Shambavi Kumaresan

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood on October 16, 2009.

The Crown presented evidence from four police officers, a citizen witness, and a toxicologist.

The accused testified that she became lost while driving, consumed half a bottle of juice that she did not realize contained alcohol approximately 15 minutes before being stopped, and did not drink any alcohol prior to that evening.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as raising no reasonable doubt and found her guilty of impaired operation.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding the over 80 charge due to concerns about the proper operation of the Intoxilyzer device.

The defendant was stopped at a RIDE program and subjected to roadside screening tests.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test evidence showing 160 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging multiple breaches including failure to provide rights to counsel, failure to make the second ASD demand forthwith, and failure to make the breath demand as soon as practicable.

The court found two Charter breaches and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in an acquittal on the charge of driving with excess alcohol.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown proceeded on the basis of care and control rather than actual operation.

The court found that while the accused was in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and was impaired, the vehicle was truly inoperable due to severe structural damage that prevented it from moving or being started.

The court distinguished between an "immovable" vehicle (stuck but potentially drivable) and an "inoperable" vehicle (incapable of being driven).

Finding the vehicle inoperable and thus incapable of creating a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, the court acquitted the accused despite the presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to exclude breath readings obtained by police on the grounds of Charter breaches relating to the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code and alleged violations of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter, claiming language difficulties prevented meaningful comprehension.

The court found that the "forthwith" requirement was met, that no special circumstances existed requiring additional steps to ensure comprehension of rights, and that the accused understood his rights and waived his right to counsel.

The breath readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The Crown relied on a breathalyzer certificate as evidence.

The court found that there was an unexplained delay of between 30 to 60 minutes between the accused's arrest at 1:06 and when the breathalyzer test was administered sometime after 2:15.

The delay violated the requirement that breath tests be conducted "as soon as practicable" as established in jurisprudence.

Consequently, the Crown was deprived of the statutory presumption contained in the Criminal Code and could not rely on the certificate as proof of the truth of its contents.

The Crown called no toxicologist to establish what the reading would have been at the time of driving.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and assault with a weapon (a motor vehicle) arising from an incident on December 15, 2010, in a Thornhill community centre parking lot.

During a physical altercation between two groups of youth, the defendant drove his red Mazda in a circular pattern toward the area where the fighting was occurring, allegedly to scare the combatants away from his employee who was being attacked.

While eyewitness accounts were inconsistent regarding whether the vehicle actually struck anyone, the court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving based on his deliberate decision to drive toward the group despite having a direct exit available.

The court also found him guilty of assault with a weapon, as the defendant used his vehicle as a weapon by threatening force through his driving conduct.

One charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused's section 8 and 9 rights were violated when he was handcuffed in the parking lot before the roadside screening test was administered.

The court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found a section 10(a) breach but noted it would not have excluded evidence on that basis alone.