Jason Rabinovitch

The accused was charged with assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code and assault by choking, suffocating, or strangling contrary to section 267(c) of the Criminal Code, arising from an incident on August 2, 2023, involving his wife.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The complainant testified that the accused struck her repeatedly in the face while driving, choked her by the neck, and pushed her head into the dashboard.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, supported by photographic evidence and medical observations.

The court rejected the accused's denial as incapable of belief and found him guilty on both counts.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the defendant following his conviction on four offences: assault with a weapon (predicate offence), uttering death threats, mischief under $5,000, and breach of probation.

The defendant had a 15-year history of violent outbursts, including three serious knife assaults on family members.

The court found the defendant met all criteria for dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour and persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that no lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The defendants jointly applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 618 days, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued for a reduction in delay due to defence actions and inactions.

The court found that a joint prosecution was justified and that the defence acted as a collective.

Specific periods of delay were attributed to the defence, including 44 days due to one counsel's unavailability for a JPT, 11 days due to a change in counsel, and 95.5 days due to the collective defence's delay in raising s. 11(b) concerns and not utilizing backlog initiatives.

Alternatively, one defendant was found solely responsible for 306 days of delay due to counsel's unavailability for an earlier trial date, which was then communally shared.

In both scenarios, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, Ayodele Adekoya, was found guilty by a jury of fraud over $5,000, possession of identity documents, uttering a forged document, and possession of property obtained by crime, stemming from a large-scale credit card fraud operation involving 60 compromised identities and a total loss of $239,677 to Citibank.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the significant quantum of fraud, the scale of the operation, and the defendant's extensive criminal record for similar dishonesty offences.

Mitigating factors included family support and rehabilitative potential.

The court rejected a conditional sentence order due to the defendant's history of non-compliance and dishonesty.

Despite concerns about collateral immigration consequences and the impact on the defendant's family, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 40 months concurrent for all counts, along with a DNA order and a restitution order of $239,677.

The defendant, Duncan Morrison, was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, stemming from an allegation that he removed a condom during consensual sexual intercourse without the complainant's knowledge or consent.

The central issue was whether the complainant consented to sexual activity without a condom.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both the complainant and the defendant.

While the complainant testified she insisted on condom use and saw the defendant put one on, her recollection of other significant details of the evening was found to be unreliable.

The defendant denied using a condom at all, stating he did not bring one.

Despite some issues with the defendant's explanations for his post-incident apologies, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity as it occurred.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge erred in inferring from circumstantial evidence that he was the driver of the vehicle and that he was impaired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluding that the totality of the evidence supported the findings that the appellant was the driver and was impaired.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault.

During deliberations, the jury inquired whether misidentification of the victim relieved the accused of intent.

The court ruled that the doctrine of transferred intent applied, meaning the accused's potential misidentification of the victim did not negate the intent to apply force, as the intention was transferred from the intended victim to the actual victim.

The accused, Peter Korgbor, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

During a pre-charge conference, the court considered whether the defence of self-defence should be put to the jury.

The court applied the "air of reality" test, reviewing the evidence from Crown witnesses regarding the altercation where the accused stabbed one individual and assaulted another with a knife.

The court found no direct or circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable belief that force was being used or threatened against the accused, nor that his actions were for defensive purposes or objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court declined to leave the defence of self-defence with the jury, concluding that doing so would invite speculation.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available child pornography, possessing child pornography, making child pornography, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter between 2014 and 2017.

The offences involved the systematic grooming and sexual abuse of the victim from age 13 to 17, the creation and distribution of hundreds of sexually explicit images of the victim, and the possession of numerous child abuse images of other children.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment, with specific counts running concurrently and consecutively as required by statute, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives given the serious nature of crimes against children.

The accused was tried on two counts of attempted fraud over $5,000, two counts of possession of property obtained by indictable offence, and four counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly participated in a scheme to deposit stolen cheques into a trust account.

The accused maintained he did not know the cheques were stolen and was not involved in any fraudulent scheme.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the fraud and possession charges, acquitting on counts 1-4.

The court found the accused guilty of breaching recognizance conditions related to possession of financial instruments (counts 7-8), but acquitted on the house arrest breach charges (counts 5-6) as the bank visits fell within the work exemption.

