Dr. Maja Popovic

Judge-alone homicide trial arising from the disappearance of two young women connected by forensic and circumstantial evidence to the accused’s apartment, including DNA evidence, body dismemberment, body-part storage in a chest freezer, and extensive inculpatory statements.

The court admitted count-on-count similar act evidence under the Handy framework, finding sufficient connectivity between the two incidents to support limited uses including death, culpable homicide, coincidence rebuttal, and after-the-fact conduct analysis.

On the evidence relating to one victim, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused death by repeated blunt-force head strikes during a sexual assault, and that the murder was first degree under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

On the other count, the court found the accused unlawfully caused death and dismembered the body, but the evidentiary gap on intent left a reasonable doubt on murder, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, brought multiple Charter applications seeking the exclusion of evidence.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel regarding initial utterances to police, his s. 9 right against arbitrary detention regarding his arrest for one of the murders, and his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure regarding the forensic re-testing of a seized knife and freezer, as well as the use of a general warrant to obtain Google data.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no Charter breaches.

The court held the accused was not detained prior to his arrest, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, no residual privacy interest remained in the lawfully seized physical items, and the general warrant was appropriately issued.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the trial judge ruled on several motions.

The judge excused a prospective juror for obvious partiality under s. 632(c) of the Criminal Code.

A motion to sever one of the co-accused due to his counsel's illness was dismissed, as the jury was willing to wait and the public interest favoured a joint trial.

The judge also dismissed a Charter application alleging that the consumption of a DNA negative control by the Centre of Forensic Sciences breached the accused's rights, finding the control was an analytical tool rather than first-party disclosure.

Finally, a request for a mid-trial instruction regarding an in-dock identification was denied, with the judge opting to provide a general warning about eyewitness identification instead.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to file a DNA expert's written report as an exhibit after the expert had already provided viva voce evidence.

The defence objected, arguing the report was prejudicial.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, ruling that the report was inadmissible because it added nothing to the oral testimony, contained matters not explored in evidence, and risked misleading or confusing the jury.

The court emphasized that the expert's evidence is their testimony, not their report.