David Craig Mitchell

Jahlando Sinclair, aged 22, faced charges related to the robbery of two pharmacies.

The central issue was the identification of Sinclair as one of the robbers, specifically the one wearing a grey Roots hoodie.

The Crown relied heavily on high-quality video surveillance, physical resemblance, matching clothing and accessories (shoes, underwear, mask), temporal proximity to other identified robbers, and the location of his arrest near discarded robbery clothing.

The court applied principles of video identification and circumstantial evidence, finding that the cumulative effect of the evidence led to the only reasonable inference of guilt, rejecting the defence's "series of coincidences" argument.

Sinclair was found guilty of robbery, masked with intent, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

A charge of possession of a loaded restricted firearm was reduced to a lesser included offence.

The defendants applied to exclude evidence (a gun and their clothing) obtained following their detention and arrest, alleging breaches of their Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the initial investigative detention lawful, but identified breaches of s. 10(b) due to the police's failure to promptly advise of the right to counsel upon detention and for subsequent delays in facilitating access to counsel at the police station.

However, the court found no s. 8 breach regarding the gun seizure, concluding the accused had no privacy expectation, had abandoned the gun, and the search was conducted with valid consent.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court weighed the moderate seriousness of the Charter breaches against their minimal impact on the accused's rights and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious armed robbery cases on their merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and all evidence was found admissible.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after striking his friend in the head with a baseball bat during an altercation.

The court considered the offender's long history of alcohol abuse, remorse, and the exceptionally harsh conditions of his pre-sentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court determined an appropriate sentence of 5 years before credit, and after applying a 1.5:1 credit for 1,100 days of pre-sentence custody, imposed a sentence of 175 days to serve, plus 3 years of probation.

The court noted the sentence of less than 6 months preserves the offender's right to appeal his likely deportation.

The defendant, designated a dangerous offender, faced charges including criminal harassment and breach of orders.

The Crown brought three pre-trial applications: (i) similar fact/prior discreditable conduct evidence regarding two former domestic partners, (ii) video link testimony for two witnesses residing in the United States, and (iii) admission of a deceased witness's videotaped statement under the hearsay exception.

The court granted the similar fact application regarding one partner (Ms. Landrio) but dismissed it for the other (Ms. MacLean), granted the video link testimony application for both witnesses, and granted the hearsay application for the deceased witness's statement.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts of robbery arising from eight bank robberies committed over one week in July 2017 while in the throes of a crack cocaine addiction.

The Crown sought six years imprisonment emphasizing general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and separation from society.

The defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less one day, arguing that meaningful treatment in the provincial system would better serve rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of five years less seventeen months presentence custody, resulting in three years and seven months remaining to serve.

The court found that while rehabilitation prospects remained limited, the seriousness of the offences, the vulnerable nature of the victims, the extensive criminal record, and the need for deterrence and denunciation were paramount considerations.

The applicant challenged a police search of the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) driver licence database under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The police used facial recognition technology to search the database and identify the applicant as the holder of multiple fraudulently obtained driver's licences.

The applicant argued that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in his photograph and personal information submitted for driver's licence purposes.

The Crown argued that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in information voluntarily submitted to obtain a driver's licence, which is a regulated privilege.

The court dismissed the applicant's challenge, finding that driver's licence applicants have neither a subjective nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained in the MTO database.

The accused was charged with 26 offences related to fraudulently obtaining and possessing multiple driver's licences under various aliases.

The Crown's case relied primarily on photo-comparison technology and visual identification from driver's licence photographs and booking hall videotapes to establish that the accused was the same person responsible for obtaining licences under seven different names.

The court found that the identification evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as no police officer who had investigated or dealt with the accused in connection with prior incidents was able to identify him as the person they had encountered.

The court acquitted the accused of all charges, finding that relying solely on the judge's own visual comparison of photographs and videotapes, without corroborating eyewitness identification, would be manifestly unsafe given the inherent frailties of identification evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault and breaches of a section 810.2 recognizance.

The assault occurred on July 7, 2017, when the accused punched the victim on the head and stole her earring while she was walking to work.

The accused was subject to multiple prior orders requiring him to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, which he breached.

The court imposed an 18-month sentence minus 196 days of presentence custody, plus 3 years of probation with conditions including no contact with the victim.

Mark Christie pleaded guilty to multiple fraud and property offenses, including fraudulent use of a credit card, fraud over $5,000, possession of property obtained by crime, and failure to comply with probation.

The offenses involved a scheme to obtain credit facilities using false identification, resulting in over $106,000 for Christie.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his extensive criminal record for similar offenses and committing the current crimes while on probation.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, strong family support, expressed remorse, and 23 months of strict house arrest pre-trial.

The Crown sought 2 years less a day plus 3 years probation, while the Defense proposed 12 to 18 months.

