ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025-02-27
COURT FILE No.: Belleville 23-13102362
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JEREMY BROWN
Before Justice J.R. Richardson
Heard on February 14, 2025
Oral Reasons for Judgment rendered on February 14, 2025
Written Reasons for Judgment released February 27, 2025
Kim Beauchamp — counsel for the Crown
David Barrison — counsel for Mr. Brown
Introduction
1The issue in this case is the appropriate sentence for a 25-year-old man, with no prior record, who has been found guilty after trial of possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, carrying a concealed weapon, careless storage and knowledge of unauthorized possession of a firearm.
2This case is complicated by the fact that before the offences before me were committed, the accused had committed a homicide in Omemee, Ontario. He was not, however, charged with that homicide until after he was charged with the offences before me.
3He has since pleaded to manslaughter and sentenced to the equivalent of an eleven-year sentence.
4The accused used a firearm to commit the manslaughter.
Facts of the Offences Before Me
5On May 9, 2021, Quinte West OPP responded to an intimate partner violence complaint on Telephone Road. After interviewing the two protagonists, Paige and Mr. Brown, the police determined that no offence had taken place.
6One of the attending officers was asked by Larry, another individual present, who was Paige’s step-father, to go outside to speak about something. Once outside, Larry gestured at the officer’s firearm and told the officer that the accused “had one”.
7The officer went downstairs and detained Mr. Brown, who was seated on the bed next to Paige, holding the couple’s baby. In the course of the detention, Paige asked Mr. Brown to give her a satchel/purse, that was around Mr. Brown’s shoulder. She referred to the satchel as her “purse”. The police, who were detaining Mr. Brown, refused to let him relinquish custody of the purse/satchel to Paige.
8Mr. Brown was then handcuffed, taken upstairs in the house and taken outside. Once outside, in order to conduct a pat-down search, the officers removed his handcuffs so as to take the satchel and set it on the ground. In the course of doing so, the officers observed a butt of a firearm sticking out from the satchel.
9Mr. Brown was charged with a number of offences including:
a) being in possession of a firearm with a tampered serial number contrary to section 108(1)(b) of the Criminal Code;
b) carrying a concealed weapon contrary to section 90 of the Criminal Code;
c) possession of a weapon dangerous to the public contrary to section 88 of the Criminal Code;
d) careless storage of a firearm contrary to section 86(1) of the Criminal Code;
e) unauthorized possession of a firearm contrary to section 91(1) of the Criminal Code;
f) possession of a firearm without a registration certificate contrary to section 92(1) of the Criminal Code.
10Defence brought an application for a finding that in detaining Mr. Brown and searching the satchel/purse, Mr. Brown’s rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were breached and the firearm should not be admitted into evidence in the face of those breaches as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2).
11The Crown conceded the breach of section 10(a) but argued that the other sections had not been breached. The Crown also argued that admission of the firearm into evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
12The matter came on before me for trial on the application on April 2, 2024. I orally dismissed the application on April 3, 2024. I released written reasons on July 16, 2024. Those reasons are now reported as R. v. Brown, 2024 ONCJ 345.
13Once the Charter application was dismissed, counsel invited the Court to make a finding of guilt. I found Mr. Brown guilty of the following offences:
a) possession of a firearm with an altered serial number;
b) carrying a concealed weapon;
c) careless storage of a firearm;
d) knowledge of unauthorized possession of a firearm.
14I stayed the charges of weapons dangerous and unauthorized possession of a firearm pursuant to the principles enunciated in R. v. Kienapple, 1974 SCC 14.
15The sentencing in this matter was delayed several months because Mr. Brown wished to resolve his homicide matter first.
The Manslaughter Conviction
16On December 20, 2024, Mr. Brown entered a guilty plea to manslaughter and was sentenced to the equivalent of an 11-year sentence made up of the following components:
a) the equivalent of 47 months of pretrial custody;
b) seven years and one month in the penitentiary;
c) a section 109 prohibition; and
d) DNA.
