Peter Connelly

The offender was found guilty of one global count of sexual assault and one global count of invitation to sexual touching involving his biological daughter, aged 11-14, over a four-year period.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence due to the breach of trust and vulnerability of the victim.

The offender, a 65-year-old first-time offender, received a four-year concurrent sentence for sexual assault and two years for invitation to sexual touching, along with ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, no-contact order, and SOIRA registration.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results on the basis of alleged Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 8 or 9 rights, as the initial police conversation was lawful and the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as police made diligent efforts to facilitate the accused's right to counsel of choice and provided adequate information regarding legal rights.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 after failing a roadside screening test and providing breath samples of 125mg and 100mg.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing whether the police officer had an objective basis for the demand given the potential presence of mouth alcohol, and that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons regarding care and control.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the objective standard, made credibility findings entitled to deference, and that the path to conviction was clear because the Crown relied on the appellant's admission of driving prior to being found in the driveway.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg/100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought to exclude breathalyzer test results on the basis that his Charter rights under s. 8 (right to privacy) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) were breached.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) as the accused failed to clearly invoke his right to counsel of choice and was not sufficiently diligent in exercising that right.

Although the court found a breach of s. 8 by videotaping the accused while using a urinal without informing him of a private washroom alternative, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to special circumstances arising from his limited English proficiency and the police's failure to secure an interpreter.

The evidence of the refusal was excluded and that charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control based on evidence that he occupied the driver's seat, attempted to move the vehicle, and displayed signs of impairment.

The applicant sought a stay of a driving prohibition imposed following a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml.

The stay was sought pending appeal, which alleged the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” and relied on facts not in evidence.

The court applied the established test for a stay pending appeal, requiring the applicant to show the appeal was not frivolous, that continuation of the prohibition was not necessary in the public interest, and that granting the stay would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found the appeal frivolous, noting the timeline showed police acted promptly and the first breath sample was taken well within the two‑hour limit contemplated by the Criminal Code.

The applicant also failed to demonstrate hardship or that the public interest favored suspending the prohibition.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and three counts of assault relating to his wife.

A replacement information was later filed with four counts of assault.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The total delay from charge to estimated end of trial was approximately 19.5 months.

The court found that while the total delay exceeded the Morin guideline of 8-10 months for institutional delay, the unacceptable delay attributable to Crown actions and institutional resources was 10.5 months.

The court found actual prejudice to the accused, including loss of employment income, jeopardized employment opportunities, and stress affecting work performance.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

Three young women pleaded guilty to forcible confinement and assault causing bodily harm after luring their friend from her home, blindfolding her, forcing her into a vehicle, beating her, and abandoning her unconscious at the roadside.

The Crown sought nine months' imprisonment, while defence counsel argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed 195 days in custody followed by two years of probation, finding that while the offenders demonstrated strong rehabilitation potential and remorse, the gravity of the offences and egregious aggravating circumstances required actual imprisonment to satisfy denunciation and general deterrence objectives.

The accused was charged with six counts of assault upon his spouse and one count of assault upon his child, allegedly occurring between June 2005 and November 2010.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant spouse, who alleged repeated assaults occurring approximately twice monthly throughout their marriage.

The defence denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to exaggerations, inconsistencies with police statements, and lack of corroboration from medical professionals despite claims of severe injuries.

The corroborating witnesses (the complainant's brother and mother) provided contradictory accounts and failed to mention key incidents in their initial police statements.

The accused testified credibly and consistently, denying all allegations.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts.

The applicant brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on January 19, 2012, but was not completed until July 25-27, 2012, with further adjournment to February 28 and March 1, 2013.

The total delay from charge to projected trial completion was approximately 27 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and R. v. Godin, analyzing the length of delay, reasons for delay (inherent, Crown actions, accused actions, and institutional factors), and prejudice to the accused.

The court found approximately 10 months of institutional delay, which fell within the Morin guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after a trial judge refused an adjournment where no qualified Tamil interpreter was available for the accused.

The trial judge declined to proceed with a conditionally accredited interpreter who had recently been found unqualified in another case and refused the Crown’s last-minute adjournment request.

The appellate court held the trial judge was entitled to accept defence counsel’s representation that an interpreter was necessary and that his refusal to adjourn was a discretionary decision owed deference.

The court further held that trial judges are not required to conduct a fresh inquiry into interpreter competence where recent findings of inadequacy exist.

The Crown failed to demonstrate any error in the exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to explicitly apply the second step of the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge omitted the second step, her overall reasons, including her strong credibility findings, demonstrated she considered whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the burden of proof, motive to lie, and the risk of innocent collusion between the complainants.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences related to a credit card fraud and manufacturing operation found in their home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred knowledge and participation from the presence of false credit cards and manufacturing equipment.

The sentence appeal for the first appellant was dismissed, including a restitution order.

However, the sentence appeal for the second appellant was allowed in part to set aside the restitution order against her, as there was no evidence of her ability to pay.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on a youthful first offender convicted of sexually assaulting an unconscious 14-year-old complainant after heavy drinking.

The Court of Appeal held that, despite strong rehabilitative prospects, family support, and strict bail compliance, the gravity of the offence and the offender's callous post-offence conduct required a custodial sentence to give proper effect to denunciation and general deterrence.

Applying the conditional sentence framework and the demonstrably unfit standard, the court found the community-based sentence outside the acceptable range.

In light of the respondent's completion of 16 months of the conditional sentence before appeal, the sentence was varied to nine months' imprisonment followed by six months' probation.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual offences arising from allegations made by his daughter, whose unsworn videotaped police statement was the only inculpatory evidence and who recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the videotaped statement was properly admitted for its truth under the principled hearsay exception because the complainant was available for cross-examination at trial, the entire interview was videotaped, and the circumstances sufficiently addressed the main hearsay danger.

However, the court found reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

By treating acceptance of the videotaped statement as necessarily requiring rejection of the defence evidence, the trial judge failed to assess whether the whole of the evidence raised a reasonable doubt under the W. (D.) framework.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, who were youthful offenders, participated in an unprovoked machete attack on a randomly selected victim, causing serious injuries.

They were convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to seven and a half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, they argued the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to their youth and erred in not granting enhanced pre-trial custody credit for poor institutional conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the severity of the violent crime, and that there was no specific evidence of hardship to justify enhanced pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his sentence for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The trial judge had imposed a ten-year sentence, granting six years of credit for two years and ten months of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or the fitness of the sentence, given the brutal nature of the offences.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of robbery and aggravated assault, with one appellant also convicted of attempted murder.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the trials so that one co-accused could call the other as a witness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by assessing the reliability and credibility of the proposed co-accused witness, which is a function for the jury.

The appeal of the first appellant was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appeal of the second appellant, who argued the defence of duress should have been left to the jury, was dismissed as there was no air of reality to the defence.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable, as there was direct evidence from the complainant identifying one of the appellants, which was confirmed by independent evidence.

However, the Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed based on the challenge for cause procedure.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a fraudulent document (exhibit 4).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension and noting the trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence primarily because it was inconsistent with his admitted mode of practice.

The sentence appeal regarding a term of the probation order was also dismissed as the term was agreed to by counsel, not punitive, and had rehabilitative potential.