Michael T. Doi

Following a trial where the plaintiff was wholly unsuccessful in his claim for personal injury damages arising from an arrest by security guards, the parties submitted written arguments on costs.

The plaintiff sought to be exempted from costs as a public interest litigant, which the court rejected due to his significant financial motive.

The defendants sought elevated costs, alleging the plaintiff's claims of racial profiling and excessive force were scandalous, but the court found the claims were arguable and supported by some evidence.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs fixed at $236,000.00.

The moving defendant sought to strike or stay the plaintiff's civil action, arguing it duplicated issues in an ongoing family proceeding between the defendants.

The plaintiff, the mother of one of the defendants, claimed she provided a $250,000 mortgage for the defendants' matrimonial home.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the plaintiff was not a party to the family litigation and her claim was not duplicative.

Instead, the court ordered that the civil action and the family proceeding be heard together or one after the other, as they shared common questions of fact and law regarding the alleged mortgage.

The defendant requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The statement of claim consisted of only two lines alleging harassment, racism, hate crime, and defamatory libel, claiming $1 million, but lacked any material facts or particulars.

The plaintiff failed to provide submissions when notified of the court's concerns.

The court found the action to be clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and dismissed it without costs.

On a motion to transfer related Small Claims Court proceedings, the court refused to transfer a straightforward contract and unjust enrichment claim concerning the proceeds of jointly owned collectible coins, but transferred an unrelated oppression claim seeking corporate and declaratory relief beyond Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

Applying the governing transfer principles, the court held the moving party failed to show the coin claim could not be justly and fairly resolved under Small Claims Court procedures.

The court emphasized that transfer discretion is exercised sparingly and should not be used to obtain a strategic advantage by displacing a plaintiff's chosen forum.

The oppression claim was transferred because its pleaded relief plainly exceeded the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for assault, breach of undertaking, and distributing intimate images without consent, together with a custodial sentence totalling 14 months.

The court held that the appeal was not frivolous, surrender was not in issue, and the determinative question was whether detention was necessary in the public interest under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the public safety and public confidence framework, the court found that a strong surety plan and the applicant's prior compliance on release addressed safety and flight concerns.

The court further found that the proposed conviction appeal raised an arguable circumstantial-evidence burden-of-proof issue under Villaroman and that the sentence appeal was also arguable, while there was a real risk the applicant would serve most or all of the sentence before appeal.

Bail pending appeal was granted.

The applicant mother sought retroactive and prospective child support for two adult children suffering from sickle cell anaemia.

The respondent father contested jurisdiction, arguing the proper forum was Ireland, Nigeria, or Israel, and denied paternity despite DNA tests confirming his parentage to a 99.99999% probability.

The court found it had jurisdiction, confirmed the respondent's paternity, and awarded retroactive child support to August 1, 2016, citing the father's blameworthy conduct in evading his obligations.

The court also ordered prospective support with set termination dates and granted a final preservation order securing the support against the father's property.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced an action against the Attorney General of Ontario seeking damages for alleged wrongs committed by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The plaintiff had previously brought a similar action directly against the HRTO, which was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendant requested that the current action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the action was an attempt to relitigate the previously dismissed claim and constituted a collateral attack on the HRTO's decision.

Furthermore, the Crown is immune from liability for acts of a judicial nature.

The action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a $200 million action against the provincial Crown, the Secretary of the Cabinet, a hospital, and various physicians, alleging medical malpractice and abuse of power.

The Crown requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim against the government defendants lacked any legal basis or material facts, and the claim against the other defendants was an abuse of process as it duplicated an existing action.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendant requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The statement of claim consisted of only two lines of text alleging various wrongs and claiming $1 million, but lacked any material facts or particulars.

The plaintiff failed to provide submissions after being notified of the court's concerns.

The court found the action to be clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and dismissed it without costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion to sever the defendants' third-party action from her main action for the recovery of a loan.

The main action was a straightforward debt claim, while the third-party action involved complex allegations of misappropriation, breach of fiduciary duty, and defamation against former employees.

The court granted the motion, finding that keeping the actions together would cause unnecessary delay and prejudice to the plaintiff, and that severance would not cause injustice to the defendants or third parties.

The plaintiff moved to not enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict that dismissed his personal injury and racial profiling claims arising from an arrest by mall security for trespassing.

The plaintiff argued there was no evidence to support the jury's findings that the defendants had reasonable grounds to arrest him, did not use racial stereotypes, used reasonable force, and that he suffered no damages.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants led 'some evidence' on each issue, including expert testimony on use of force and medical causation, which the jury was entitled to accept.

