Paul Leishman

The applicant, Ramon Williams, sought to withdraw his guilty pleas to multiple counts of human trafficking, procuring, receiving material benefit from sexual services, and assault, arguing the pleas were not fully informed due to a misunderstanding of immigration consequences and appeal rights.

The court found the pleas were voluntary and fully informed, that the applicant received sound legal advice, and that his assertion of being unaware of appeal rights or immigration consequences was not credible.

The court concluded that the applicant was experiencing buyer's remorse and dismissed the application to withdraw the guilty pleas, directing the matter to proceed to sentencing.

Marlon Downey applied to stay human trafficking proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed, as the total delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown opposed, attributing delay to the pandemic and defence unavailability.

The court found the primary reason for delay was a systemic lack of judicial resources, not solely COVID-19 backlog or defence actions.

The application was granted, and proceedings were stayed.

The accused, S.E., sought judicial interim release on serious charges including human trafficking, procuring, sexual assault, and drug trafficking.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing S.E.'s alleged breaches of a previous release order and the unsuitability of proposed sureties.

The court found the proposed sureties unsuitable due to their "blind spots" and inability to provide adequate supervision, and determined that the release plan would not reduce the substantial likelihood of reoffending or maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite S.E. being a member of an overrepresented vulnerable population, the court ordered his detention.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (drugs, cell phone data) seized from a motor vehicle, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the initial warrantless seizure of the vehicle was lawful under section 489(2) of the Criminal Code, as it was offence-related property.

While there was a two-month delay in obtaining a search warrant for the vehicle and its contents, which constituted a breach of section 8 of the Charter, the court determined that this delay was not due to negligence or wanton disregard but rather the investigating officer's overwhelming workload and health issues.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breach was minor, did not itself produce the evidence, and did not significantly impact the accused's privacy interests, especially given the serious nature of the human trafficking charges.

Therefore, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and the application to exclude was dismissed.

The accused, a young Black man, was charged with firearms and drug offences and detained following a bail hearing.

A 90-day detention review was held under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing judge found the justice of the peace erred by treating an uncertified substance as carfentanil and by failing to consider the accused's membership in a vulnerable population under section 493.2.

Concluding that continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, the court ordered the accused's release on strict house arrest conditions with GPS monitoring and substantial sureties.

The applicant, facing serious drug trafficking and firearms charges, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code based on a material change in circumstances.

The court found that the proposal of two new sureties, a stricter release plan including GPS monitoring, and the failure of the detention centre to address the applicant's basic medical needs constituted a material change.

The court held that the strict release plan sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

Furthermore, the institution's failure to provide adequate medical care meant that the applicant's continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The bail review was granted and the applicant was released on a recognizance.

Eduardo Bohorquez and Qasim Siddiqi were found guilty by a jury of sexual assault with another person contrary to s. 272(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The court was tasked with imposing sentence.

The offenders, sexual predators, lured a 19-year-old complainant, S., to Bohorquez's home for non-consensual sexual activity, which they video recorded.

The court rejected the offenders' claims of consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent, emphasizing the power imbalance and the complainant's fear.

The impact on the victim was severe, leading to PTSD and a suicide attempt.

Bohorquez was identified as the leader and more aggressive participant, while Siddiqi was an enthusiastic follower.

The court considered sentencing objectives of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, noting the aggravated nature of the offence.

Bohorquez was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months imprisonment, and Siddiqi to 3 years and 7 months imprisonment, along with ancillary orders.

The accused, A.J., was sentenced for three sexual assaults, two counts of surreptitiously making visual recordings of sexual activity, forcible confinement, assault, and theft of a cell phone, all involving his common-law partner.

The case had a protracted procedural history, including a jury trial for some charges and guilty pleas for others, and a withdrawn Dangerous Offender/Long Term Offender application.

The court considered aggravating factors such as victim vulnerability, force used, internet publication of images, and the accused's criminal record, alongside mitigating factors including guilty pleas, family support, rehabilitation efforts, and significant pre-trial custody in harsh conditions.

A joint submission for a total sentence of 71 months (five years and eleven months) was accepted, with a remanet of six months to be served, followed by three years of probation with strict conditions.

Tofarri Wright was found guilty of four counts related to firearm possession, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the public nature of the possession and the loaded status of the weapon, and mitigating factors including his youth, lack of prior record, strong community support, and personal tragedies including being a victim of gun violence himself.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearm offences but also rehabilitation for a youthful first offender.

The final sentence was 22 months in reformatory on Count 1 and one year concurrent on Count 4, followed by two years' probation, after credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

Counts 2 and 3 were stayed under the rule against multiple convictions.

The accused was charged with multiple robbery-related offences arising from an armed robbery of a restaurant involving masked perpetrators using imitation firearms and a knife.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including surveillance video showing the accused entering an apartment building with other perpetrators shortly after the robbery, possession of stolen liquor, and conduct consistent with concealing stolen property.

The accused testified and called defence witnesses claiming he attended the location only to deliver money to an acquaintance.

Applying the framework from R. v. W. (D.), the court rejected the accused’s testimony as not credible and found the defence evidence unreliable.

Considering the totality of circumstantial evidence, the court concluded the only rational inference was that the accused participated in the joint enterprise robbery.

The accused were tried for multiple offences arising from the armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's presence at an apartment where stolen property was found shortly after the robbery.

The court found that the evidence against one accused was not sufficient to prove his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt, as his presence could be explained by other rational inferences.

However, the court found the other accused guilty, concluding that his prior employment at the restaurant, possession of stolen currency, and other circumstantial factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a party to the robbery.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter to exclude a firearm discovered during a police encounter.

Police officers observed the accused walking in a neighbourhood where they were searching for armed robbery suspects and noted behaviours consistent with a person carrying a concealed weapon, including slowing his pace, performing a 'safety pat', and blading his body away from officers.

The court found the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was armed and therefore lawfully conducted an investigative detention and safety search.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence and accepted the officers’ testimony regarding the circumstances of the detention, arrest, and search.

No Charter breaches were established and the firearm was ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with arson causing damage to property and arson to an inhabited dwelling arising from a fire in a condominium apartment unit.

The Crown’s case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance footage showing the accused entering and leaving the unit minutes before the fire and the absence of any evidence of another person entering the building.

The accused testified that an armed intruder forced him from the apartment before the fire began.

Applying the principles in R v W.(D) and the law governing circumstantial evidence, the court rejected the accused’s testimony as implausible and inconsistent with other evidence.

The court concluded that the only rational inference from the evidence was that the accused intentionally set the fire.

The offender was sentenced following jury convictions for multiple offences including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and several breaches of firearms prohibition orders.

Police located drugs, cash, and a loaded handgun in a safe in an apartment connected to the offender, and cocaine in a vehicle he was driving.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving firearms and drug trafficking offences and was already subject to prohibition orders at the time.

Applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, and totality, the court imposed a global sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.

Credit of approximately 29 months was granted for pre‑sentence custody, including limited enhanced credit for triple bunking and lack of yard access.

The accused applied to quash a telewarrant and exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant relating to firearm and drug offences.

The challenge argued that the Information to Obtain relied too heavily on a confidential informer, contained careless drafting errors, and failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

Applying the principles from Garofoli and Debot, the court assessed the reliability of the informant’s tip, the credibility of the source, and the extent of police corroboration.

The court found the informer’s information detailed and credible, supported by prior reliability and partial police corroboration through database checks and surveillance.

Despite drafting errors in the ITO, the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.