreted them such that one applied to scheduled work and the other to unscheduled work.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's conclusion to be reasonable based on the record and dismissed the application, fixing costs at $5,000.

Homeowners and the Ontario New Home Warranty Program brought actions against a concrete supplier (Bertrand) and a cement manufacturer (Lafarge) for defective concrete foundations caused by the introduction of fly ash.

The trial judge found Lafarge 80% liable and Bertrand 20% liable in negligence for failing to conduct adequate testing.

Lafarge appealed the liability findings and the costs award (which ordered Lafarge to pay 90% of costs due to its conduct at trial).

Bertrand cross-appealed seeking full indemnity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and cross-appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings on liability, apportionment, and costs, while varying the judgment slightly to reflect settlements reached during the appeal regarding prejudgment interest and one homeowner's garage.

The appellant brought a motion to prohibit the intervener from presenting arguments on the federal peace, order and good government (POGG) power.

The intervener sought to argue that the impugned provincial legislation fell under POGG, an issue not raised by the respondent or included in the constitutional questions framed by the Chief Justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, holding that an intervener is not entitled to widen or add to the points in issue, and cannot introduce a new constitutional issue that would circumvent the notice requirements for Attorneys General.