Heather Cook

The defendant, Jacob Martin Norn, was sentenced for manslaughter and trafficking fentanyl after supplying the drug to a friend who subsequently died.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the dangerous nature of fentanyl, and the need for general deterrence and denunciation, while also weighing mitigating factors such as the defendant's youth, lack of prior criminal record, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

Despite arguments for a conditional sentence and alleged Charter breaches, the court imposed a custodial sentence, emphasizing the defendant's continued drug use post-conviction and the societal impact of fentanyl trafficking.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of manslaughter against the defendant, Jacob Norn, following the death of Tyler Ginn from combined fentanyl and etizolam toxicity.

Norn had pleaded guilty to trafficking fentanyl to Ginn.

The central issues were whether the fentanyl supplied by Norn was a significant contributing cause of Ginn's death and whether Norn's warning to Ginn not to use too much fentanyl broke the chain of causation.

The court found that the fentanyl supplied by Norn was a significant contributing cause of death and that the warning did not sever the chain of causation, leading to a finding of guilt for manslaughter.

Mohammad Bashi applied to extend the time for leave to appeal his conviction, which resulted from a guilty plea on March 23, 2023.

He claimed he was misled, did not commit all offenses, and was unaware of appeal rights/timelines.

The court reviewed the thorough plea comprehension inquiry conducted by Justice West and found no evidence of pressure or misrepresentation.

The complainant, Nisrin Aidak, never recanted her allegations.

The court dismissed the application, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the period, no adequate explanation for the delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal, concluding that no injustice occurred.

M.Z., a registered physiotherapist, was charged with sexually assaulting A.S., an office administrator, by allegedly touching her bare breasts during a neck massage.

M.Z. denied the sexual assault, claiming the interactions were mutual and consensual massages.

The court conducted a credibility assessment of both parties, applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

The court found M.Z.'s testimony to be consistent and without obvious flaws.

Conversely, A.S.'s testimony contained significant omissions from her initial police statement, particularly regarding prior disclosure to her boyfriend and the instruction to unbutton her shirt, and her claim of needing to "Google" whether nipple touching was wrong strained credulity.

The court concluded that while M.Z.'s conduct was socially inappropriate and reflected an error in judgment, the Crown failed to prove the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence due to exceptional rehabilitative efforts and strong family support.

The court, balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with electronic monitoring and house arrest, followed by three years of probation, a DNA order, a 10-year SOIRA order, and specific internet use restrictions.

The Superior Court of Justice considered a constitutional challenge to mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 286.2(2) (receiving material benefit from sexual services provided by a person under 18), 286.3(2) (procuring a person under 18), and 163.1(3) (distributing child pornography) of the Criminal Code.

The applicants, who were found guilty by a jury, argued these mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court, applying the "grossly disproportionate" standard and considering reasonable hypotheticals, found the mandatory minimums for ss. 286.2(2) and 163.1(3) to be unconstitutional and declared them of no force or effect.

The mandatory minimum for s. 286.3(2) had already been declared unconstitutional in a prior decision.

Following their convictions for various prostitution-related offences involving minors, the applicants sought a declaration that sections 286.2(2), 286.3(2), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional, arguing they violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding the impugned sections constitutional.

It held that the sections were not arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate under s. 7, and that while s. 286.4 infringed s. 2(b) freedom of expression, it was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with multiple vehicles in a construction zone on Highway 401.

The Crown proved the actus reus, showing the accused failed to slow down despite clear signage and stopped traffic.

The defence argued the accused experienced a 'micro-sleep' due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and chronic renal disease, negating the mens rea.

The court rejected the expert evidence of a micro-sleep, finding the accused's prolonged inattention and failure to brake constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a traffic stop.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath samples obtained in violation of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The investigating officer failed to communicate an approved screening device demand "forthwith" upon formation of reasonable suspicion, delaying approximately two minutes.

Additionally, the officer failed to provide rights to counsel while awaiting delivery of the ASD, despite believing the delay could be 15-20 minutes.

The court found both breaches established on a balance of probabilities.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence, emphasizing that the breaches resulted from deficient training of the investigating officer that was not corrected by the training officer present at the scene.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with two counts of mischief and two counts of failing to comply with a probation order prohibiting contact with her neighbours.

The Crown alleged the defendant threw eggs at the neighbours' window, made excessive noise, and engaged in direct contact in violation of the court order.

The court found the mischief charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as the egg-throwing did not cause sufficient damage to property and the noise did not substantially interfere with the neighbours' quiet enjoyment of their property.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of both counts of breaching the probation order, as her conduct on both dates constituted unacceptable conduct that violated public peace and good order, and she made direct contact with the neighbours in contravention of the order.

The Crown's application for a mental disorder assessment under section 672.12(3) of the Criminal Code was dismissed, as the Crown failed to establish reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's criminal responsibility on account of mental disorder.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery with an imitation firearm and use of an imitation firearm in commission of an indictable offence.

The offences arose from a robbery of an individual who had advertised a ring for sale on Kijiji.

The defendant brandished an imitation firearm during a struggle over the ring but was not disguised and did not use gratuitous violence.

The court imposed a total sentence of 30 months imprisonment, with enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of 16.2 months imprisonment plus 12 months consecutive, followed by 3 years probation.

The court considered the defendant's youth, early guilty plea, criminal record, and rehabilitation potential in fashioning the sentence.