David Harris

The respondent claimed damages for breach of an Exclusive Selling Agreement after the appellant withdrew its business from sale.

The trial judge awarded damages based on a transaction fee calculated from a rejected Letter of Intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the agreement limited compensation to circumstances where an accepted agreement of purchase and sale existed.

Since no such transaction occurred, no fee was payable.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and counselling to commit murder.

The trial judge had excluded intercepted private communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police affiant and Crown agent acted improperly in obtaining the wiretap authorization.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction by excising correct information from the affidavit and erred in finding that the remaining information was insufficient.

The Court also found that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors regarding the conduct of the police affiant and the legal duties of the Crown agent.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $418,732.00 in damages for wrongful dismissal.

The respondent was a senior executive terminated without cause after a corporate acquisition.

The trial judge found the 1994 employment agreement governed the termination but interpreted 'salary' generously to include a retention bonus, car allowance replacement, performance bonuses, vacation pay, and RRSP contributions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, except for an award of $5,123 in mitigation expenses, as the agreement provided for payment in lieu of notice regardless of mitigation.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal (majority) allowed the appeal, finding that the admission relied upon by the motion judge did not establish liability for the full proceeds of the machines purchased by Husky.

The Court concluded that there were material facts in dispute regarding whether the respondent acquired ownership of the machines and whether it paid for them, which were necessary to determine the quantum of loss.

The appeal was allowed, with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her Statement of Claim based on information provided in a Demand for Particulars.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that statements made in judicial proceedings, including pleadings and particulars, are protected by absolute privilege, even if made falsely and maliciously.

The court also found that the plaintiff's claim for abuse of process lacked the essential element of an overt act distinct from the proceedings themselves.

The order granting leave to amend was set aside and the motion was dismissed.

The appellants, former senior executives of the respondent corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding that no 'change in control' had occurred to trigger generous compensation provisions in their employment contracts.

During a period of financial difficulty, a shareholder group accumulated proxies for over 35 percent of the voting shares to requisition a special meeting to replace the board of directors.

A settlement was reached before the meeting, and the executives subsequently claimed payouts from a trust fund established for change of control scenarios.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that the mere accumulation of proxies did not confer the right to control or direct the voting power of the corporation, and thus did not constitute a change in control under the agreements.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals, stating they were in entire agreement with the reasons of the lower court judge.

The respondent did not seek costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent was constructively dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the removal of 90% of the respondent's duties was sufficient to constitute constructive dismissal.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's findings that the alternative position offered was demeaning, excusing the respondent from accepting it, and that age was a factor in the change of duties, justifying a Wallace extension.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal.

The court ordered no costs for the motion before Carthy J.A., but awarded the respondents their costs of the appeal fixed at $26,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her solicitor negligence claim against her former family law lawyer.

She alleged the lawyer negligently consented to a non-depletion order, preventing her from selling the matrimonial home at the peak of the real estate market.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the lawyer did not consent to the order, the order could have been varied if a sale was desired, and the appellant did not actually intend to sell the home at that time.

The plaintiff, a senior communications consultant, was wrongfully dismissed after one year of employment.

A jury awarded her 12 months' notice (including a three-month Wallace extension for bad faith) and $75,000 in punitive damages.

The employer appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 12-month notice period, finding the employer's conduct in maintaining cause allegations and withholding commissions justified the Wallace extension.

However, the court set aside the punitive damages award, finding no independent actionable wrong and that the generous compensatory award was sufficient to deter the employer's conduct.

The court also ordered a new trial on the limited issue of whether the plaintiff's compensation included revenues from the Montreal office, as the trial judge had unfairly precluded the employer from leading evidence on this point.

The appellant, while on probation in Ontario, travelled to Cuba and assaulted his companion.

He was charged in Ontario with breach of probation.

The trial judge convicted him, and the summary conviction appeal court upheld the conviction.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that probation orders bind the conduct of probationers both at home and abroad.

Applying the real and substantial link test, the Court found that Ontario had jurisdiction to try the offence because the probation order was made in Ontario and prosecuting the breach did not offend international comity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 26 months' salary for wrongful dismissal.

The sole issue on appeal was whether long-term disability benefits received by the respondent during the notice period should be deducted from the wrongful dismissal damages.

The Court of Appeal held that the benefits were not deductible because the respondent had indirectly contributed to the disability plan by accepting a lower salary in exchange for the benefits package.

The appeal was dismissed.

Two appellants challenged convictions arising from a failed police takedown, raising issues about jury exhortation, a police-created videotaped re-enactment, and the timing of a Corbett ruling.

The court held that the trial judge improperly exhorted the jury and imposed a deadline on deliberations, creating a reasonable possibility of coercion and requiring a new trial for both appellants.

The court further held that the videotaped re-enactment was wrongly admitted against one appellant because it inaccurately depicted undisputed facts, presented only the prosecution version of disputed events, had little or no probative value, and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found prejudicial error in delaying the Corbett ruling until after the appellant completed examination-in-chief, undermining the fairness of the jury's credibility assessment.

The applicant filed a reprisal complaint under section 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The responding parties brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the parties had reached a binding oral settlement during a meeting with a Board Officer.

The applicant argued that the settlement was only tentative and that his former counsel lacked authority to bind him without his final approval of the written documents.

The Board found that a final oral settlement had been reached and that the applicant's former counsel had ostensible authority to bind him.

The Board exercised its discretion not to inquire further into the complaint.

The complainant, an environmental technologist, alleged he was discharged contrary to section 134b(2) of the Environmental Protection Act after cooperating with a Ministry of the Environment investigation and refusing to destroy sensitive documents.

The employer claimed he was terminated for failing to return to work from sick leave.

The Board found the employer's reasons were pretextual and that a major reason for the discharge was the complainant's compliance with the Act and provision of information to the Ministry.

The Board ruled the discharge violated the Act and held that damages would be assessed based on actual compensation rather than Employment Standards Act minimums.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowing the Crown's appeal from their acquittal on charges of manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that under the established rules for directed verdicts, the Court of Appeal did not err in ordering a new trial.