17On February 18, 2020, Alex Tobin died as the result of a single gunshot wound to the chest at his girlfriend’s residence located at 36 King Street East Apartment 1, Omemee.
18Mr. Brown and an unidentified male went to the residence to purchase marihuana from Tobin. During the transaction, the unidentified male took Tobin’s marihuana without paying for it. This resulted in an altercation.
19Mr. Brown was armed with a firearm. He pulled out his firearm during the altercation. He believed that Mr. Tobin was reaching for the firearm and he pulled the trigger.
20Mr. Tobin suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his left chest.
21At the time of the incident, Mr. Brown had a license to lawfully possess firearms.
22On February 18, 2020 – the same day as the shooting – Mr. Brown and his father called police and reported a theft of firearms from his residence. This report was fabricated. One of the firearms reported stolen was the firearm used to kill Mr. Tobin.
23In February 2021, police executed a search warrant in Oshawa in relation to an unrelated investigation. The firearm used to kill Mr. Tobin (and reported stolen by Mr. Brown and his father) was recovered.
24Mr. Brown was arrested and charged in relation to the homicide on May 12, 2022.
25He has been detained ever since.
The Criminal Record
26Mr. Brown’s criminal record consists of convictions for manslaughter, as I have set out above, and failing to comply with a release order. The convictions for these offences post-date the commission of the offences before me. Thus, he had no record at the time that the offences before me were committed.
27He received a suspended sentence and probation for the fail to comply.
The Accused’s Background
28I asked the parties for written submissions.
29Defence advised that Mr. Brown is 29 years of age. He was 25 when the offences before me were committed.
30He has a four-year-old son.
31He has a supportive family.
32He has sickle cell disease and is on the waiting list for a bone marrow transplant. It is known to this Court that sickle cell disease can be an extremely painful and debilitating disease.
33Today, in the course of hearing final oral submissions, I was given a copy of a Pre-Sentence Report that was prepared for Mr. Brown’s sentencing on the manslaughter charge. It reveals the following:
a) Mr. Brown is the younger of two children in his family.
b) He was born in Scarborough.
c) He lived with his grandparents until 2005 when the family moved to Ajax.
d) Living conditions while he was at his grandparent’s address were not great. It was very crowded. Other residences that he lived in before the family moved to Ajax were infested with rodents. The areas that they lived in were areas of high violent crime.
e) Despite the move to better living conditions, Mr. Brown’s parents’ relationship deteriorated, and they separated when Mr. Brown was in Grade 10.
f) There was a custody battle for the children which lasted some three years. The family home had to be sold.
g) Mr. Brown initially lived with his father, but in 2020, moved to live with his mother and his brother.
h) Mr. Brown had a significant relationship with an intimate partner which lasted four years. Mr. Brown told the author of the pre-sentence report that he ended the relationship because it was toxic. His former partner died of an overdose in 2020. He is said to have been devastated by news of her death and he has been dealing with depression ever since.
i) Mr. Brown then started a relationship with the person I infer to be Paige. It has been in decline since he was arrested on the manslaughter charges.
j) His grandmother died in 2023 and it has been difficult for him to deal with this as well.
k) Mr. Brown was diagnosed with sickle cell disease when he was nine months old. He is said to have spent his childhood in and out of hospital. He is at a high risk of stroke because of his disease.
l) He is awaiting a bone marrow transplant.
m) He reported that he was sexually abused by a camp counsellor when he was ten years old.
n) Mr. Brown completed his elementary and secondary school education. He was bullied when he was in elementary school because he is smaller.
o) He enrolled in a university program for Business Administration but withdrew from that because he decided it was not something he wanted to do.
p) He then enrolled and completed two years of a three-year program in social work. He withdrew from that to pursue employment.
q) He worked first as a security guard. After he was charged and unable to get security clearance, he worked doing electrical work. His long-term plan is to complete his education to become a licensed electrician.
r) He does not endorse problems with alcohol or drugs. He uses alcohol and marihuana socially. He has prescription medication for codeine and morphine to manage pain caused by his sickle cell disease.
s) He was said to be cooperative with the author of the report.
t) He expressed remorse for killing Mr. Tobin. The author of the presentence report noted, however, that Mr. Brown tends to minimize responsibility for that offence, claiming that it occurred because of events in his life that he had no control over.
u) He has converted to Islam while in custody.
v) Four of his friends have died or been maimed as a result of gun violence. Two are paralyzed as a result of being shot.
w) He denied being affiliated with any gangs. The author of the presentence report contacted an officer with the Toronto Guns and Gangs Unit who reported that they are not aware of Mr. Brown having any gang affiliation.
