John McInnes

In this sentencing decision for possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material, the court applied the post-Friesen and Pike framework emphasizing denunciation and deterrence and an elevated range of up to five years on indictment.

The court found the collection’s extraordinary size, high video volume, and severe content placed offence gravity near the highest end, while recognizing mitigating factors including a guilty plea, remorse, first-offender status, and some increased custodial onerousness linked to mental disorder.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, holding the personal and medical circumstances were not sufficiently compelling to render incarceration disproportionate in light of the offence’s harms and Parliament’s sentencing direction.

Applying restraint within that framework, the court imposed a 28-month custodial sentence.

The defendant, Colin Ramsay, pleaded guilty to communicating with a person under 18 for the purpose of facilitating sexual exploitation.

The Crown proceeded summarily, which carried a six-month mandatory minimum sentence.

The defence challenged the constitutional validity of this mandatory minimum under s.12 of the Charter.

The court, applying the principles of horizontal stare decisis from R. v. Sullivan, found itself bound by R. v. Hems, which held s.172.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code to be unconstitutional, rendering the mandatory minimum inoperative.

Considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, planning, and significant interference with the victim, balanced against mitigating factors including the offender's guilty plea, first-offender status, low risk of recidivism, and his role as sole caregiver for his disabled brother, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day with strict house arrest.

This sentence was deemed to adequately address denunciation and general deterrence while also serving rehabilitative and restorative goals by allowing the offender to continue caring for his brother.

The Crown applied for a forfeiture order under s. 117.05(1) of the Criminal Code in respect of a handgun seized from the respondent during a mental health crisis.

The crisis was precipitated by an adverse reaction to a newly prescribed antidepressant medication.

The respondent subsequently changed medications, stabilized, and reconciled with his family.

The court found that the respondent was a responsible gun owner and that there was no continuing basis to restrain his possession of the firearm.

The application for forfeiture was dismissed and the firearm was ordered returned to the respondent.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to s. 151(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved sexual touching and fellatio with a 14-year-old complainant when the accused was 20 years old.

The conduct occurred between September 2017 and October 2017 at a church where both parties attended.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence with an initial three-month period of virtual house arrest, followed by probation.

The sentencing decision balanced the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and general deterrence against significant mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, successful completion of counselling, and low risk of reoffence.

The accused was charged with six offences arising from a home invasion, robbery, forcible confinement, and kidnapping for ransom.

The accused admitted committing the actus reus of all charges but raised a defence of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The accused claimed he suffered from delusional disorder and believed he was on a mission assigned by Chinese anti-corruption authorities to locate and apprehend corrupt Chinese officials in Canada.

The trial proceeded in two phases: the first addressing the Crown's case and the accused's testimony; the second addressing psychiatric evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, rejecting the NCR defence after finding the accused's account of his motivations was not credible and that he had not proven on a balance of probabilities that his mental disorder deprived him of the capacity to know his actions were wrong according to Canadian societal standards.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and "over 80" operation of a motor vehicle following a traffic stop on Highway 404.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing blood alcohol concentrations of 150 mg/100ml and 140 mg/100ml.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, alleging the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds.

The defence also alleged a breach of section 10(b) rights regarding privacy during consultation with duty counsel.

The trial judge found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for arrest was riddled with anomalies, implausibilities, and internal inconsistencies, and rejected most of the officer's evidence concerning indicia of impairment.

The court found the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, constituting a Charter breach.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was serious and compounded by misleading testimony.

Without the breath evidence, the Crown could not prove impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and "over 80" after police found his extensively damaged vehicle stationary on an exit ramp with the motor running.

The defendant challenged whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) that breath readings conclusively prove blood alcohol concentration, arguing the samples were not taken as soon as practicable and the first sample was not taken within two hours of the alleged offence.

The defendant also challenged the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000C and argued the evidence of impairment was insufficient.

The court found the Crown had proven the temporal preconditions beyond a reasonable doubt, the police acted reasonably in obtaining the samples, there was no Charter breach, and the evidence of impairment was sufficient.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample results obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand, arguing the officer lacked proper grounds and that the officer's failure to activate his in-car camera system breached the Charter.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for the demand was unreliable, established a breach of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded the breath results under section 24(2).

