David Dmitri Genis

The accused, Hallie Ndorley, faced charges of robbery with an imitation firearm and possession of counterfeit money.

For the robbery charges, the court found the complainant's testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable, leading to a reasonable doubt.

For the counterfeit money charges, the evidence of possession was entirely circumstantial.

Applying the principles from R. v. Villaroman, the court determined that a reasonable innocent scenario could be inferred from the evidence or lack thereof, specifically that the counterfeiting operation might have been run by other residents without the accused's knowledge or control.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to approve a settlement under s. 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act regarding $195,110 in seized currency.

The currency was seized from a safe during a drug trafficking investigation.

The parties agreed to a settlement where $39,022 would be paid to the respondent's mother, and the remainder forfeited to the Crown.

The court found the currency was likely the proceeds of unlawful activity and approved the settlement as a reasonable compromise in the interests of justice.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, impaired operation, and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a high-speed chase through residential areas.

The defence brought Charter applications challenging the admissibility of breath test evidence on grounds of violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found a breach of section 8 (right to privacy) regarding cell toilet surveillance and excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2).

However, the court convicted the accused on the dangerous operation and impaired operation charges based on the totality of the evidence, including observations of the accused's driving and physical condition.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 mgs following a motor vehicle accident.

The defence raised two Charter issues: (1) whether the defendant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated when police offered duty counsel in Mandarin rather than permitting the defendant to use his cell phone to search for a lawyer of his choice; and (2) whether the arrest and approved instrument demand violated sections 8 and 9 Charter rights due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The defendant's primary concern was obtaining legal advice in Mandarin, which was satisfied by duty counsel.

The officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the serious accident, evidence of alcohol consumption, and observable signs of impairment.

The defendant was convicted of both offences.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device on May 15, 2015.

The information was sworn on May 20, 2015.

By June 27, 2018, when the section 11(b) Charter motion was heard, the matter had been scheduled for trial five times over approximately three and one-half years.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that while the net delay of 16.5 months fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases, the case had taken markedly longer than a straightforward roadside refuse case ought to take.

The court found that the accused had demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the delay had caused prejudice.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to vacate a Justice of the Peace's decision granting bail to the accused, Miguel Nash.

The accused was facing new charges including impaired driving, assault police, and breach of recognizance, while already on bail for previous impaired driving offences and awaiting sentencing.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace failed to properly apply reverse onus provisions and public safety concerns.

The court found the Justice of the Peace's decision "clearly inappropriate" for failing to adequately weigh public safety and the accused's history of non-compliance and reoffending.

The court ordered the accused detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample results obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand, arguing the officer lacked proper grounds and that the officer's failure to activate his in-car camera system breached the Charter.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for the demand was unreliable, established a breach of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded the breath results under section 24(2).

Both charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a blood-alcohol offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appellant contended that a 7.5-month adjournment, characterized as neutral time by the trial judge, was in fact Crown-caused delay due to a belated expert report on a post-driving drinking scenario.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, finding that the total delay was 26 months and one week.

However, after attributing 9.5 months of delay to the defence (including the 7.5-month adjournment due to tactical choices and scheduling conflicts), the net delay was less than 16 months, falling below the 18-month ceiling.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no unreasonable delay.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and operate over 80 following an incident on November 3, 2013.

The Crown established that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that his blood alcohol concentration substantially exceeded the legal limit of 80 mg/100mL.

The defence conceded these facts but argued the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea, claiming he was disabled through no fault of his own from appreciating that he was impaired or that his BAC exceeded the legal limit due to an interaction between Tylenol 3 medication and alcohol.

The court rejected this defence, finding that the defendant's impairment resulted from voluntary consumption of alcohol and that he knew or ought to have known of the risks.

The court convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with Over 80 Operation of a Motor Vehicle following a motor vehicle collision on October 15, 2014.

The Crown proved that the accused was involved in a rear-end collision, had a faint odour of alcohol on his breath, failed a roadside screening device test, and provided three breath samples to an Approved Instrument with results of 240, 218, and 206 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 10(b), and contended that one of the breath samples was deemed unsuitable by the breath technician and therefore should not be used.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty based on the expert toxicology evidence.

The accused applied for relief under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The accused was arrested on October 18, 2014 for care and control over 80 and charged on November 19, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for March 15 and 16, 2016, resulting in a total delay of 17 months from arrest and 16 months from the swearing of the information.

The delay was primarily caused by both parties awaiting disclosure of an in-car camera video that did not exist, despite both parties having information indicating its non-existence as early as January 19, 2015.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) rights and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with Dangerous Driving and Driving while Over 80mgs following a high-speed flight from police and a failed Approved Screening Device test.

The Crown proved dangerous driving based on the accused's objectively dangerous conduct during the pursuit, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable driver would observe.

The defence raised Charter breaches regarding delayed right to counsel advice and the breath demand due to language difficulties.

The court found no Charter breaches, as the officer acted appropriately in obtaining translation assistance when language barriers were identified, and the right to counsel advice was provided without delay in the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit ("Over 80") after failing a roadside screening device test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results from an approved instrument to establish the accused's blood alcohol level.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the Crown failed to prove the breath demand was made "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, thereby depriving the Crown of the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c).

The court dismissed the motion, holding that while the demand was delayed, the failure to comply with the timing requirement in section 254(3) does not render the breath test evidence inadmissible or deprive the Crown of the section 258 presumptions in the absence of a Charter application.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration on June 23, 2014.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol based on the evidence presented.

Additionally, the trial judge found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, rendering the breath analysis results inadmissible.

Both charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge failed to consider a requested remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach relating to an Intoxilizer demand.

The alleged breach arose from an officer’s imprecise description of the approved screening device used during a roadside R.I.D.E. stop.

The trial judge had admitted the breath test results under s. 24(2), finding the breach technical, in good faith, minimally intrusive, and producing reliable evidence.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s rejection of the s. 24(1) remedy was implicit in his findings and that denying the Crown reliance on the presumption of identity would have been disproportionate.

The court emphasized that minor technical breaches do not justify remedies that would effectively mandate acquittal.

The appellant, who was unrepresented at trial, appealed his conviction on the grounds that he did not receive a fair trial because he misunderstood the concept of wilful blindness and the evidentiary nature of disclosure material.

He also argued the trial judge applied an objective standard to wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant understood wilful blindness, the confusion over disclosure did not impact the trial's fairness, and the trial judge did not err in applying the wilful blindness doctrine given the overwhelming nature of the Crown's case.