David Michael Barrison

This decision addresses sentencing for Jeremy Brown, a 25-year-old with no prior record at the time of offences, convicted of possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, carrying a concealed weapon, careless storage, and knowledge of unauthorized possession.

The case is complicated by Brown’s prior manslaughter conviction involving a firearm, for which he received an 11-year sentence.

The Court considered aggravating factors including the altered serial number, proximity to vulnerable persons, and the dangerous nature of the firearm possession, alongside mitigating factors such as Brown’s age, health condition (sickle cell disease), and social context as a Black man.

The Court imposed consecutive custodial sentences totaling 21 months, to be served consecutively to the manslaughter sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The accused, Jeremy Brown, brought a Charter application to exclude a firearm found during his detention, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded a 10(a) breach but argued no other breaches occurred and that the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2).

The court found no breach of section 8 or 10(b), and despite the conceded 10(a) breach, determined that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the charges, the reliability of the evidence, and the exigent circumstances faced by the police.

The Charter application was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual interference against the defendant, D.C., involving his stepson, J.R., who was 10 years old at the time of the alleged assault.

J.R. was the sole witness, testifying via Zoom and through prior video statements to police.

The court assessed J.R.'s testimony, finding him believable and consistent on the core allegation.

However, the court noted a significant lack of specific details, several inconsistencies regarding minor facts, and a complete absence of corroborating evidence.

Applying the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal cases, the court concluded that despite J.R.'s apparent truthfulness, the evidence was insufficient to be sure that the assault occurred as alleged.

Consequently, D.C. was found not guilty.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of failing to provide the necessaries of life, contrary to s. 215 of the Criminal Code, against an accused whose girlfriend died from diabetic ketoacidosis.

The court found that the deceased was under the accused's charge and that his failure to summon medical aid, particularly by taking a sleeping pill that rendered him insensible, constituted a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable and prudent person.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was objectively foreseeable to a reasonable person, lacking specific medical knowledge of diabetes, that the deceased's symptoms would lead to death or permanent injury within the timeframe affected by the accused's inaction.

The accused was acquitted.

Oral Richards was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant (G.T.), a friend, and forensic experts, while Richards testified in his defence.

The case hinged on conflicting accounts and the reliability of G.T.'s memory, particularly regarding how she entered certain rooms and the consistency of her testimony with DNA evidence.

The court applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) to assess credibility and reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and contradictions with forensic DNA, leading to serious doubts about consent and the accused's knowledge of lack of consent.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused, a 65-year-old woman, was found guilty by a jury of importing 1.522 kilograms of cocaine.

Following numerous adjournments and failures to appear, the court found the accused had absconded and proceeded with sentencing in her absence pursuant to s. 475(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the quantity of cocaine and the nature of the offence against mitigating factors including the accused's age, significant health issues, and personal tragedies.

The court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years, reduced by 12 months for personal circumstances and 24 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years and 156 days incarceration.

Dante Johnson, arrested for gun and drug offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds.

He asserted two material changes in circumstances: a new, suitable surety (his paternal grandmother) and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown conceded COVID-19 as a material change but opposed release.

The court conducted a de novo assessment, finding the new surety addressed the Justice of the Peace's concerns regarding supervision.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and strength of the Crown's case, the court determined that a reasonable person, informed of Charter values and the specific circumstances (accused's youth, first adult charges, strong release plan), would not lose confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was granted with strict conditions.

R.D., a 16-year-old, pleaded guilty to 10 counts related to three jewellery store robberies and one attempted robbery.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence under Section 64(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and a youth sentence would not sufficiently hold R.D. accountable.

The defence sought the maximum youth sentence of three years.

The court found that R.D. demonstrated sufficient maturity at the time of the offences, which were well-planned and violent, and that a youth sentence would not be sufficient for accountability.

R.D. was sentenced as an adult to a global term of 7 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The defendant, W.P., was charged with five counts including sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and uttering a death threat, against an eight-year-old boy, C.C. The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of C.C.'s evidence, noting inconsistencies, the problematic manner in which police elicited allegations through leading questions, and the malleability of C.C.'s narrative.

