W. J. Blacklock

The appellant challenged his conviction for spreading false news arising from publication of a pamphlet denying the Holocaust.

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that s. 181 of the Criminal Code infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter because it criminalized a broad range of expression, including false statements, and that the provision could not be justified under s. 1.

The majority found the provision lacked a pressing and substantial objective demonstrably tied to Parliament's intent and was overly broad and disproportionate in its reach.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered, and the dissent would have upheld the provision as a justified limit aimed at preventing serious harm caused by deliberate injurious lies.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had struck down a reverse onus provision in the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its recent decision in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. The Court held that while the requirement for the accused to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities restricts the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is a justifiable limit under s. 1.

The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal to dispose of the remaining grounds of appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge instructed the jury that he could be found guilty as a party to murder under the combined operation of ss. 21(2) and 213(c) of the Criminal Code, even without subjective foresight of death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction using the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 213(c) and s. 21(2) violate ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting a murder conviction without subjective foresight of death, and ordered a new trial.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following a consensual fist fight outside a bar.

The victim was knocked unconscious but the accused continued to strike him, resulting in the victim's death.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the victim had consented to a fair fight.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and substituted a manslaughter conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that public policy and common law principles limit the legal effectiveness of consent to assault.

Consent is vitiated between adults who intentionally apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl.

The respondents were convicted of attempted murder after an accomplice shot a convenience store clerk during an armed robbery.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the respondents could be convicted as parties under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code if they knew or ought to have known that the shooting was a probable consequence of the robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the principles of fundamental justice require subjective foresight of death to convict a principal of attempted murder, the same minimum degree of mens rea is constitutionally required to convict a party.

The objective foreseeability component ('ought to have known') in s. 21(2) violates s. 7 of the Charter and cannot be justified under s. 1 in cases where subjective foresight is constitutionally required.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowing the Crown's appeal from their acquittal on charges of manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that under the established rules for directed verdicts, the Court of Appeal did not err in ordering a new trial.

The appellant, after consuming alcohol, drove his vehicle into a hayride, killing four people and injuring a fifth.

At trial, he was acquitted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, but convicted of dangerous driving, after the trial judge instructed the jury that criminal negligence required a subjective 'deliberate and wilful assumption of the risk'.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the trial judge's instruction placed too high an onus on the Crown, though the Court split on whether the proper test for criminal negligence is purely objective or requires a minimal subjective intent.

The respondents, parents of a diabetic child, withheld his prescribed insulin due to their religious belief in faith healing, resulting in the child's death.

They were convicted of manslaughter by criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial due to errors in the jury charge regarding the burden of proof.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the order for a new trial.

The Court split on the appropriate test for criminal negligence under s. 202 of the Criminal Code, with half favouring an objective standard and half favouring a subjective standard requiring advertence to the risk.

The appellants, charged with murder in Ontario, sought to waive their right to a jury trial and be tried by a judge alone.

The Criminal Code required a jury trial for murder in all provinces except Alberta.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an accused can waive the benefit of a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter, this does not create a constitutional right to a non-jury trial that overrides the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the geographic distinction allowing non-jury trials only in Alberta did not violate s. 15 of the Charter, as persons accused of murder outside Alberta do not constitute a disadvantaged group subject to discrimination.