The judge sentenced Christie to 12 months in custody, followed by 3 years probation, a DNA order, forfeiture of his vehicle, and a restitution order of $106,524.85, taking into account the pre-trial house arrest as a mitigating factor.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud over $5,000 and one count of unauthorized use of a credit card.

Between March and August 2013, she defrauded her employer, a Shopper's Drug Mart, of $110,484.28 USD by facilitating fraudulent transactions using American Express credit cards while exploiting a security flaw in the company's system.

The employer suffered devastating consequences, losing his franchise agreement and substantial income.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 5½ months followed by three years of probation, taking into account the defendant's status as a permanent resident and the collateral immigration consequences of a sentence exceeding six months.

The accused was arrested for attempted murder and firearm offences following a shooting in downtown Toronto.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's post-arrest statements, including an 80-minute video interview, arguing breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to an unjustified three-hour delay in facilitating access to duty counsel while gunshot residue tests were conducted.

The court also found the statements were involuntary due to police threats to lay additional charges, inducements, and the 18-year-old accused's learning disabilities and physical distress.

All post-arrest statements were excluded.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable sample into an approved instrument following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown alleged the accused deliberately failed to provide a proper breath sample during approximately 10 attempts over 12 minutes at the police station.

The accused testified she was genuinely attempting to provide a sample.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to refuse to provide a suitable sample, as the video evidence (without audio) was not conclusive and the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a stay of firearm-related charges on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Morin framework, the court examined the 1,035-day period from charge to scheduled trial, deducting waived time and excluding delay attributable to the applicant, co-accused, and inherent case requirements.

The court held that most of the impugned delay arose from institutional limits and co-accused scheduling issues, with only a limited period attributable to the Crown.

Given the minimal prejudice flowing from delay itself and the serious public interest in trying the charges, the application was dismissed.

Following a traffic stop for an illegal turn, police searched a vehicle and located a loaded prohibited firearm and 209 grams of marijuana inside a bag in the trunk admitted to belong to the accused.

The accused admitted the marijuana was his but denied knowledge of the firearm, suggesting another rear-seat passenger may have placed it in the bag through the back-seat access panel while police were stopping the car.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as implausible and found it did not leave a reasonable doubt.

Applying the circumstantial evidence rule, the court held that guilt was the only reasonable inference and convicted on all counts except the proceeds of crime count, which the Crown asked to be dismissed.

The two accused were stopped by police while driving in a vehicle owned by the driver.

Both were arrested for breaching their bail conditions.

During the arrest, an officer spotted the handle of a loaded handgun protruding from under a floor mat in the back seat.

The driver brought a s. 8 Charter application challenging the seizure, which was dismissed as the court found the gun was in plain view.

At trial, the driver was found guilty of all firearms and breach charges, as his knowledge and control of the weapon were inferred from his ownership and control of the vehicle.

The passenger was acquitted of all charges due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge and control of the firearm.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter or, alternatively, exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 9 arising from a lengthy investigative detention.

Police detained the accused for approximately 2.5 hours while investigating a stabbing and a gun call before locating a bag containing two loaded firearms.

The court held that while the initial investigative detention was justified, the duration exceeded permissible limits and therefore infringed s. 9 of the Charter.

However, the court found no causal connection between the detention and the discovery of the firearms and concluded the police conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was therefore not warranted.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm and threatening death following an incident in a Toronto laneway.

The defendant, driving a sports utility vehicle, encountered three pedestrians leaving a nightclub.

After the complainant tapped on the defendant's vehicle window, the defendant exited his vehicle and struck the complainant in the face, causing a severe laceration requiring eight sutures.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting the complainant had advanced aggressively toward him.

The court rejected the defendant's account and found that the complainant was attempting to flee the situation, not attack the defendant.

The court found the defendant guilty of assault causing bodily harm and dismissed the threatening death charge.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on charges of attempted murder and overcoming resistance to the commission of an offence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, particularly regarding the specific intent to kill, such as the nature of the weapon, the vital area of the stab wound, and the respondent's actions after the stabbing.

The application was granted, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to commit the respondent for trial on those charges.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, appealed his 8-month sentence for sexual interference against a child and challenged the constitutionality of the 14-day mandatory minimum sentence under s. 15(1) and s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenges, finding that the mandatory minimum did not disproportionately disadvantage Aboriginal offenders in a discriminatory manner and did not create institutional bias.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 90 days intermittent custody followed by three years' probation, citing fresh evidence of the appellant's remorse and the significant delay in the proceedings.

The appellant appealed her conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code, stemming from her breach of a 1994 injunction prohibiting protests outside abortion clinics.

She argued that s. 127 was ultra vires Parliament, overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and that her prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding s. 127 to be valid criminal law and appropriately tailored.

The court also held that the appellant's attempt to challenge the enforcement of the injunction constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the original order.