34There is no report concerning the social context (commonly referred to as a Morris report) pertaining to Mr. Brown, who is a Black man.
35As Justice Green observed in R. v. McLarty-Mathieu, 2022 ONCJ 498 at paragraphs 14 and 15:
As gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, judges must be acutely aware that overreliance on academic achievement or employment success as mitigating factors can be unintentionally discriminatory. Of course, stereotypical assumptions about a black person’s background should never influence a sentencing decision.
In the collaborative expert’s report filed as Appendix A in the Morris decision, the Court had the benefit of extensive statistical analysis about the socio-economic impact of systemic racism on black Canadians commencing as children right through to adulthood. Black children are far more likely to be apprehended by child welfare agencies negatively impacting familial bonds. Black students are statistically less likely to succeed in school. Young black Canadians are far less likely to secure stable employment and when they do, they receive disproportionately lower pay. Incarceration rates are disproportionality higher among black offenders.
Mr. Brown’s Statement in Court
36When I asked Mr. Brown if there was anything he would like to tell me, he said that he was sorry for what he had done. He also said he was sorry for the time that it took to complete this matter. He thanked me for sentencing him today so that he can get on with serving his sentence in the penitentiary. I note that he has been confined in the reformatory since the sentencing on the manslaughter in December 2024. He is eager to get on with serving his sentence. It is known to this Court that conditions in the penitentiary are generally better than they are in the reformatory.
The Position of the Parties
37The Crown seeks a sentence of two years in custody, to be served consecutive to the sentence that Mr. Brown received for the manslaughter.
38Defence seeks a sentence of one year consecutive.
Aggravating Facts
39The Crown points to the following aggravating factors:
a) the criminal record;
b) the nature of the firearm seized – a handgun;
c) the fact that the serial number had been altered;
d) the fact that the handgun was concealed in Mr. Brown’s satchel;
e) the fact that Mr. Brown was holding his child while he possessed the handgun and therefore potentially dangerous to the child;
f) the fact that he was in the vicinity of his girlfriend and her parents while he possessed the handgun and therefore potentially dangerous towards them;
g) the fact that he was in the vicinity of the police, who were initially unaware of the handgun when they were on scene and investigating a domestic incident and therefore potentially dangerous towards them, the girlfriend, the parents and the baby.
Mitigating Factors
40Defence counsel pointed to the following factors:
a) The accused’s age;
b) The fact that he is now serving a significant sentence for manslaughter (the sentencing principle of totality).
41Defence counsel acknowledged that Mr. Brown is not entitled to any mitigation for an early guilty plea.
Factual Issues in Dispute
42The Crown says that it is aggravating that the firearm was loaded. Defence states that the fact that the firearm was loaded was never proven.
43The Crown says that Mr. Brown’s possession of the firearm was “long-standing and deliberate as opposed to momentary possession”. Defence counsel says that there is no evidence as to the length of the accused’s possession.
44The Crown says that Mr. Brown’s possession of the firearm made him dangerous to anyone around him, in particular, his baby, his girlfriend, his girlfriend’s parents and the police. Defence says that in light of the fact that it is not proven that the firearm was loaded, “it is unclear how he was dangerous to anyone in his proximity.”
Has the Crown Proven that the Firearm was Loaded?
45With respect to whether the firearm was loaded, I note that one of the offences that Mr. Brown was originally charged with was an offence contrary to section 95(1), that is possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition.