The accused was charged with threatening to cause bodily harm contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused made threatening statements to a Children's Aid Society caseworker when she attended his home to remove his children.

The accused denied making the threats.

The trial judge found the caseworker to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable.

The court found that the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a conviction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was involved in a single motor vehicle accident and was later arrested after registering a fail on an approved screening device.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control for the period between a tow truck's arrival and police arrival.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to the entire relevant time period, specifically the period of driving leading up to the collision.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Kamil Filli and Liban Douale, faced charges of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Both brought applications to exclude evidence under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Filli argued his warrantless arrest and subsequent search were unlawful.

The court dismissed Filli's application, finding his arrest and search lawful, or at worst a low-level Charter breach that would not warrant exclusion of evidence under the R. v. Grant test.

Douale argued the search warrant for his residence was based on information obtained through an unlawful warrantless search by police in the common hallway of his multi-unit residential building.

The court granted Douale's application, finding that the police conducted an unlawful warrantless search by entering the building and overhearing a conversation, which was the sole basis for subsequent incriminating observations.

This serious breach of privacy, coupled with the affiant's omission of these facts from the Information to Obtain, led to the exclusion of evidence against Douale under section 24(2) of the Charter, effectively ending the prosecution's case against him.

A young person was charged with manslaughter in the death of a four-year-old child.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to his father, who was acting as a police agent without the accused's knowledge.

The accused had previously been interviewed by police and had retained counsel who advised him not to make statements.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statements made during a hotel meeting between the accused and his father, where the father was instructed by police to attempt to elicit information about the child's death.

The central issue was whether the use of the accused's father as a police agent to obtain statements constituted an abuse of process that would render the evidence inadmissible.

A registered nurse was sentenced after being convicted of voyeurism and sexual assault committed against two hospital patients while they were receiving emergency medical treatment.

The offences involved photographing and recording a patient in various states of undress and taking a photograph of another unconscious patient without consent.

The court emphasized the profound breach of trust by a healthcare professional exploiting vulnerable patients.

After considering aggravating factors including multiple victims and abuse of a position of authority, as well as mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and professional consequences, the court imposed a custodial sentence.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and lengthy restrictive bail conditions.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner over a period of approximately one year ending in February 2013.

The Crown alleged that the defendant assaulted the complainant on several occasions, including breaking her nose, choking her, striking her with various objects, and sexually assaulting her.

The defendant testified in his own defence, denying all allegations and providing alternative explanations for the incidents.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's testimony, including multiple contradictions between her police statement and courtroom evidence, inconsistent accounts given to different people, and implausible details regarding the alleged incidents.

The court acquitted the defendant on all counts, finding that the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown called three police officers and a qualified breath technician.

The defence did not call evidence but challenged the reliability of the breath test results, arguing that vomiting shortly before the breath samples were taken could have introduced mouth alcohol into the samples.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, holding that the Crown had proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, and that the defence had failed to raise a real doubt about the reliability of the breath test results.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The Crown presented evidence from a York Regional Police officer and a breath technician regarding the investigation and breath testing procedures.

The defence challenged whether the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable, arguing that the officer completed the roadside sample at 02:28 and then delayed, and that the officer should have arrested for impaired driving without conducting an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout the investigation, that the total elapsed time of approximately 1 hour and 15 to 22 minutes was reasonable, and that the officer's decision to conduct an ASD was justified.

The court found the accused guilty based on the breath test readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following an incident in Mississauga on November 25, 2011.

The court examined five key issues: whether police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand, whether the demand was made as soon as practicable, whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, and whether impairment was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds existed for the breath demand and that the first breath test was taken within two hours.

However, the court found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable due to unreasonable delays caused by the investigating officer's decision to transfer the investigation to a RIDE officer without promptly calling for one.

Consequently, the breath test results were excluded as inadmissible.

Despite exclusion of the breath evidence, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of the evidence, including observations by multiple officers and an eyewitness of signs of impairment and erratic driving.

The accused was acquitted of the excess blood alcohol charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained pursuant to an Intoxilyzer demand, which was based on an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test result.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the seizure of the breath samples, arguing that the officer lacked an objective basis for believing the ASD was in proper working order, thereby breaching section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the device was operating properly based on his knowledge of the fail-safe feature, the device's successful activation and operation, and the reasonable assumption that his unit would provide a properly functioning device.

The Charter application was dismissed.