Shambavi Kumaresan

Michael Williams pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight years, taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors, including Mr. Williams' disadvantaged background, harsh pre-sentence custody, and the joint submission of counsel.

The decision reviews the relevant sentencing principles and case law, and details the factual background, evidence, and positions of the parties.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 rights following his arrest and the search of his home, seeking exclusion of a firearm under s. 24(2).

Police had intercepted communications indicating a firearm transaction and followed the seller to the applicant's residence.

When police attempted to arrest the men in the driveway, they fled into the house.

The court found the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful, and the warrantless entry into the home was justified by hot pursuit and exigent circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a mid-trial application seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 278.93/4 hearing and to prevent disclosure of application materials to the complainant, relying on the recent decision in R. v. Reddick which found those provisions unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the principles of stare decisis did not apply because Reddick was decided in the context of a pre-trial application, whereas this was a mid-trial application.

Furthermore, the court held that even if stare decisis applied, the decision in Reddick was plainly wrong as it failed to fully consider the constitutional issues in the context of a mid-trial application and misinterpreted the legislation.

Following his conviction for child luring, the applicant brought an entrapment application seeking a stay of proceedings.

The conviction arose from a police sting operation targeting individuals seeking juvenile prostitutes on an online classifieds website.

The court found that the police had a reasonable suspicion to investigate the virtual space and that the undercover officer introduced the poster's underage status early in the conversation, distinguishing the case from others where entrapment was found.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought a motion seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 276/278 admissibility hearing regarding WhatsApp messages.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision (R. v. Reddick) that found the participation provisions unconstitutional, arguing that under the principles of stare decisis, the court should follow Reddick without a formal constitutional challenge.

The Crown argued that a Notice of Constitutional Question was required under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that relying on a previous declaration of unconstitutionality still puts the constitutional validity of the legislation in question, thereby triggering the mandatory notice requirement under s. 109.

However, the court ruled that notice did not need to be served on the complainant.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, flight from police, and possession of a prohibited firearm while prohibited.

He fled from police in a vehicle and on foot, discarding a loaded handgun with a removed serial number.

At the time, he was subject to a lifetime weapons prohibition.

Accepting a joint submission, the court sentenced the offender to four years in custody, leaving 22 months and 15 days to serve after accounting for pre-sentence custody and lockdown credits.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought a ruling on whether an application to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity (WhatsApp messages) under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code could be brought mid-trial rather than pre-trial.

The court reviewed the legislative history, the purpose of the rape shield provisions, and the accused's Charter rights to make full answer and defence and against self-incrimination.

The court concluded that requiring a pre-trial application would force premature disclosure of impeachment material, potentially tainting the complainant's evidence and violating the accused's fair trial rights.

The court ruled that the application could be brought mid-trial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought to adduce WhatsApp messages exchanged between them.

He brought an application for a ruling that the messages were not 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and thus not subject to the admissibility regime in s. 278.92.

The court first ruled that the Crown was not entitled to review the messages at the threshold stage to argue whether they constituted a record.

After reviewing the messages, the court held that the complainant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, as they were voluntarily exchanged with the accused and were innocuous in nature.

Therefore, the messages were not 'records' and the accused was not required to bring an application under s. 278.93 before using them at trial.

The accused was found asleep in a vehicle parked on the side of Highway 400 with the engine running.

A police officer detected an odour of alcohol and conducted an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test at the roadside, which led to further testing and charges of Over 80 and Impaired care or control.

The impaired count was dismissed.

The defence challenged the ASD demand as lacking reasonable suspicion and argued the demand was not made forthwith, constituting a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court found the demand was based on reasonable suspicion and was made in a timely manner.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty of care or control with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The applicants, who were charged with criminal offences and elected trial by jury before the Bill C-75 amendments came into force, brought pre-trial applications seeking a ruling that the amendments eliminating peremptory challenges did not apply retrospectively to them.

The court applied the framework from Dineley and concluded that the elimination of peremptory challenges affects the substantive right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

As a result, the court held that the amendments operate only prospectively, and the applicants were entitled to exercise peremptory challenges at their upcoming trials.

This is a sentencing decision for a serious domestic assault.

The offender, Kostantinos Tountzios, pleaded guilty to assaulting his common-law spouse, causing significant injuries including a fractured arm and concussion.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the prolonged and vicious nature of the assault, the breach of trust, and the prevention of calling 911.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, and lack of prior criminal record.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary objectives, alongside specific deterrence and rehabilitation, noting the offender's alcohol abuse as an explanation for his behaviour, not a mitigating factor.

