Robbie John Wilfred Chartier

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple serious firearms and drug trafficking offences stemming from two separate incidents, the second of which occurred while he was on bail for the first.

The court found the offender was a commercial drug trafficker using firearms as tools of the trade, necessitating a sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Applying the totality principle and accounting for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, the court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years imprisonment, less credit for time served.

Following a jury trial, the accused was found guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault, but acquitted of firearm possession charges.

The sentencing judge was required to make factual findings under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code for sentencing and an impending constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence.

Applying the Ferguson principles, the court found the accused credible and accepted that he snatched the gun from the victim in self-defence, was pursued by the victim, and fired at the ground out of a legitimate fear for his life.

The applicants, Cash Dillon and Jarra Shifara, challenged the admissibility of firearms and drug evidence seized during a vehicle stop, alleging violations of their Charter rights.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the applicants by transitioning a sobriety check into a Cannabis Control Act investigation without statutory or common law authority.

Additionally, the police failed to promptly inform the applicants of the reasons for their detention or advise them of their right to counsel, and subsequently conducted an unreasonably intrusive search of their groin areas.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court determined that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the court granted the application and excluded all evidence and statements obtained during the stop.

The court considered an application by Adrian Davey to stay proceedings on the ground of entrapment after he pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court reviewed the sufficiency of disclosure to the defence and whether police had reasonable suspicion before offering Davey the opportunity to commit the offence.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding that the police had reasonable suspicion at the relevant time and that the defence was able to make full answer and defence.

The Crown applied to have the court endorse a certificate of default pursuant to s. 770(1) of the Criminal Code, alleging the respondent breached his bail conditions by failing to reside at his specified address, breaching a curfew, and committing offences in the United States.

The respondent had failed to attend the last day of his trial because he was in custody in New York.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent failed to reside at his address, breached his curfew without an applicable exception, or committed the alleged offences in the US.

Four co-accused were tried for their alleged roles in a coordinated jewellery store robbery and a preceding distraction shooting.

The Crown relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including covert video surveillance, intercepted communications, and DNA.

The court acquitted Hadi of all charges due to reasonable doubt regarding his identification from video evidence.

Mitsakis and Bangura were convicted of conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offences related to the distraction shooting, as DNA and circumstantial evidence proved their involvement.

Mohamed was acquitted of robbery but convicted of being an accessory after the fact, dangerous driving, and fleeing from police after he attempted to escape the arrest scene in a vehicle containing evidence.

This decision concerns a s. 24(2) Charter application to exclude evidence (a firearm) obtained following an invalid search warrant and unconstitutional police entry.

The court applied the three-factor test from R. v. Grant, finding the police conduct (gross negligence in preparing the Information to Obtain, misleading statements, lack of investigation, and warrantless entry) to be extremely serious.

While the impact on the accused's privacy interest was moderate (as he was not a resident), the seriousness of the police misconduct outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded the firearm against all accused.

This decision addresses a Garofoli application to review a search warrant for firearms-related offences.

The Information to Obtain (ITO) used to secure the warrant contained significant false, misleading, and unconstitutionally obtained information, which was excised on review.

The court assessed whether, based on the amended record, reasonable grounds existed to believe an offence was committed and that evidence would be found at the residence.

While a thin basis for believing an offence was committed was found, the court concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe evidence of the offence would be found at the residence.

This was primarily due to the lack of a direct connection between the firearm and the residence, the fact that the accused was not in possession of the firearm upon arrest, and the extensive misleading information in the original ITO undermining the affiant's credibility.

The search was deemed unreasonable, constituting a s.8 Charter breach.

The s.24(2) Charter analysis regarding the admissibility of seized evidence was deferred.

This preliminary inquiry addressed charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking against three accused.

The Crown sought to admit evidence via a s.540(7) application, primarily relying on police notebook notes.

The court found significant issues with the admissibility and trustworthiness of much of the Crown's evidence, particularly hearsay statements within officer notes, which prevented the defence from cross-examining critical witnesses.

While some drug trafficking activity was inferred, the court found insufficient evidence to establish constructive possession for most charges against Bogdan Butean and Justin David Gurley.

Natalie Tovah Abuhav was committed to stand trial only on the charge of Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking Percocet, as her identification was found with those specific drugs.

The other charges against her, and all charges against Butean and Gurley, were not committed for trial due to lack of sufficient evidence for committal.

The accused was stopped at a R.I.D.E. spot check where an officer smelled marijuana and observed erratic behaviour.

After a brief interaction, the accused was arrested for possession of marijuana and placed in a police cruiser.

At the end of the officer's shift, cocaine and a heroin/fentanyl mixture were found in the cruiser where the accused had been seated.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter application, finding the initial interaction and search incident to arrest were lawful.

