McLachlin J.

The intervener, the West Nova Fishermen's Coalition, applied for a rehearing of the appeal and a stay of the Court's September 17, 1999 judgment which acquitted the accused based on Mi'kmaq treaty rights.

The Coalition sought a new trial to allow the Crown to justify licensing and closed season restrictions on conservation grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that while it has jurisdiction to entertain an intervener's application for a rehearing in exceptional circumstances, none existed here.

The Court clarified that its previous judgment did not hold that treaty rights cannot be regulated, but rather that the Crown had not attempted to justify the regulations in this specific prosecution.

The appellant was arrested in connection with a cocaine transaction and placed in a cell with an undercover police officer.

The appellant initiated a conversation about the arrest, during which the undercover officer asked 'What happened?' and mentioned that his fingerprints were on the drugs, prompting the appellant to admit his fingerprints were also on the drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the undercover officer's conduct did not amount to active elicitation or the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

The statements were volunteered by the appellant, and his section 7 right to silence was not violated.

The Minister of Health and Community Services sought to extend an order granting him custody of the appellant's three children.

The appellant, an indigent parent, was denied legal aid for the custody hearing because the provincial guidelines did not cover custody applications.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the state's removal of a child from parental custody constitutes a serious interference with the psychological integrity of the parent, engaging the right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that in the circumstances of this case, the appellant's right to a fair hearing required that she be represented by counsel, and the government's failure to provide state-funded counsel violated section 7.

The infringement was not saved by section 1.

The appellant, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for breaking and entering.

The Review Board repeatedly granted him conditional discharges, denying an absolute discharge because it could not conclude he was not a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which had found that section 231.4 of the Income Tax Act infringed sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Strayer J.A. in the court below.

The Court held that section 231.4 does not restrict the rights guaranteed by section 7 or section 8 of the Charter, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the constitutional challenge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, rape, and indecent assault to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the issues before them, except for the indivisibility of the Crown, which it found unnecessary to address.

The Court concluded there was no violation of the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from a conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately explained the defence position to the jury.

The appellants were charged with failing to comply with an administrative order issued under the Environmental Protection Act requiring them to clean up PCB contamination at an abandoned mine.

They did not appeal the order to the Environmental Appeal Board but attempted to collaterally attack its validity at their penal trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the order, as the legislature intended the specialized appeal board to be the exclusive forum for such challenges.

The appellants picketed a police station carrying placards alleging a police officer allowed or participated in the sexual abuse of children.

They were convicted of defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Criminal Code.

They appealed, arguing the defamatory libel provisions infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provisions infringe s. 2(b), they are justified under s. 1, subject to the severance of a portion of s. 299(c).

The Court found the protection of reputation to be a pressing and substantial objective, and that the provisions were rationally connected and minimally impairing, given the requirement of subjective knowledge of falsity and intent to defame.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions upheld.

The appellant was arrested for possession of narcotics.

Hours later, an RCMP officer conducted a warrantless inventory search of the appellant's impounded car pursuant to police policy, discovering cash and cocaine.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated section 8 of the Charter because an inventory search is not a valid objective of the common law power of search incident to arrest, and thus the search was not authorized by law.

However, applying the Collins test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the non-conscriptive evidence should not be excluded, as the breach was not serious and exclusion would have a more detrimental impact on the administration of justice.

The appellant, a black youth, was acquitted of assaulting a police officer after the Youth Court Judge accepted his testimony over the conflicting testimony of the white arresting officer.

In her oral reasons, the judge remarked that police officers have been known to overreact when dealing with non-white groups.

The Crown appealed, arguing these comments raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the judge's comments, viewed in context by a reasonable and informed person aware of the social reality of racism, did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias but rather reflected an appropriate recognition of the social context.

Following a fatal crane collapse at a construction site, injured workers and dependants of deceased workers received workers' compensation benefits.

They subsequently brought a tort action against the Government of Saskatchewan, alleging negligence in its capacity as a regulator under occupational health and safety legislation.

The Workers' Compensation Board determined that the action was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was protected by a full privative clause and that the question of whether the statutory bar applied fell within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.

Applying the patent unreasonableness standard of review, the Court concluded that the Board's decision to bar the action against the government was not patently unreasonable.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge allowed the Crown to reopen its case to call a new witness after the defence had closed its case.

The trial judge also allowed the Crown to cross-examine the accused on her bad character, including her sexual relationship with one of the co-accused and the presence of stolen property in her house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case at the third stage of the trial, as it prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The Court found that the character evidence was properly admitted as it was relevant to significant issues in the case.

The respondent, a government employee, was terminated while receiving short-term disability benefits.

He sued for wrongful dismissal and was awarded damages representing his salary for a 20-month notice period, with the Court of Appeal holding that disability benefits received during that period should not be deducted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the employer's appeal, holding that the employment contract did not intend for the employee to receive both disability benefits and damages for wrongful dismissal simultaneously.

Consequently, the disability benefits received during the notice period must be deducted from the wrongful dismissal damages.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown did not call the victim of the assault to testify, relying instead on other witnesses and forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the Crown had a duty to call the victim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, ruling that the Crown has broad discretion in deciding which witnesses to call, including the victim, and is not required to call all material witnesses absent an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that affirmed the dismissal of his application for certiorari.

The appellant sought to quash his committal to stand trial on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, holding that there was sufficient evidence to justify the committal.

The appellant companies were defrauded by their bookkeeper, who issued 155 fraudulent cheques payable to third parties and deposited them into her own accounts at the respondent bank.

The bank accepted many of the cheques without endorsement, and the bookkeeper forged endorsements on the rest.

The appellants sued the bank for conversion.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was strictly liable for conversion.

The cheques were not payable to fictitious persons under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act because the intention of the corporate drawer, not the fraudulent employee, governed.

Furthermore, the bank could not rely on s. 165(3) to claim the rights of a holder in due course, as that section only protects a bank when a cheque is deposited to the credit of the legitimate payee or endorsee.

The appellants, members of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations, were convicted of gambling-related offences under the Criminal Code for conducting high stakes bingo and other gambling activities on their reserves.

They appealed, arguing that their activities were protected by an inherent aboriginal right to self-government under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which included the right to regulate gambling.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Van der Peet test and held that the claimed right must be characterized as the right to participate in and regulate gambling activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that gambling or its regulation was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the First Nations at the time of contact.

The United States of America appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal regarding the extradition of the respondent for immigration offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, adopting the dissenting reasons of Hetherington J.A. The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored the order of committal for extradition.

The Nova Scotia legislature amended the Residential Tenancies Act to create a new dispute resolution mechanism, empowering a provincially appointed Director and Board to investigate, mediate, and adjudicate residential tenancy disputes.

The constitutionality of these unproclaimed provisions was referred to the Court of Appeal, which found the Board's powers ultra vires.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the provisions do not violate s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that at the time of Confederation, superior courts did not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over residential tenancy disputes, as inferior courts shared this jurisdiction.

Therefore, conferring this power on a provincial tribunal is constitutionally permissible.