C. Angelini

This decision concerns the trial of Jevor Brown, who was charged with sexual assault with a weapon, using an imitation firearm to commit sexual assault, forcible confinement, and sexual assault as a party with another, arising from an incident at 111 Bathurst Street, Toronto, on July 10, 2019.

Brown conceded to having non-consensual intercourse with the complainant, K.M., while his co-accused, Shayne Codrington, was also sexually assaulting her.

The main issues were whether the defence of duress applied, and whether Brown was a party to the offences involving the firearm and confinement.

The court found Brown's evidence of duress not credible or reliable, and concluded the Crown had disproved all elements of the duress defence.

Brown was found guilty on all remaining counts.

The accused, Jovane Watson, was charged with accessory after the fact to murder.

The key issue was whether the Crown could disprove the defence of duress beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court analyzed the six elements of duress, including implicit threat, reasonable belief, absence of safe escape, temporal connection, proportionality, and lack of conspiracy.

The court found that the Crown failed to disprove any of the elements, particularly that the accused acted under a reasonable fear of death or bodily harm from the principal offender, who had just committed a murder.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

Marlon Downey applied to stay human trafficking proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed, as the total delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown opposed, attributing delay to the pandemic and defence unavailability.

The court found the primary reason for delay was a systemic lack of judicial resources, not solely COVID-19 backlog or defence actions.

The application was granted, and proceedings were stayed.

Roland Nugent, charged with firearms and conspiracy offences, brought an S. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 25 months and 16 days (777 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances, citing discrete events related to an ongoing homicide investigation and the particular complexity of the multi-accused case.

The court found no discrete exceptional circumstances for the Crown's decision-making delay but accepted that the case's complexity, including multiple accused, extensive disclosure, and necessary pre-trial motions, justified the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

This criminal case involved a pre-trial Garofoli application challenging the validity of three search warrants obtained under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant alleged breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, arguing that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained deliberate misrepresentations and omissions by the affiant officer.

The court found that the affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the issuing justice, rendering the ITOs unreliable after excisions and amplifications.

Key issues included false assertions about the applicant's residence, exaggerated claims about his criminal history, and misleading descriptions of surveillance videos.

The court concluded that the warrants were invalid and, applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, excluded the evidence (cocaine and a firearm) due to the serious nature of the Charter-infringing conduct and its impact on the applicant's rights, despite society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Acquittals were entered on all charges.

Jevor Brown, co-accused in a sexual assault case, brought a motion under s.11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 46 months and 29 days, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling for indictment cases.

Brown argued that only a four-month period was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the Crown should have severed his case from his co-accused, Shane Codrington, whose actions caused significant delay.

The Crown contended that a longer period of delay was due to the pandemic's "ripple effect" on court capacity, resulting in a net delay below the Jordan ceiling, and that severance was not in the interests of justice given the nature of the charges and potential for a cut-throat defence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the majority of the delay was attributable to the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and its systemic impact, and that the Crown's decision not to sever the trials was justified by the interests of justice.

The accused was arrested for care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and subsequently charged with refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown alleged the accused was found asleep behind the wheel of a running vehicle with signs of impairment.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of her arrest on Charter grounds, alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel.

The trial proceeded on both the Charter application and the substantive charges.

The court found no Charter breach regarding the right to counsel of choice.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample but acquitted her of the impaired care and control charge, finding insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt despite circumstantial indicators of impairment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis addressing both the merits and a Charter application.

The defence alleged a section 8 Charter violation arising from police monitoring of the accused while she used the toilet on two occasions while in short-term police custody.

The Crown obtained breath samples of 160 and 143 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The trial judge found a serious section 8 violation and excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutional validity of a search warrant executed at their residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

As part of the Garofoli procedure, the accused sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant on various alleged misstatements, omissions, and unsubstantiated claims.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on limited grounds, including the affiant's failure to maintain a proper investigative file, a specific reference to a police occurrence report, and the basis for the night entry request.

Leave was denied for the remaining proposed areas of cross-examination as they were deemed irrelevant or unlikely to elicit testimony discrediting the preconditions for the warrant's issuance.

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery, being masked with intent, and possession of a weapon after participating in a planned jewellery store robbery on Halloween night.

The court weighed the gravity of the offence, which involved a firearm and disguises, against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and guilty plea.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence of 3 years for the robbery, less 7 months credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years and 5 months, along with concurrent sentences for the remaining charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The Crown dismissed the Over 80 charge.

The central issue was whether statements made by the defendant to police officers at the scene—that he was the driver and had been drinking—were admissible as evidence.

The defendant argued the statements were statutorily compelled under section 199 of the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible as a violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant held a reasonable belief that he was obliged to answer police questions about the accident and his drinking, and that the state overreached by compelling information beyond what was required in an accident report.

The court allowed the Soules application and excluded the statements.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning four accused charged with multiple offences under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought committal on various counts including possession of firearms, ammunition, and cocaine.

The court considered whether there was sufficient evidence for each accused on contested counts.

The court committed some accused on certain counts while discharging them on others, applying the test that an accused will be committed if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict.