Brian McCallion

The court sentenced Alexander George Jolly for manslaughter after he shot and killed Nicole Mercer, with whom he had an intimate relationship.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, the offender’s background, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court imposed a nine-year sentence, less credit for pre-sentence custody, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in intimate partner violence cases.

The defendant, Anushan Uthayakumar, faced charges including careless storage of a firearm and possession of a loaded restricted firearm after a traffic stop and subsequent discovery of a weapon.

The defence sought to exclude the firearm, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, specifically arguing racial profiling in the selection of the surveillance location, a pretextual traffic stop, and an unlawful search of the vehicle.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding no evidence of racial profiling, that the traffic stop was a legitimate sobriety check, and that the cannabis discovery leading to the search was lawful.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty on all counts.

This decision addresses an application by the York Regional Police (YRP) for standing to make submissions in a disclosure classification hearing.

The defence sought police policy documents, and the core issue was whether these were first-party (Crown's automatic disclosure) or third-party (O'Connor regime) records.

The YRP, supported by the Crown, argued for standing, while the defence objected.

The court granted YRP standing, emphasizing that police forces have a direct interest in disclosure issues concerning their own records and that substance should prevail over form, especially when the Crown's position aligns with the police.

The defendant, Giuseppe Galati, facing a dangerous driving charge, brought an application for disclosure of the York Regional Police's (YRP) Suspect Apprehension Pursuit (SAP) policies and procedures.

The Crown and YRP opposed the request, arguing it was a speculative fishing expedition.

The court, applying the 'obviously relevant' test from R. v. Gubbins, found that the SAP policy was relevant to the credibility of the central Crown witness (PC Skelly) and the defence's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the YRP to disclose the SAP policy created pursuant to O. Reg. 266/10, but declined to order a broader disclosure of all pursuit-related policies as overly vague.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentence for repeated harassing telecommunication and breach of recognizance.

The charges arose from a prolonged dispute regarding a local dog park, during which the appellant repeatedly emailed a volunteer and posted about her online in breach of his bail conditions.

On appeal, the appellant raised numerous grounds, including errors in arraignment, limitation periods, mens rea, and the trial judge's handling of his self-represented status and the appointment of section 486.3 counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings sound, his legal analysis correct, and his management of the trial exceedingly fair to the self-represented appellant.

The 60-day conditional sentence and suspended sentences were upheld as fit.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against his wife, alleging incidents on April 9 and 14, 2019.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual contact, while the defence claimed the contact was consensual.

The complainant testified that she had no interest in the accused, that their marriage had broken down, and that she did not consent to the sexual contact.

The accused testified that the contact was consensual and that their marriage was loving.

The court found the accused's evidence to be unreliable due to multiple inconsistencies and evasiveness regarding the state of the marriage.

The complainant's evidence also contained inconsistencies regarding post-incident contact with the accused.

The court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.

However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.

The accused pleaded guilty to careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a serious motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger.

The accident occurred on February 21, 2017, when the accused was driving northbound on Keele Street in Vaughan at an excessive speed in heavy rush hour traffic.

He attempted to pass a slowing vehicle, lost control of his vehicle, which rolled and was struck by an oncoming vehicle.

The passenger, Alwyn Lloyd, a 27-year-old father and husband, died as a result of his injuries.

The court imposed a $1,000 fine, 18 months probation with a requirement to perform 50 hours of community service and attend counselling, and an 18-month driving suspension.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found that while the "forthwith" requirement for field sobriety tests was met, the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make a breath demand under section 254(3) because the officer should not have relied on the failure of field sobriety tests given the accused's disclosed medical conditions affecting his ability to stand and his vision impairment.

The trial judge also found the accused was denied access to necessary medication during detention.

The breath samples were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after strangling his grandmother to death.

The accused suffered from schizophrenia and experienced severe delusions, believing his grandmother was part of a broad conspiracy to kill him.

The court accepted expert psychiatric evidence that the accused's mental illness deprived him of the capacity to know that others would view his conduct as morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant, Matthew Ruscica, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

He alleged breaches of his Charter rights under s. 10(b) (right to counsel of choice) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 10(b) advice given by police met the required Charter standard and that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of arbitrary detention for the post-investigation delay.