46At the outset of the trial, Crown counsel advised that she was not in a position to prove the charge and I dismissed it.
47However, the Crown filed – on consent – documents to the effect that the firearm met the definition of a “firearm” and ammunition seized met the definition of “ammunition”. The photographs that were filed in evidence are inconclusive as to whether the firearm was loaded when it was seized.
48I went back and listened to the evidence of the seizing officer, Constable Clark which revealed the following:
a) Constable Clark arrived on scene at 4:13 pm. When he arrived, he heard one of the officers say “gun”. He went to assist but was not needed.
b) He stated that “after everything calmed down a little bit”, he retrieved the bag that had been taken from the accused. He checked the gun to ensure that it was not loaded. He then secured the bag with the gun in his cruiser.
c) He transported the bag with the gun back to the detachment. Upon arrival he secured the bag with the gun in the vault at the Quinte West Detachment. He then went and assisted with lodging Mr. Brown into custody.
d) When he was finished with that, he went back and retrieved the bag from the vault and started going through the contents of the bag to document its contents.
e) The firearm, which he described as a silver .357 magnum Taurus handgun, was located in the main pocket of the bag.
f) A photo of the ammunition was filed but Constable Clark simply referred to it as ammunition that he received “in the course of the investigation”. Nowhere in his detailed recitation of what he located in the bag, does he indicate that he found the bullets in the firearm, or for that matter, in the bag.
49I therefore find that the Crown has not proven that the gun was loaded.
Has the Crown Proven that Mr. Brown’s Possession was Long-Standing?
50With respect to the issue of whether Mr. Brown’s possession was “long-standing and deliberate” or “momentary”, I agree with defence counsel’s submission that there is no evidence as to how long Mr. Brown was in possession of the firearm.
51It was found in a satchel that Mr. Brown was wearing around his neck. He tried to pass the satchel off to his girlfriend when he realised that the police were detaining him. He clearly knew that the firearm was there and he had control over it.
52A number of documents belonging to him were found in the bag. There was nothing tying the bag to Paige.
53On the evidence before me, however, I cannot find how long he had knowledge of and control over the firearm.
Was Mr. Brown’s Possession Dangerous to Anyone in his Proximity?
54Regardless of whether the firearm was loaded, I find that Mr. Brown’s possession of it was dangerous to anyone in his proximity.
55I made those findings at trial with respect to the issue of section 10(a) and 10(b). I noted at paragraph 144(e), (f) and (g) of the judgment that the threat to public safety and officer safety was very high. Indeed, it was so great that it justified Constable Szijarto’s decision not to give the accused his 10(a) and 10(b) rights.
56A confrontation in a small room – with two civilians present, one of whom was a defenceless child – between Mr. Brown and a number of armed police officers could have resulted in devastating consequences for everyone in the vicinity, even others occupying the house (the girlfriend’s parents) and anyone who might have been nearby.
57Once the police had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Brown was in possession of the firearm, they had to act with dispatch to protect their safety and the safety of everyone else. This was not a situation where the police can be expected to stop and ensure that the firearm is unloaded.
58The potential for a devastating — if not deadly — result was very high.
Analysis
59Section 718 of the Criminal Code states:
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.
60Section 718.1 states:
A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
61Section 718.2 sets out “other sentencing principles”:
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) …..
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.
62In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the “cardinal principle” of sentencing law is the principle of proportionality enshrined in section 718.1. That is, the more serious the crime and the greater the degree of the offender’s responsibility, the more severe the sentence will be. This must be balanced against the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
63Lacasse also describes sentencing as a “delicate task”. Other cases have established the principle that sentencing is a highly individualized process.
64Possession of a loaded handgun is, in and of itself, usually deserving of a denunciatory and deterrent sentence.