The court concluded the accused placed the drugs in the cruiser and found him guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and simple possession of heroin.

The applicant, Holly Whittaker, faced charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession.

She brought two Charter applications: one alleging violation of her right to silence and right to counsel (ss. 7 and 10(b)) regarding an utterance about a purse, and another alleging unlawful arrest (s. 9) and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) leading to a strip search and seizure of fentanyl.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) regarding the utterance, as police elicited evidence after she requested counsel without providing an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The court also found a breach of s. 9 and s. 8, concluding that the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, as the confidential informant's tip was uncorroborated and unreliable.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded both the utterance and the seized fentanyl and purse under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court considered whether amendments to section 535 of the Criminal Code, effective September 19, 2019, which restricted preliminary inquiries to offences carrying a maximum sentence of 14 years or more, applied retroactively to invalidate elections for preliminary inquiries made before the amendment.

The Crown argued that prior elections were nullified and the court lacked jurisdiction.

The defence argued the amendment did not apply retroactively to vested rights and that validly made elections survived the enactment.

The court found itself bound by the Superior Court decision in R. v. R.S., which held that the Ontario Court of Justice lost jurisdiction to conduct preliminary inquiries except for offences with a 14-year maximum penalty as of September 19, 2019.

The accused was sentenced for robbery of convenience stores.

The court imposed 12 months imprisonment on top of 123 days pre-sentence custody (credited as 185 days), for a total of 18 months, followed by three years probation.

The sentencing judge emphasized the need for rehabilitation given the accused's neurological challenges and substance abuse issues, and made a strong recommendation for placement in either OCI or St. Lawrence correctional facilities.

The court balanced the need for a strong community message regarding convenience store robberies with a measured increase in sentence length to facilitate rehabilitation.

The accused, charged with dangerous driving and firearm offences, sought a bail review after being denied bail on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the proposed addition of a GPS ankle monitor constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the strict supervision plan, including house arrest with two sureties and electronic monitoring, addressed the secondary ground concerns.

Balancing the factors under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court found that detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was granted.

During a proceeding for a carjacking and shooting, the Crown sought to introduce non-expert recognition evidence from a police officer to identify one of the accused from security video.

The officer's prior interactions with the accused occurred mostly when the accused was a child, were brief, and were undocumented.

A subsequent interaction was specifically directed by a superior officer for the purpose of identification.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the officer lacked sufficient prior acquaintance and that the post-offence contact was tainted by its investigative purpose.

Six defendants were charged with multiple offences including criminal organization offences, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and trafficking in identification and firearms.

The Crown's case relied heavily on six months of intercepted telephone calls and BBMs, bank records, expert evidence on account takeover frauds, and search warrant results.

The trial lasted one year.

The court found that Mr. Kalonji engaged in account takeover frauds involving insiders, hackers, and runners.

Mr. Henry was found guilty of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.

Ms. Galbraith was found guilty of conspiracy to commit fraud.

Mr. Simmons-McKenzie was acquitted due to insufficient voice identification evidence.

Ms. Munyenga and Ms. Robinson were acquitted of conspiracy charges.

All defendants were acquitted of criminal organization offences due to insufficient evidence of the requisite structure and organization.

Mr. Kalonji was convicted of the lesser included offence of trafficking in identification.

Mark Christie pleaded guilty to multiple fraud and property offenses, including fraudulent use of a credit card, fraud over $5,000, possession of property obtained by crime, and failure to comply with probation.

The offenses involved a scheme to obtain credit facilities using false identification, resulting in over $106,000 for Christie.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his extensive criminal record for similar offenses and committing the current crimes while on probation.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, strong family support, expressed remorse, and 23 months of strict house arrest pre-trial.

The Crown sought 2 years less a day plus 3 years probation, while the Defense proposed 12 to 18 months.

The judge sentenced Christie to 12 months in custody, followed by 3 years probation, a DNA order, forfeiture of his vehicle, and a restitution order of $106,524.85, taking into account the pre-trial house arrest as a mitigating factor.

The accused sought judicial interim release (bail) on charges of two counts of robbery armed with a handgun, one count of disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence, and one count of assault with a weapon.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

The accused bore the burden of proof due to the firearm allegations under section 515(6)(a)(vii).

The court found the Crown's case to be weak, based primarily on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance, vehicle identification, and clothing similarities.

The court granted bail with conditions, finding the proposed plan of release adequate and that detention would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown sought to commit multiple co-accused to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry into numerous drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, and criminal organization charges.

The court applied the test for committal, assessing whether there was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit several accused on substantive drug and firearms offences, as well as conspiracy charges.

However, the court discharged certain accused on the criminal organization charges, finding insufficient evidence that they operated as a criminal organization rather than for personal benefit.