Paul A. Renwick

Summary conviction appeal from a conviction entered after a guilty plea to operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The appellant argued that the trial judge wrongly refused a day-of-trial adjournment to retain counsel and that the plea was uninformed because he did not understand the immigration consequences of conviction.

The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing the adjournment, given the age of the charges, the absence of diligence in retaining counsel, and the readiness of the witnesses and Crown to proceed.

The court further held that the appellant was sufficiently aware that a criminal conviction could carry serious immigration consequences, and in any event failed to establish credible subjective prejudice showing a reasonable possibility that he would have proceeded differently.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for assault, breach of undertaking, and distributing intimate images without consent, together with a custodial sentence totalling 14 months.

The court held that the appeal was not frivolous, surrender was not in issue, and the determinative question was whether detention was necessary in the public interest under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the public safety and public confidence framework, the court found that a strong surety plan and the applicant's prior compliance on release addressed safety and flight concerns.

The court further found that the proposed conviction appeal raised an arguable circumstantial-evidence burden-of-proof issue under Villaroman and that the sentence appeal was also arguable, while there was a real risk the applicant would serve most or all of the sentence before appeal.

Bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his sentence of 12 months in custody and 2 years of probation.

He argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine the complainant on inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court admitted fresh evidence to evaluate the claim but found no miscarriage of justice, as the alleged inconsistencies were peripheral and did not affect the trial judge's credibility assessment on material facts.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the sentence proportionate and within the established range for offences involving a breach of trust by a driver.

On a summary conviction appeal from convictions and acquittals arising from domestic allegations, the appellant challenged the assault conviction on grounds including improper use of prior consistent statements, misapprehension of evidence, and reliance on prior case reasoning.

The appeal court held the trial reasons, read as a whole, did not show impermissible credibility bolstering and disclosed no material misapprehension affecting the verdict.

The court found it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant’s explanation for the injury evidence and to accept corroborative value in contemporaneous photographs.

The court further held the circumstantial-evidence argument was inapplicable because the case included direct testimony and proper reasonable-doubt analysis.

The summary conviction appeal was dismissed and the assault conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen property and driving while prohibited, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on video surveillance and police identification evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly conducted an independent assessment of the video evidence and did not merely adopt the police officer's opinion.

The court also admitted fresh evidence but concluded that trial counsel's strategic decision not to call the appellant to testify did not constitute ineffective assistance or cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant sought to withdraw guilty pleas to one count of threatening and two counts of failing to comply with bail, alleging that the evidence was fabricated, that he was set up, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that he was coerced into pleading guilty due to threats and abuse by inmates at Maplehurst Correctional Complex.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the guilty pleas were voluntary and unequivocal, that the appellant had ample opportunity to voice complaints during the judicial proceedings but did not, and that the appellant's account was neither plausible nor credible.

The court found no merit to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, Karanjot Parhar, appealed his eight-month custodial sentence for offences related to a car theft ring, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider credit for time spent on restrictive pretrial bail (Downes credit).

The court found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not addressing Downes credit, and that this error impacted the sentence.

After reviewing the facts and the length and restrictiveness of the appellant’s pretrial bail, the court reduced the sentence to five months in custody, dismissing the Crown’s cross-appeal for a longer sentence.

Jarnail Randhawa pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his wife.

The court determined the parole ineligibility period, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years, considering aggravating factors such as the brutality of the attack, gratuitous violence, abuse of trust, and leaving the victim to die, as well as mitigating factors including the guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior criminal record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a text message sent by the accused to a police officer inquiring about his mother's life insurance policy.

The Crown opposed, arguing it was self-serving hearsay.

The court found that while the text was presumptively inadmissible hearsay, it should be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement's substantive reliability was corroborated by other evidence and that fairness to the accused required its admission to provide a complete picture of his statements regarding the insurance policy.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied to re-open a pre-trial statement voir dire under section 551.3(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that fresh evidence showing he received pre-interview advice from a disbarred lawyer acting as a paralegal, rather than a licensed lawyer, undermined the original finding that his statement to police was voluntary and compliant with the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the fresh evidence could not have affected the original ruling, as the accused was not detained at the time and had explicitly declined to exercise his right to counsel even if he had been detained.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence, including an imitation firearm and a construction vest, arguing his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter were violated during his arrest for a home invasion.

The court found the detention and searches were lawful, but the police breached the implementational component of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel by unreasonably delaying his access to a lawyer due to an internal policy.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that despite the serious s. 10(b) breach, the evidence should not be excluded because the impact on the accused's protected interests was minimal and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits favoured admission.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for charges of assault with a weapon and forcible confinement.

The appellant died before the appeal was decided, but the court exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal due to its jurisprudential importance.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by allowing the Crown to raise the NCRMD issue without first making a full finding of guilt, including mens rea, as required by the first precondition in Swain.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, holding that an appellate court cannot substitute itself for the trial judge to make an initial finding of fact on mens rea.

The court also found the second Swain precondition was not met, as the appellant's evidence of delusions did not put his mental capacity for criminal intent in issue.

Had the appeal not been moot, the court would have allowed the appeal, quashed the NCR finding, and ordered a new trial.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter challenge to the requirement in the Criminal Code, the Juries Act, and a regulation under the Administration of Justice Act that all jurors be Canadian citizens.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, which directly addressed the issue.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown requested that the lesser included offence of manslaughter be left to the jury, relying on criminal harassment as the predicate unlawful act.

The defence opposed the request.

The court declined to put manslaughter to the jury, finding no air of reality to the predicate offence of criminal harassment.

Specifically, there was no evidence that the victim knew she was being harassed or reasonably feared for her safety, as the accused's surveillance was intended to be surreptitious.

The Crown and defence sought pre-trial rulings regarding the editing of police statements made by the accused, Mr. Lu and Mr. Dookhram, and an application for severance by Mr. Lu.

The court ruled on various excisions to Mr. Lu's statements, removing highly prejudicial opinions from his grandmother and questions about another witness's credibility, while retaining references to his homosexuality and the officer's interview techniques.

The court declined to edit out Mr. Dookhram's references to triads and fear, prioritizing fairness to him over minimal prejudice to Mr. Lu.

Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Lu's application for severance, finding the preference for joint trials was not rebutted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit expert evidence and the defence brought applications regarding jury selection, editing a co-accused's statement, and admitting third-party suspect evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court ruled that the accused, an Indo-Caribbean man, could ask the standard Parks question during jury selection.

The court admitted the Crown's expert evidence on bloodstain pattern analysis and handwriting, finding it necessary and reliable.

The court declined to heavily redact the co-accused's police statement, opting instead for limiting instructions.

Finally, the court admitted hearsay evidence implicating a third-party suspect under the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on a charge of first degree murder and committing him only for second degree murder.

The accused was alleged to have committed a drive-by shooting.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, which was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused to stand trial for first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for simple assault against his former common-law spouse, which involved a kick to her ankle.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of property, misapprehending video evidence, and applying uneven scrutiny to credibility assessments.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of property because the appellant denied the act entirely, and concluding the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle.

At trial, the judge found that the police had violated the appellant's Charter rights by arbitrarily detaining him for 32 hours, but declined to order a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a lenient sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing the stay request.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the proper test and fashioned an adequate Charter remedy.