Jinwon Kim

The court considered whether Daniel Pestill should be declared a high-risk accused following a finding of not criminally responsible for the death of Michael Ryan, and also determined the appropriate sentence for various drug and firearm offences.

The court reviewed expert psychiatric evidence, statutory criteria, and relevant case law, ultimately designating Pestill as a high-risk accused and imposing a six-year sentence for the drug and gun offences, to be served in a hospital.

The decision includes detailed analysis of the factors for high-risk designation and the principles of sentencing for serious drug and firearm offences.

Matthew Albert Valley pleaded guilty to sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and breach of probation.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody credit to a net 23 months, along with ancillary orders including DNA orders, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a communication ban with the complainant, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

A three-year probation term was also imposed.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the egregious nature of the sexual assault, the offender's extensive criminal record, and the vulnerability of the victim, while also considering the offender's youth and substance abuse issues.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a 14-year-old complainant, applied for bail pending his summary conviction appeal.

The court applied the criteria for bail pending appeal, finding that while the appeal grounds were weak, they were not frivolous.

The court further held that the appellant's detention was not necessary in the public interest, noting his low-moderate risk of re-offence and his compliance with previous release conditions.

Bail pending appeal was granted on strict terms, including a surety.

Jerome Derby pleaded guilty to four firearm-related offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a vehicle with a prohibited firearm, and breach of a weapons prohibition order.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the offences, the public setting of the shooting, and the offender's significant criminal record, including a prior manslaughter conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, the offender's lived experience with anti-Black racism and poverty, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9.5 years, which, after credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 5 years and 3 months.

The offender was convicted of the first-degree murder of one young woman and the manslaughter of another.

Both victims were vulnerable and their bodies were dismembered and disposed of in a callous manner.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 25 years for the murder.

For the manslaughter, the court found extreme aggravating factors, including the complete desecration of the victim's body, and imposed a sentence of 18 years imprisonment to be served concurrently.

The accused was charged with two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to tender two lengthy videotaped statements given by the accused to police.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statements under the common law confessions rule.

The court analyzed the police conduct, including the use of emotional appeals, discussions of potential deals, and the conditions of the interviews.

The court found that the police did not use oppressive circumstances, impermissible trickery, or prohibited inducements (quid pro quo) that overbore the accused's will.

Both statements were ruled voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.

The accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, brought multiple Charter applications seeking the exclusion of evidence.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel regarding initial utterances to police, his s. 9 right against arbitrary detention regarding his arrest for one of the murders, and his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure regarding the forensic re-testing of a seized knife and freezer, as well as the use of a general warrant to obtain Google data.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no Charter breaches.

The court held the accused was not detained prior to his arrest, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, no residual privacy interest remained in the lawfully seized physical items, and the general warrant was appropriately issued.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court considered the admissibility of crime scene and autopsy photographs, evidence of the accused's knife collection, and proposed expert psychiatric testimony.

The court admitted several panoramic and autopsy photographs, requiring editing for some to minimize prejudice, while excluding others deemed repetitive or overly graphic.

Evidence that the accused possessed a knife collection was deemed admissible through police testimony, but the physical knives or their photographs were excluded due to high prejudicial effect outweighing marginal probative value.

The proposed expert evidence from a forensic psychiatrist, intended to explain the accused's actions based on past trauma, was ruled inadmissible as it failed the necessity criterion, amounted to impermissible oath-helping, and encroached on the jury's function to assess intent and self-defence.

Sharon Baksh pleaded guilty to manslaughter during her second-degree murder trial.

The sentencing hearing considered aggravating factors, including a home invasion, the victim's age (89), and 149 stab wounds, alongside mitigating factors such as her drug/alcohol dependency and troubled childhood.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 12-year custodial sentence, which, after 1.5x credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 7 years, 8 months, and 13 days.

Non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders were also issued.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking permission to sit at counsel table with defence counsel during a jury trial for second-degree murder rather than in the prisoner’s dock.

The Crown opposed the request, relying on customary courtroom practice and security concerns.

The court reviewed authorities recognizing that the location of the accused in the courtroom is a matter within the trial judge’s discretion and that the traditional use of the dock does not create a presumption of guilt.

Given the absence of flight risk, anticipated violence, or disruption, and considering the modern courtroom setting, the court held that there was no reason to insist on the traditional arrangement.

The accused was therefore permitted to sit beside counsel without restraints in the presence of the jury.

The Crown brought an application seeking to admit evidence of discreditable conduct consisting of mail belonging to the deceased that was found in the apartment occupied by the accused and another individual.

The deceased had lived across the hall from the accused and there was no evidence of any relationship that would explain the presence of the deceased’s mail in the accused’s residence.

The court considered whether the evidence was relevant and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Applying the principles governing admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the court found the evidence was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity of the person responsible for the death.

The probative value was found to outweigh any potential prejudice to a fair trial.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking production of correctional, parole and probation, telephone, and Children's Aid Society records relating to an alleged jailhouse informant expected to testify about admissions to a murder.

Applying the framework from R. v. O’Connor, the court assessed the likely relevance of the records and balanced the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against privacy interests of the witness and other inmates.

The court found the probative value of certain correctional, parole, probation, and limited telephone records outweighed privacy concerns, given the need to scrutinize jailhouse informant evidence.

Limited disclosure with redactions was ordered, while Children's Aid Society records were withheld.

Strict conditions were imposed governing use, disclosure, and eventual destruction of the records.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of second degree murder and awaiting a further murder trial, sought a publication ban on evidence and credibility findings arising from an earlier application under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code for access to seized funds to pay legal fees.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant a ban and applied the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test balancing freedom of expression against the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The court concluded that publication of the applicant’s admissions of criminal activity and the court’s adverse credibility findings posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice in the upcoming jury trial.

A temporary ban was therefore necessary and proportionate.

The court ordered a time‑limited publication ban on the evidence, the fact of the application, and the earlier decision until completion of the pending murder trial.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code for access to funds seized by police as alleged proceeds of crime in order to pay legal fees while facing multiple serious criminal charges including kidnapping and murder.

The court applied the three‑part test requiring proof of an interest in the funds, the absence of other assets or means to fund legal expenses, and the absence of competing ownership claims.

While the Crown conceded the accused had an interest in the seized funds, the court found he failed to establish that he lacked other available assets.

Given extensive evidence of undisclosed or unaccounted assets and the applicant’s lack of credibility, the court was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that no other means existed to fund counsel.