Tim Gleason

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The moving party, a construction company, sought to transfer its appeal of a lien action dismissal order from the Court of Appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, or alternatively an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The motion judge found that conflicting precedents — TRS Components and Arcamm — created genuine uncertainty over whether the appeal route under s. 71 of the Construction Act lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal.

Unable to conclude the appeal was filed in the wrong court, the motion judge declined the transfer.

The extension of time was granted given that both parties had operated under the shared mistaken assumption that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, which was attributable to the competing jurisprudence rather than inadvertence.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect a cross-appeal against a Divisional Court decision regarding the Law Society of Ontario's voiding of licensing exam results and registrations following a security breach.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld the LSO's decision to void registrations as procedurally fair, finding the decision to be administrative rather than adjudicative in nature.

The moving party sought to challenge the fairness of the voiding of her barrister exam result and the LSO's failure to disclose a key statistical report (the Caveon Report).

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed cross-appeal lacked merit and that the justice of the case did not favour granting an extension of time.

This costs endorsement follows the Law Society of Ontario’s successful motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court orders each of the moving parties severally liable for costs of $200, payable to the Law Society of Ontario, on a partial indemnity basis.

The court dismissed Aqib Rahman's action against Dewart Gleason LLP and Lawyers Professional Indemnity Company as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim alleged civil fraud by the defendants in defending lawyers in prior litigation, but the court found that the doctrine of absolute privilege, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rahman v. Elia Associates, provided a complete defence.

The court held that the action was devoid of merit, sought to relitigate settled issues, and should not proceed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed a motion by 13 respondents to re-open an appeal regarding the Law Society of Ontario’s decision to void their licensing exam results and registrations due to exam integrity breaches.

The court found that the moving parties had not been denied judicial review, that their complaint was about the adequacy of reasons rather than a rare circumstance justifying re-opening, and that the interests of justice did not require reconsideration.

The court held that the Law Society’s actions were consistent with its by-laws and that the moving parties’ arguments had been addressed.

This endorsement addresses a scheduling dispute in a class action involving dentists who purchased insurance policies brokered by CDSPI Advisory Services Inc. and issued by Aviva companies.

The plaintiffs sought to adjourn upcoming motions for settlement approval and a stay of proceedings, pending an anticipated Court of Appeal decision in Thrive Capital Management Ltd. et al v. Noble 1324 Queen Inc. et al., which may reconsider the principles in Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited regarding partial settlements.

The court declined to adjourn, emphasizing the need for timely resolution and noting that new procedural rules (Rule 49.14) would be in force for the scheduled hearing.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its administrative decision to void the registrations of 20 licensing candidates implicated in a cheating scandal.

The Divisional Court had found the LSO breached procedural fairness by not holding oral hearings before voiding the registrations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the Baker factors and conflated the LSO's administrative licensing functions with its disciplinary good character functions.

The Court held that the written process provided by the LSO, which included disclosure and multiple opportunities to respond, satisfied the duty of procedural fairness.

The Court also admitted new evidence and found the Divisional Court breached procedural fairness by making costs orders without allowing submissions.

The court considered a motion by the Defendants for leave to late-serve an expert report on the standard of care in a real estate negligence action.

The report was served after the pre-trial conference, and the Third Parties opposed its admission.

The court applied the test under Rule 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay, whether prejudice would result, and whether the trial would be unduly delayed.

The court found the explanation of solicitor’s inadvertence to be at the low end of reasonable, but accepted it.

The court concluded that any prejudice could be managed by costs or adjournment, and that the trial would not be unduly delayed.

Leave was granted to admit the report, subject to strict terms to protect the Third Parties.

The court considered a motion by LLF Lawyers LLP to dismiss the action against them on the basis that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that confidential information was disclosed by an LLF employee to her spouse, who then defamed the plaintiff.

The court found that the statement of claim, as supplemented by particulars, disclosed a cause of action in favour of Michael Kelsey against LLF Lawyers LLP, and dismissed the motion as against him.

The action by The House Consulting Group Inc. was dismissed for not pleading a lawyer-client relationship or disclosure of its confidential information.

The appellant, a condominium unit owner, sued the lawyers who represented the condominium corporation in prior litigation, alleging fraud, perjury, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made by solicitors in the course of litigation are protected by absolute privilege, there is no civil cause of action for perjury, and solicitors owe no duty of care to opposing parties.

A police officer and her children sued the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) and several officers, as well as a lawyer designated to prosecute her, for civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, negligence, defamation, and abuse of non-criminal proceedings.

The DRPS defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration due to a collective agreement.

The lawyer defendant (Johnstone) moved to strike the claim against him for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, among other grounds.

The court dismissed the DRPS defendants' motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute, involving alleged police misconduct targeting the plaintiff and her family in their private capacities, transcended the collective agreement.

However, the court granted Johnstone's motion to strike, finding the pleadings against him did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and refused leave to amend.