Judgment was ordered to be entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.

The moving plaintiff sought summary judgment against a numbered company and its sole director to recover funds given for a failed cryptocurrency investment.

The company did not dispute its indebtedness but the director opposed personal liability.

The court found the director made fraudulent misrepresentations by guaranteeing that stop losses would protect the plaintiff's crypto investment capital when he had no basis to believe this was possible and later failed to disclose that stop losses could not be set on the chosen crypto platforms.

The court pierced the corporate veil under the Transamerica test, holding the director personally liable on a joint and several basis for the plaintiff's out-of-pocket loss of $152,086.41, being the principal investment less partial repayments.

As the loan agreement was tainted by fraud, the plaintiff was entitled to rescission and tort damages but not contractual interest.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of a municipal by-law prohibiting grass over 20 cm and certain nuisance weeds, arguing it infringed his right to maintain a naturalized garden.

The court found the by-law infringed the applicant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The municipality failed to justify the infringement under s. 1, as it provided no evidence that the by-law minimally impaired the right or that the benefits were proportionate to the infringement.

The court struck down the impugned provisions and set aside the work charges added to the applicant's property tax bill, but declined to award Charter damages.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Registrar under the Funeral, Burial and Cremation Services Act, 2002, which refused to fully reimburse their costs for a burial site investigation.

Human remains were discovered on the applicants' property during a Stage 4 archaeological assessment, prompting the Registrar to order a burial site investigation.

The Registrar later found the investigation caused an undue financial burden and agreed to reimburse costs, but limited the reimbursement to a fraction of the claimed amount, attributing the rest to the Stage 4 assessment.

The Divisional Court found the Registrar's decision unreasonable, as it disregarded prior directions that expanded the scope of the burial site investigation and relied on a faulty tool-based analysis to differentiate the work.

The decision was quashed and remitted for reconsideration.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) eviction order.

The LTB had ordered the tenant's eviction because the landlord entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with a purchaser who intended to occupy the unit.

The tenant appealed on four grounds, including misnomer of the landlord, refusal of an adjournment, and the subsequent termination of the purchase agreement due to the tenant's refusal to vacate.

The Divisional Court found that none of the grounds raised a question of law and that the appeal was an abuse of process designed to game the system and frustrate the sale.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and the stay of eviction was vacated.

The moving defendants brought motions under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike claims for disclosing no cause of action.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent and social media content creator, alleged that she was defamed by two other real estate agents through social media posts.

She sued the brokers of record, branch managers, and brokerages for negligence and vicarious liability.

The court found that the negligence and vicarious liability claims were viable and disclosed reasonable prospects of success.

However, the court struck the claims for punitive damages on a theory of vicarious liability, as punitive damages cannot flow vicariously to an employer.

Leave was granted to amend the pleading to better plead aggravated and punitive damages against the individual defendants.

The defendant repair shop brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's negligence claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged the repair shop negligently failed to properly inspect and diagnose vehicle damage following a motor vehicle accident, improperly diagnosed necessary repairs, and failed to disclose known defects.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded all elements of negligence and that the claim was viable and should proceed to trial.

The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Insurance Act barred the claim.

This costs decision addresses the allocation of costs for a distribution motion concerning competing claims over preserved funds in a complex fraud and investment scheme case.

The Trial Parties, who succeeded at trial on fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment claims, sought to recover their judgment from preserved funds.

The Settling Parties, who had reached settlement agreements with the defendants before trial, sought equitable liens and constructive trusts over the same preserved funds.

The court awarded costs to the Trial Parties against the Settling Parties, finding that the Settling Parties had deliberately delayed enforcement of their settlements and improperly sought to benefit from the Trial Parties' litigation efforts without bearing the associated costs and burdens.

The applicants, parents elected to a school council, brought an application for judicial review after the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) disbanded the council and ordered a new election due to a procedural irregularity.

The Divisional Court held that the TDSB lacked the statutory authority under the Education Act and O. Reg. 612/00 to disband a school council or review its elections.

The court granted a declaration that the TDSB's decision was made without jurisdiction, but declined to grant further remedies as the school year had already ended.

The plaintiff sought to recover $500,000 from her younger brother, claiming it was an undocumented loan.

The defendant asserted the funds were a gift.

The court found the action was not statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendant successfully rebutted the presumption of a resulting trust by establishing on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff intended to gift the funds as an early inheritance to help him purchase a home following his marital separation.

The court found no unjust enrichment as there was a donative intent, and declined to apply the equitable fraud doctrine as the defendant's retention of the gifted funds was not unconscionable.

The action was dismissed.