Paula Thompson

A youth was convicted of multiple offences arising from events in 2013 involving the recruitment and exploitation of a 14-year-old girl for sexual services in Toronto.

The offences included attempt to procure, exercise control, living off avails of a person under 18, perjury, intimidation, obstruction of a peace officer, and failure to comply with orders.

The court imposed an adult sentence of four years imprisonment, with 306 days remaining after credit for pre-sentence custody calculated at 1.5:1.

The court also imposed three years of probation with conditions including counseling, education/employment requirements, no contact with the victim, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

A young person was charged with manslaughter in the death of a four-year-old child.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to his father, who was acting as a police agent without the accused's knowledge.

The accused had previously been interviewed by police and had retained counsel who advised him not to make statements.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statements made during a hotel meeting between the accused and his father, where the father was instructed by police to attempt to elicit information about the child's death.

The central issue was whether the use of the accused's father as a police agent to obtain statements constituted an abuse of process that would render the evidence inadmissible.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a sample into an approved screening device contrary to Section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

Following a traffic stop on July 6, 2013, where the defendant's vehicle failed to stop at an intersection, police observed the defendant's suspicious behavior and detected an odour of alcohol and empty beer cans in the vehicle.

The defendant was directed to provide breath samples using an approved screening device but made ten unsuccessful attempts.

The Crown alleged the defendant failed to provide suitable samples; the defendant claimed he attempted to provide samples but was unable to do so due to fear stemming from prior traumatic experiences with police in his home country.

The court found credibility and reliability issues with the police officer's evidence regarding the specifics of each sample attempt, particularly the lack of detailed contemporaneous notes.

The defendant was acquitted.

Two young persons were charged with multiple offences related to the trafficking and exploitation of a 14-year-old girl for prostitution in Toronto over a ten-day period in September and October 2013.

The charges included procuring a minor to become a prostitute, attempting to procure a minor to become a prostitute, failing to comply with youth court orders, obstructing police, living on the avails of prostitution of a minor, exercising control over a minor for exploitation, intimidating a minor to perform acts of prostitution, and participating in the activity of a criminal organization.

The court found that the defendants organized and facilitated a crude but deliberate criminal enterprise involving the recruitment, transportation, and exploitation of underage girls for sexual services.

The victim was recruited through peer networks, transported to Toronto, housed in hotels, advertised online, and forced to engage in multiple sexual transactions while receiving no compensation.

The court convicted on most counts but dismissed counts relating to counselling and certain control offences due to insufficient evidence on those specific elements.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial focused on the identity of the driver and whether the evidence proved care and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown's case relied on a McDonald's employee's observations, the arresting officer's testimony, and Breathalyzer results.

The defence called the accused's brother and cousin who testified regarding the evening's events.

The court found the accused guilty of care and control over 80 but acquitted on the impaired charge and found insufficient evidence regarding the McDonald's incident.

The accused was sentenced to the minimum fine of $1,000 plus a $150 surcharge and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The accused faced a single remaining count of obstructing justice after resolving other charges by plea.

The allegation was that he misled the court about his identity by allowing himself to be presented under an assumed name and by providing a false birth date during a bail appearance.

The court held that giving a knowingly false birth date that perpetuated the court’s misunderstanding of the accused’s identity constituted the actus reus of obstruction under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

Although the accused testified that he intended only to maintain the status quo until consulting counsel, the court found that his purpose at the time was to preserve concealment of his true identity.

The Crown proved both the actus reus and specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest after the lawyer provided brief legal advice to a material Crown witness who was also the accused’s power of attorney.

The witness had contacted the lawyer seeking guidance about police questioning relating to potential obstruction charges.

The court applied the principles governing removal of counsel, including the accused’s fundamental right to counsel of choice and the requirement that counsel be free from disqualifying conflicts.

Finding that no solicitor‑client relationship existed between the lawyer and the witness and that no confidential information had been imparted, the court held that no realistic risk of conflict had been established.

The application was therefore dismissed, although the trial judge retained the ability to impose measures such as independent cross‑examination if necessary.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the Crown failed to establish that the accused understood the breath demand made by the arresting officer, a prerequisite for the admission of breath test evidence.

The court held that while evidence established that a demand was made and complied with, there was no evidence that the accused understood the nature of the demand.

Without evidence satisfying the informational component required for lawful breath demands, the statutory preconditions for admitting the breath certificate were not met.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The applicant, charged jointly with a co-accused for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, brought a motion to sever his trial from that of his co-accused.

The applicant argued that a statement made by the co-accused to police, which placed the applicant at the scene, would cause prejudice if heard by a jury in a joint trial.

The court applied the factors for severance and concluded that a strong limiting instruction to the jury would be sufficient to prevent prejudice.

The application for severance was dismissed.