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking after police found approximately one kilogram of marijuana in his vehicle during a purported Highway Traffic Act stop.

The court found that the initial detention was unlawful as it was not conducted for road safety purposes but rather for investigative purposes related to suspected drug trafficking.

The officer had no grounds for an investigative detention.

The court excluded the evidence under sections 9 and 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

On appeal from a stay of proceedings entered by Justice of the Peace H. Radtke on June 21, 2016, the court considered whether the respondent's right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

The respondent was charged with speeding on December 30, 2014, and the matter proceeded through two adjournments before a stay was granted.

The appeal court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and determined that the net delay of 326 days (10 months and 22 days) was presumptively reasonable.

The court also addressed whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan applies to Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings, concluding that a lower ceiling of approximately 14 months is more appropriate for such regulatory matters.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit of 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

The Crown obtained breath readings of 140 and 130 mg/100 ml.

The defence sought to exclude these readings under sections 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights regarding the delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to an unjustified six-hour overholding of the accused.

The court determined the breath readings were obtained in a manner that violated the Charter and excluded them under section 24(2), resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (Count 1) and impaired driving (Count 2).

The Crown's case was based on observations of erratic driving by civilian witnesses, police observations of indicia of impairment, and breath test results showing 170 mg/100 ml and 160 mg/100 ml.

The court dismissed Count 1 because the Crown failed to prove that the breath samples were received directly into the approved instrument as required by s. 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant guilty on Count 2 based on the cumulative circumstantial evidence of impairment, including the protracted period of dangerous driving, physical indicia of intoxication, and the defendant's demeanor and confusion.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100ml.

Police found the accused asleep behind the wheel in a shopping mall parking lot at 3:30 a.m.

The officer made a breath demand and obtained readings of 97 and 93 mg/100ml.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand, arguing the officer lacked both subjective and objective reasonable grounds.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding observations of impairment was unreliable and inconsistent with in-car video evidence and the breath technician's observations.

The court concluded neither the subjective nor objective component of the reasonable grounds standard was established, constituting a serious Charter breach.

The breath results were excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The sole issue at trial was whether the breath testing was conducted "as soon as is practicable" after the demand was made, as required by s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was stopped at 1:51 a.m., failed a roadside screening demand at 1:54 a.m., and provided the first breath sample at 3:08 a.m., approximately 72 minutes after the demand.

The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout the process and that the breath tests were taken within a reasonably prompt time under the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit after police found him outside his vehicle in an intoxicated state following a collision with a parked car.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the offence of operating over 80 due to lack of evidence establishing the time of the accident.

The Crown alternatively sought a conviction for the included offence of having care and control of a motor vehicle over 80.

The court dismissed the charge, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual care and control of the vehicle.

The evidence was equally consistent with the defendant remaining at the scene to comply with his statutory duty under the Highway Traffic Act.

The accused were charged with possessing marihuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the court discharged both accused on all four counts.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

While the court found sufficient evidence that the accused had resided at the premises where the drugs were discovered, the Crown failed to establish sufficient evidence that the accused had knowledge of and control over the controlled substances on or about the date of the search.

The absence of evidence regarding the accused's whereabouts in the days preceding the search, combined with the presence of identification documents belonging to unknown persons and evidence of other criminal activity at the premises, created reasonable alternative explanations for the presence of the drugs that did not involve the accused.

The defendants were jointly charged with possessing a controlled substance.

During trial, they sought exclusion of heroin found in their vehicle based on alleged violations of their Charter rights (sections 8 and 9).

The central issue was whether police had reasonable grounds to arrest them.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by one defendant to police in 2012 during an unrelated investigation as part of the officer's grounds for arrest.

The defence objected, arguing the Crown must first prove the statement was voluntary.

The court ruled that the Crown does not need to prove voluntariness of an accused's statement prior to its admission in a Charter voir dire, following the reasoning in R v Paterson.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving"over 80" and dangerous driving following a June 6, 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The trial was originally scheduled for July 28-29, 2016 but was not reached and rescheduled for January 16-17, 2017.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The parties agreed that the net delay was 18 months and 28 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan by 28 days.

The Crown argued a transitional exceptional circumstance applied, but the court found the Crown failed to establish this exception and granted the stay of proceedings.