65In R. v. Smickle, 2013 ONCA 678, the offender was 27 years of age, had no record and was in possession of a loaded cocked handgun when the police executed a search warrant. The trial judge found that the accused was taking photos of himself with the handgun and trying to “look cool”. With respect to the danger posed to the public, Justice Doherty stated at paragraphs 28 and 30:
The respondent was not off by himself in some isolated forest playing with a fully loaded cocked handgun. He was in someone else’s apartment located in a high-rise apartment building. It is fair to assume there were other people in the adjoining apartments who could well have been at risk had the gun accidentally discharged. Furthermore, as subsequent events clearly demonstrated, the respondent had no idea of, and no control over, what might happen as he was playing with the fully loaded cocked handgun. The police who were engaged in an important and dangerous public duty were clearly put at risk by the respondent’s conduct. Surely, it is a matter of good fortune that someone was not hurt either by the accidental discharge of the respondent’s firearm or by the police response to the apparent threat posed by the respondent. (Emphasis mine).
The respondent’s conduct falls squarely at the “true crime” end of the s. 95 spectrum I described in Nur. He had a loaded cocked gun in his hand. He was engaged in conduct that posed a serious and immediate risk to others. He had no authority to possess the gun at any place or in any circumstances. Even having regard to the personal circumstances of the offender, a sentence approaching or at the maximum reformatory sentence (two years less a day) would have been appropriate absent a mandatory minimum sentence.
66See also, R. v. Smickle, 2014 ONCA 49.
67In R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, the police were called to the report of a home invasion robbery. The complainant described the culprits as four Black men. On police arrival, there were four Black men walking in a nearby parking lot. Mr. Morris ran from the police after being told by them to stop. During the course of the pursuit, he ducked into a stairwell. When he came out of the stairwell, the pursuing officer noticed that he was not wearing a jacket. The officer ultimately was able to take Mr. Morris into custody. He went back to the stairwell and recovered the jacket. It contained a loaded 38 calibre prohibited firearm. Mr. Morris was never charged with the robbery. He was convicted at trial by a jury.
68He was 23 when he committed the offences and 26 when he was sentenced. He did not have a criminal record.
69The Court of Appeal had this to say about the nature of gun crime at paragraph 68:
Gun crimes involving the possession of loaded, concealed firearms in public places pose a real and immediate danger to the public, especially anyone who interacts with the gun holder. When the person with the gun is confronted by the police, who are engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, the risk increases dramatically. It increases yet again when the gun holder flees, and still again when the gun holder discards the weapon in a public place. A person who carries a concealed, loaded handgun in public undermines the community’s sense of safety and security. Carrying a concealed, loaded handgun in a public place in Canada is antithetical to the Canadian concept of a free and ordered society: see Nur (ONCA), at paras. 82, 206; R. v. Felawka, 1993 SCC 36, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 199, at pp. 214-15. (Emphasis mine)
70As I have noted, in the case before me, Mr. Brown was not possessing a loaded firearm. He was not possessing a firearm in a public place. Nor did he flee. However, on the facts of this case, as I have set out above, this is a distinction without much of a difference. As I have said, the potential danger to police and to others who were in the vicinity was incredibly high and that is the gravamen of this offence.
71The Court of Appeal went on to find, citing R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 that a three year penitentiary sentence was appropriate in the “vast majority of offences” in cases involving gun crimes where there is unlawful possession of a loaded handgun in a public place.
72In Morris, supra, the Court of Appeal found that the appropriate sentence, having regard to the offender’s challenges with his mental and physical health, and the social context evidence, was two years less a day for a section 95 offence.
73In R. v. Fagan, 2024 ONSC 2718, the offender was found guilty of a section 95 offence. The facts involved the offender discharging a 40 calibre handgun at least five times on a residential street in Brampton. The offender was young and Black. He had no criminal record. He pleaded guilty. He expressed remorse. He had been subject to anti-Black racism that limited his education opportunities, shaped his world view and narrowed his peer group. He believed that arming himself was the only way he could remain safe. After noting that the appropriate sentence would normally be between three and three and a half years in the penitentiary, Justice Stribopoulos found that the mitigating factors mandated a sentence of two years less a day in the reformatory, to be followed by two years probation.