Aviva Insurance Company of Canada brought a motion to set aside its notice of abandonment of appeal, seeking leave to file a new factum or an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal.

The respondent, 8262900 Canada Inc. (CarePartners), brought a cross-motion for directions regarding its cross-appeal.

Aviva had abandoned its appeal after an application judge found partial insurance coverage but did not address apportionment of costs, an issue Aviva intended to pursue in a new application.

CarePartners' subsequent supplementary cross-appeal raised res judicata and issue estoppel, which Aviva's counsel had not anticipated when abandoning the appeal.

The court dismissed Aviva's motion, finding the abandonment was a deliberate strategic decision, not due to inadvertence, mistake, or misapprehension.

The court emphasized the importance of finality in litigation and found Aviva's proposed appeal on apportionment lacked merit as the issue was not raised before the application judge.

CarePartners' cross-motion for directions was granted.

The appellant contested the denial of statutory accident benefits following a 2010 automobile accident, bringing simultaneous proceedings before the Divisional Court by way of statutory appeal on questions of law and judicial review on questions of fact and mixed fact and law.

The courts below held that, where there is a limited statutory right of appeal, judicial review should only be exercised in exceptional or rare cases.

The Supreme Court of Canada held this was an error: a circumscribed statutory right of appeal on questions of law does not restrict the availability of judicial review on questions of fact or mixed fact and law, and the Strickland framework does not support imposing a heightened threshold for judicial review in such circumstances.

The Court further found that the LAT adjudicator's reconsideration decision was unreasonable because he failed to consider the effect of the reinstatement of income replacement benefits on the validity of the initial denial and failed to have regard to relevant tribunal jurisprudence on the point.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the LAT adjudicator for reconsideration.

The defendants successfully brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion.

The court found no reason to depart from the presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the plaintiff's action was brought for an improper purpose to stifle public expression.

The plaintiff's offer to settle, which required retractions and apologies, was deemed unreasonable given the court's prior findings.

While the court found the defendants' lawyers' time excessive, it awarded costs of $132,268.17 on a full indemnity basis, a reduction from the claimed amount, deeming it fair, reasonable, and within the plaintiff's reasonable expectation given his prior involvement in similar cases.

The Estate Trustee of T.O. brought a motion to amend a notice of appeal to add two corporations, The Ridgeway Education Rec Centre Ltd. and 2012023 Ontario Limited, as respondents.

The original appeal, initiated by T.O. before his death, sought repayment of loans from these corporations, but the notice of appeal inadvertently named only D.O. as the respondent.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, applying the five-factor test for amending a notice of appeal after perfection.

The court found that the appellant had the requisite intention to appeal against the corporations, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence and promptly addressed, there was no relevant prejudice to the respondents (who shared counsel and were aware of the claim), the appeal had arguable merit regarding the Limitations Act, and the justice of the case favored determining the matter on its merits.

The plaintiff retained the defendant lawyers for a human rights application but later terminated the retainer.

The defendants sought unpaid legal fees through arbitration as required by the retainer agreement.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action seeking a declaration that the arbitration clause was invalid, damages for malpractice, and a fee assessment.

The defendants moved to stay the action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court granted the stay, finding that the dispute fell within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement and that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine threshold issues of validity.

The appellants, a newspaper publisher and his company, appealed the dismissal of their defamation and other tort claims against city councillors, school trustees, and media entities under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The appellants had published articles critical of the Toronto Catholic District School Board's LGBTQ2S+ policies, using derogatory language.

The respondents, in turn, took action to have the City of Toronto cease advertising in the appellants' newspaper, alleging the articles promoted homophobia and transphobia.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the respondents' expressions related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the respondents had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment).

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the fair comment defence was viable, and that the appellants' constitutional arguments regarding freedom of expression and religious protection were without merit.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, Tegan Adams, brought a motion for partial summary judgment against Ruth Chun and Chun Law Professional Corporation, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and professional negligence.

The motion specifically sought a finding of breach of fiduciary duty or, in the alternative, the existence of a fiduciary relationship.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the evidentiary record incomplete and inadequate for summary judgment, particularly due to a lack of documentary discovery, examinations for discovery, and necessary witness testimony, as well as significant credibility issues.

The court emphasized that the existence of a fiduciary duty could not be bifurcated from the broader issues of the case.

This is a costs endorsement following motions by three groups of defendants to strike the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim.

The court had previously substantially granted the motion by the 1Plus12 Corporation defendants, dismissed the motions by the Ricci and Karp defendants to strike the statement of claim against them, and struck the plaintiff's affidavit.

This endorsement determines the costs payable between the parties.

The 1Plus12 defendants were awarded $17,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, as they were substantially successful.

The Ricci defendants were awarded $9,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, despite their motion to stay being dismissed, due to the necessity of responding to allegations of criminal conduct that were struck.

No costs were awarded to or against the Karp defendants, as their motion to strike the claim against them was dismissed, although they succeeded in striking the plaintiff's affidavit.