A joint submission was accepted.

The defence brought a motion seeking an order to declare Toronto as the proper venue for the trial and to transfer the indictment from Newmarket to Toronto, along with a declaration of mistrial.

The accused, Ashton Lawson, was charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent, with the alleged offences occurring in the City of Toronto.

The indictment, however, was filed in Newmarket, York Region, where all pre-trial proceedings had taken place.

The defence argued that the trial must be held in the judicial region where the offence occurred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown was not strictly required to file the indictment in the Toronto region, and that Newmarket was a proper and permissible venue.

The court clarified that while the usual administrative practice is to file an indictment in the region of the offence, it is not an absolute requirement, and the Superior Court has province-wide jurisdiction.

The accused was tried for robbery with a firearm at a residential property in Vaughan.

The Crown's case relied on video surveillance footage, GPS tracking of the suspect vehicle, cell tower evidence, cell phone contact records, and DNA evidence.

The key issue was identification of the accused as one of the three perpetrators captured on church surveillance footage.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on a holistic assessment of the evidence, including video identification under the Nikolovski test, GPS evidence placing the suspect vehicle at the accused's residence and the robbery scene at relevant times, and DNA evidence linking the accused to a glove found in the suspect vehicle.

The Crown applied to admit recognition evidence from a police officer identifying the defendant in surveillance video footage from a church parking lot.

The officer claimed to recognize the defendant as one of the suspects fleeing from a gunpoint robbery in Vaughan.

The application turned on whether the officer had sufficient prior acquaintance with the defendant to satisfy the Leaney/Brown test for admissibility of lay recognition evidence.

Despite reliability concerns regarding the officer's recollection of certain physical characteristics and limited prior contact, the court found the officer had sufficient prior acquaintance through a face-to-face interaction and was in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the perpetrator.

The recognition evidence was admitted.

The accused was charged with three counts of failing to comply with probation orders under s.733.1 and one count of failing to comply with a SOIRA order under s.490.031.

The Crown and defence agreed that counts 3 and 4 should be dismissed.

The defence argued that the Crown must prove the failures to report were wilful and that the accused's mental health difficulties provided a reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The court found that s.733.1 does not require proof of wilfulness and that the evidence did not establish a reasonable excuse.

The court convicted on counts 1 and 2 and dismissed counts 3 and 4.

The accused brought a Charter s.11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay in trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drug, resisting arrest, and possession of cocaine.

The trial commenced on its third scheduled date after nearly three years of delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework to assess whether the delay breached the accused's right to trial within a reasonable time.

After deducting defence delay and accounting for discrete exceptional events, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the Crown had proven the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with sexual touching and sexual assault against two granddaughters.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from the two complainants, who alleged multiple incidents of sexual abuse occurring over several years.

The defence presented the accused and his wife, who denied all allegations.

The trial judge found significant frailties in the complainants' evidence, including recovered memories, inconsistencies between trial testimony and police statements, and concerns regarding potential collusion.

The judge applied the W.D. analysis and found that the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

A bail de novo hearing under section 33 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act concerning a young person charged with assault, carrying a concealed weapon, failing to comply with a youth court sentence, threatening to cause bodily harm, theft, possession of stolen property, possession of a burglary tool, failing to comply with a recognizance, and drug-related offences.

The Crown consented to release with a surety, while the defence sought release to a bail program with shelter accommodation.

The court found that the young person's history of non-compliance with bail conditions and failure to appear in court, combined with allegations of further offences committed while on bail, demonstrated that supervision by a bail program would be insufficient.

The court released the young person on a recognizance with a surety and imposed strict conditions including residence with the surety, attendance at school or employment, drug counselling, weapons prohibition, and no contact with the complainant.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol concentration greater than 80 mg in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought regarding alleged breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused had unequivocally requested to speak to duty counsel after being arrested, but the investigating officer failed to implement or facilitate this request.

The officer did not contact duty counsel despite having a realistic opportunity to do so during a 20-minute delay at the scene.

The court found serious breaches of the right to counsel and excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the accused had a blood alcohol level of 210 mgs/100ml based on approved instrument tests at the station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, the delay in making the demand, the validity of the ASD test, and the adequacy of the right to counsel advice.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on the evidence.