Hans Cedro

Sentencing of two offenders convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

Jason Wisdom, a mature recidivist, was convicted of possessing large quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine, as well as a loaded restricted firearm and breaching prohibition orders.

He was sentenced to a total of 17 years imprisonment.

Dae-Shawn Wisdom, a younger recidivist, was convicted of possessing fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and was sentenced to 7 years and 4 months consecutive to a sentence he was already serving.

The court applied the totality principle and Lord Coke's principle regarding subsequent convictions.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown requested that the lesser included offence of manslaughter be left to the jury, relying on criminal harassment as the predicate unlawful act.

The defence opposed the request.

The court declined to put manslaughter to the jury, finding no air of reality to the predicate offence of criminal harassment.

Specifically, there was no evidence that the victim knew she was being harassed or reasonably feared for her safety, as the accused's surveillance was intended to be surreptitious.

The Crown and defence sought pre-trial rulings regarding the editing of police statements made by the accused, Mr. Lu and Mr. Dookhram, and an application for severance by Mr. Lu.

The court ruled on various excisions to Mr. Lu's statements, removing highly prejudicial opinions from his grandmother and questions about another witness's credibility, while retaining references to his homosexuality and the officer's interview techniques.

The court declined to edit out Mr. Dookhram's references to triads and fear, prioritizing fairness to him over minimal prejudice to Mr. Lu.

Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Lu's application for severance, finding the preference for joint trials was not rebutted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit expert evidence and the defence brought applications regarding jury selection, editing a co-accused's statement, and admitting third-party suspect evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court ruled that the accused, an Indo-Caribbean man, could ask the standard Parks question during jury selection.

The court admitted the Crown's expert evidence on bloodstain pattern analysis and handwriting, finding it necessary and reliable.

The court declined to heavily redact the co-accused's police statement, opting instead for limiting instructions.

Finally, the court admitted hearsay evidence implicating a third-party suspect under the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The accused, Andrew Bond, was found guilty of possession of cocaine for trafficking and illegal possession of a loaded semi-automatic handgun.

This judgment addresses three Charter applications made by the defence during the trial: (1) exclusion of evidence obtained via search warrants based on confidential informants, (2) exclusion of evidence obtained through warrantless cellphone "pinging," and (3) a breach of the right to counsel due to delayed access.

The court upheld the search warrants after a Garofoli analysis, found that the "pinging" was justified by exigent circumstances (or that the evidence would not be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter), and determined that the delay in access to counsel did not constitute an infringement or cause actual prejudice.

All defence applications to exclude evidence were denied.

The applicant sought to exclude a firearm found during a search, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant was deficient, breaching his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown conceded the redacted ITO was insufficient and proceeded with a "Step Six" Garofoli procedure.

The court reviewed the ITO, including redacted material via a judicial summary, and found a sufficient link between the applicant and the searched premises.

Applying the Debot criteria, the court found the confidential informant's tip compelling, credible, and sufficiently corroborated.

The court concluded there were reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, no s. 8 Charter breach, and dismissed the application for exclusion of evidence.

Two offenders were sentenced after a jury conviction for importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Each offender attempted to import nearly four kilograms of high‑purity cocaine concealed in luggage after travelling from Panama.

The court reviewed the established six‑to‑eight‑year sentencing range for first‑offender couriers importing multiple kilograms of cocaine, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Arguments that potential immigration consequences for one offender should justify a sentence below the range were rejected as speculative and inconsistent with proportionality principles.

Considering mitigating factors including lack of criminal records, the court imposed custodial sentences near the low end of the range.

The accused were tried for multiple offences arising from the armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's presence at an apartment where stolen property was found shortly after the robbery.

The court found that the evidence against one accused was not sufficient to prove his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt, as his presence could be explained by other rational inferences.

However, the court found the other accused guilty, concluding that his prior employment at the restaurant, possession of stolen currency, and other circumstantial factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a party to the robbery.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, unauthorized possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm in a motor vehicle, possession for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA, and four counts of breach of a prohibition order.

The offences arose from an arrest on March 5, 2013, when police executed a high-risk vehicle stop and found the accused armed with a loaded .40 calibre Glock pistol and in possession of MDMA.

The accused had an extensive criminal record dating back to 1991, including four prior firearm convictions and multiple breaches of firearms prohibition orders.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10½ years less credit for time served (8 months pre-trial custody on a 1:1 basis), resulting in a total sentence of 9 years and 10 months.

Following a jury trial, three accused were convicted of robbery arising from a group robbery of two complainants in a Toronto hotel room during Caribana weekend.

The sentencing judge found that although threats of violence were made by a co‑accused not before the court, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used or that the robbery was pre‑planned.

The court assessed the offenders’ differing personal circumstances, including one offender’s extensive criminal record and the others’ relative youth and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed distinct sentences reflecting each offender’s background and role.

Sentences included time served and probation for one offender, a short custodial sentence consecutive to an existing federal sentence for another, and a conditional sentence with probation for the third.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.