74In R. v. Bajraktari, 2024 ONSC 4536, the offender was found guilty of a section 95 offence after he was found in possession of a loaded 9 millimetre handgun in a satchel located at his feet. He was a rear passenger in a vehicle that was detained by police pursuant to investigation under the Liquor Licence Act for open liquor. At the time of the offence, the offender was 19 years old. He had a deprived upbringing. His father was deported to Albania. He was a first-time offender. He conceded the Crown’s case after he was unsuccessful in a Charter application. The sentencing judge specifically found that the offender was not a danger to the public and not a violent offender. There were immigration consequences that could potentially be mitigated if he was given a conditional sentence. Justice Sugunasiri sentenced the offender to two years less a day conditional.
75There are a number of other cases where conditional sentences have been imposed in cases of young Black men who are first time offenders and who possessed loaded handguns, or handguns with readily accessible ammunition: see most recently for example, R. v. Vanderhyden-Steaman, 2025 ONCJ 22.
76On the facts before me, however, it is clear that Mr. Brown is not entitled to a conditional sentence. I reject a conditional sentence on the basis that Mr. Brown has already been sentenced to a significant term of custody in the penitentiary for manslaughter with a firearm.
77Denunciation and deterrence demand, not only a custodial sentence, but a significant consecutive custodial sentence.
78At the time he committed the offences before me, Mr. Brown had already killed Mr. Tobin with a firearm.
79While I accept that he now expresses remorse and regret for killing Mr. Tobin, between the commission of that offence in February 2020 and his arrest for it in May of 2022, Mr. Brown no doubt was hoping that he got away with it.
80Whether that is the case or not, I would have thought that this experience would have been a life-changing event for Mr. Brown, after which he would have refused to have anything to do with firearms.
81But that was not the case. Fifteen months after that fateful day in Omemee, Mr. Brown was in possession of a prohibited handgun in Quinte West. He was not authorized to possess it. His possession was concealed. The firearm had an obliterated serial number.
82I say this not to punish Mr. Brown for the manslaughter offence twice. I say this to deter Mr. Brown and other like-minded individuals from a life of possession of dangerous firearms and to denounce this repugnant and dangerous crime.
83I also say this to illustrate that despite the experience of killing a man with a firearm, Mr. Brown’s actions did not deter him.
84It is further aggravating that the handgun that he was in possession of, had its serial number altered.
85The only reason to possess a handgun with an obliterated serial number is to keep the authorities from learning what the origin of that handgun is.
86Some may quarrel with the fact that the sentencing authorities that I have referred to all involve possession of a loaded firearm or a firearm where ammunition is readily accessible, which is viewed to be a more serious crime than the unauthorized possession offence that I have found Mr. Brown guilty of.
87On the facts of this case, I find that it matters little that the firearm was not loaded or that the ammunition was not readily accessible. It matters little that the firearm was being possessed in a dwelling house, as opposed to a public place.
88It matters greatly that there were others nearby who were in danger due to the possession of the firearm including Mr. Brown’s little baby, his girlfriend, his girlfriend’s family and the police.
89A significant consecutive custodial sentence must be imposed in order to deter and denounce his conduct.
Sentence Imposed
90The sentence that I impose is:
a) For the offence of possessing a firearm with an altered serial number, the sentence is six months.
b) For the offence of carrying a concealed weapon, the sentence is six months consecutive.
c) For the offence of careless storage of a firearm, the sentence is six months concurrent.
d) For the offence of possession of a firearm knowing that its possession is unauthorized, the sentence is nine months consecutive. I impose a nine month sentence to reflect the sentencing principles of restraint and totality, to take into account the fact that Mr. Brown suffers from sickle cell disease and to recognize the social context in which Mr. Brown, a Black man from Scarborough and Durham Region, has lived. Otherwise I would have imposed a twelve-month sentence for this offence.
e) These sentences will be served consecutively to the sentence that Mr. Brown is serving for the manslaughter conviction.
f) Additionally, I will impose a section 110 prohibition for ten years and an order for the taking of Mr. Brown’s DNA.
Released: February 27, 2025
Signed: Justice J.R. Richardson