Daniel Varilone

Jevoi Sangster pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine.

The offences occurred when he was 18 years old.

The Crown sought 2-3 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the lethality of fentanyl and Sangster's continued offending while on bail.

The defence sought a conditional sentence, highlighting Sangster's youth, lack of prior record at the time of the offence, family support, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on his life choices.

The court considered aggravating factors (gravity of fentanyl trafficking, planned profit-driven activity, re-offending on bail) and mitigating factors (guilty plea, remorse, youth, good rehabilitation prospects, family support).

Applying principles of proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, and restraint, and considering social context evidence regarding anti-Black racism, the court imposed a two-year less a day conditional sentence followed by three years of probation, with strict conditions including house arrest and a GPS monitor.

Ancillary orders included a 20-year weapon prohibition, DNA sample, and drug forfeiture.

The defendant, C.A., was charged with criminal harassment for watching or besetting the residence of T.K., the mother of his son, causing her to reasonably fear for her safety.

A related charge for breaching a probation order was acquitted.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the child witness, J.A., finding his testimony consistent and logical despite minor inconsistencies.

Applying the definition of "besetting" from R. v. Dapena-Huerta, the court found that C.A.'s conduct of returning to T.K.'s residential area, seeking out their son, and making statements indicating knowledge of their residence and T.K.'s habits, constituted besetting.

Considering C.A.'s history of violence against T.K., the court concluded that the Crown proved criminal harassment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to vacate a previous detention order on firearms charges.

The applicant argued that a material change in circumstances had occurred, including the resolution of other outstanding charges, 10 months of pre-trial custody, and a new release plan with electronic monitoring.

The Superior Court of Justice found that a material change was established.

The court was satisfied by the applicant's evidence demonstrating a commitment to abide by the strict release conditions and concluded that detention was no longer justified on secondary or tertiary grounds.

The application was granted and the applicant was released on bail.

The Superior Court of Justice considered a constitutional challenge to mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 286.2(2) (receiving material benefit from sexual services provided by a person under 18), 286.3(2) (procuring a person under 18), and 163.1(3) (distributing child pornography) of the Criminal Code.

The applicants, who were found guilty by a jury, argued these mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court, applying the "grossly disproportionate" standard and considering reasonable hypotheticals, found the mandatory minimums for ss. 286.2(2) and 163.1(3) to be unconstitutional and declared them of no force or effect.

The mandatory minimum for s. 286.3(2) had already been declared unconstitutional in a prior decision.

Following their convictions for various prostitution-related offences involving minors, the applicants sought a declaration that sections 286.2(2), 286.3(2), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional, arguing they violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding the impugned sections constitutional.

It held that the sections were not arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate under s. 7, and that while s. 286.4 infringed s. 2(b) freedom of expression, it was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.