The court applied the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the special considerations for child witnesses but ultimately finding C.C.'s evidence unreliable.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault arising from an alleged incident in a restaurant storage room.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony, which was contradicted by the accused's denial.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to numerous inconsistencies, omissions, and memory failures regarding significant details, including the appearance of the storage room door, the location of the light switch, and the sequence of events.

The accused's evidence was found credible.

The trial judge concluded that the complainant's evidence was too weak to meet the Crown's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with criminal harassment contrary to s.264(1) of the Criminal Code and distribution of intimate images contrary to s.162.1 of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from a relationship that ended in September 2015.

The Crown alleged the defendant criminally harassed the complainant through persistent electronic communications after she made clear she did not wish further contact, and distributed intimate images to her family and friends without consent.

The defendant denied responsibility, claiming they agreed to remain friends and that many communications were not directed at the complainant.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts based on credibility assessments, circumstantial evidence, and objective documentary evidence including text messages and email distribution patterns.

The accused pleaded guilty to Over 80 (impaired driving), Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm, Fail to Stop, and Drive Suspended.

The accused, a transport truck driver, drove while impaired by alcohol on one occasion and subsequently drove while extremely fatigued, fell asleep at the wheel, and struck a victim's vehicle, causing life-altering injuries.

The accused fled the scene and provided a false account to her employer.

The court imposed a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months, probation, driving prohibitions, DNA order, and victim surcharge, emphasizing the enhanced duty of care owed by commercial truck drivers and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The offender was acquitted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle but found guilty of criminal harassment by indictment.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence with credit for 438 days of pre-sentence custody, followed by three years of probation.

The sentence addressed the offender's recidivist history of criminal harassment, particularly involving domestic partners, his lack of impulse control, and the ongoing impact on the victim.

The court balanced denunciation and specific deterrence with rehabilitation, emphasizing the offender's need to engage with probationary resources and psychological programming.

The accused, a 42-year-old father of three with no prior record for drug offences, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in cannabis on a mid-level scale.

Over an eight-month period, he retrieved quantities of marijuana from a stash house operated by a member of a criminal organization for resale purposes.

The Crown sought 12 months custody plus time served, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with one year probation, giving full credit for 4.5 months of pretrial custody on a 1.5:1 basis and substantial credit for 16.5 months of house arrest under strict bail conditions.

Two young persons were charged with multiple offences related to the trafficking and exploitation of a 14-year-old girl for prostitution in Toronto over a ten-day period in September and October 2013.

The charges included procuring a minor to become a prostitute, attempting to procure a minor to become a prostitute, failing to comply with youth court orders, obstructing police, living on the avails of prostitution of a minor, exercising control over a minor for exploitation, intimidating a minor to perform acts of prostitution, and participating in the activity of a criminal organization.

The court found that the defendants organized and facilitated a crude but deliberate criminal enterprise involving the recruitment, transportation, and exploitation of underage girls for sexual services.

The victim was recruited through peer networks, transported to Toronto, housed in hotels, advertised online, and forced to engage in multiple sexual transactions while receiving no compensation.

The court convicted on most counts but dismissed counts relating to counselling and certain control offences due to insufficient evidence on those specific elements.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The incident occurred when the defendant, having consumed 10-12 drinks, drove at excessive speed through a residential area and collided with trees and a light post, injuring his passenger.

The defendant fled the scene and fabricated a false story to police.

The Crown sought 8-12 months incarceration; the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years probation, considering the defendant's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and significant cognitive impairments resulting from a prior brain injury, while balancing denunciation and deterrence objectives.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a police interview statement on the basis that his s. 10(b) right to counsel was breached.

Although the accused had spoken with duty counsel after arrest, he later expressed confusion about whether duty counsel was a lawyer and repeatedly requested to speak with a lawyer during a subsequent police interview.

The police declined to facilitate further consultation because the accused could not name a specific lawyer.

The court held that the detainee’s comments demonstrated a reason to question his understanding of the right to counsel under the framework established in R. v. Sinclair.

Applying the exclusion analysis from R. v. Grant, the court found the Charter breach serious and concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.