Charles Chun appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing a breach of his s. 10(a) Charter rights and an error by the trial judge in declining to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a standard of deference to the trial judge's factual findings and s. 24(2) analysis, found that the trial judge's characterization of the events leading to the breath demand was reasonable.

Despite a s. 10(a) Charter breach, the trial judge's application of the Grant analysis was upheld, concluding that the breach was not trivial, but police acted in good faith and the impact on the appellant's interests was minimal.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction.

The appellant, Nilesh Patel, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 9, and 10(b), and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge found a 10(b) violation but not 7 or 9, and declined a stay.

On appeal, the court found a Section 9 violation due to unlawful detention for 38 minutes after the appearance notice was issued.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no Section 7 violation, as the injuries sustained were not a "substantial interference" with physical or psychological integrity, and there was no intentional infliction of suffering by police.

The court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not justified, as the police conduct was not egregious enough to meet the high threshold for such a remedy, and the trial judge had already ameliorated the sentence to account for the unlawful detention and discomfort.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Robert Strmota, appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg, arguing that his s. 9 Charter right to be free from arbitrary detention was violated when he was stopped in a private parking lot during a R.I.D.E. program.

The trial judge had dismissed the Charter application, finding the stop lawful for sobriety checks, even on private property, based on common law powers and road safety concerns.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming that police officers have common law power to detain motorists for sobriety checks, even on private property, without reasonable suspicion, particularly in the context of a R.I.D.E. program aimed at road safety.

The defendant was charged with breach of recognizance (violation of house arrest) and failure to stop for a peace officer as soon as was reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown proved the defendant was operating the vehicle and that police were pursuing him.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant failed to stop as soon as reasonable, given the short timeframe between when police activated emergency lights and when the defendant stopped in a plaza.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's intent to evade police while operating the motor vehicle.

The defendant was convicted on Count 1 (breach of recognizance) but acquitted on Count 2 (failure to stop for peace officer).

The court delivered reasons for sentence for Bradley Screen, who pleaded guilty to an offence carrying a maximum 10-year imprisonment.

Aggravating factors included a criminal record dating back to 2009 and a considerable amount of money obtained.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility.

The court accepted a joint submission from Crown and defence, sentencing Mr. Screen to eight months in jail, consecutive to his current sentence, followed by 12 months of probation with specific conditions, a DNA order, and a $200 victim fine surcharge with 24 months to pay.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving with excess alcohol (160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood) and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so, both offences occurring on March 7, 2017.

The defendant had an extensive criminal record including four previous drinking and driving convictions between 1995 and 2003, and seven previous driving while disqualified or prohibited offences between 1998 and 2013.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment (concurrent on both charges), a lifetime driving prohibition, and 36 months probation with conditions including mandatory alcohol treatment and counselling.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a sample of breath (ASD refusal) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown sought conviction on the charge.

The defendant raised Charter applications challenging the validity of the ASD demand and alleging breaches of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the ASD demand was valid based on reasonable suspicion of alcohol consumption.

While finding a technical breach of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel, the court determined no Charter relief was warranted under the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments of section 7 and 9 breaches, finding the detention and handcuffing, though uncomfortable, did not rise to the level of constitutional violation.

The defendant was found guilty of the ASD refusal charge.

The defendant was convicted after trial of impaired (by drug) driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 255(2) of the Criminal Code and failure to comply with a demand for a urine sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found stopped in a driveway while impaired and, when police arrived, his vehicle backed up slowly and struck a police officer, causing bodily harm to the officer's knee.

The defendant refused a lawful demand to provide a urine sample.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 7 months imprisonment and a 3-year driving prohibition, while the defendant sought a suspended sentence with a fine and increased licence suspension.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 60 days for the impaired driving causing bodily harm and 30 days for the failure to provide a urine sample, to run consecutively, plus a 2-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample results obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand, arguing the officer lacked proper grounds and that the officer's failure to activate his in-car camera system breached the Charter.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for the demand was unreliable, established a breach of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded the breath results under section 24(2).

Both charges were dismissed.