Lindsay Daviau

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 791 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court deducted periods of delay attributable to the defence (late disclosure receipt, late Crown Pre-Trial, and defence unavailability for an earlier trial date), resulting in a net delay of 643 days.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances (power outage, technology issues), but the court found these did not cause the delay, attributing the delay instead to the Crown's failure to prioritize the matter.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

Roland Nugent, charged with firearms and conspiracy offences, brought an S. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 25 months and 16 days (777 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances, citing discrete events related to an ongoing homicide investigation and the particular complexity of the multi-accused case.

The court found no discrete exceptional circumstances for the Crown's decision-making delay but accepted that the case's complexity, including multiple accused, extensive disclosure, and necessary pre-trial motions, justified the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

Mitchell Miskie was charged with sexual assault.

He relied on the defence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism, arguing that his consumption of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and Xanax rendered him an automaton with no willed control over his actions.

The defence presented expert psychiatric evidence supporting a blackout state.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Brown and R. v. Sullivan, found that while the accused was significantly intoxicated and claimed no memory, his coherent speech and responsive actions during the assault, along with police observations post-arrest, indicated he was not in a state of automatism.

The court emphasized that a mere blackout or memory loss does not equate to involuntariness.

The defence of extreme intoxication was not made out, and the accused was found guilty.