Jeffrey Alan Costain

R.G. was sentenced for 10 offences of sexual abuse against his daughter, spanning an eight-year period from when she was 9 or 10 until just before her 17th birthday.

The offences included incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and unlawful confinement, involving significant physical interference and violence.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the egregious breach of trust, the victim's young age, the duration and frequency of abuse, and the profound impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's steady employment history and family support, as well as time spent in pre-sentence custody and under restrictive bail conditions, including hardships due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying principles from R. v. Friesen, the court imposed a total sentence of 10 years, with a credit of 2 years for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions, resulting in 8 years of imprisonment yet to be served.

Ancillary orders included a communication prohibition, DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance.

The applicant, R.G., sought an order to reopen his trial and declare a mistrial after being found guilty of 10 counts of sexual abuse but before sentencing.

He presented fresh evidence, including cell phone records and affidavits, to establish an alibi for some charges and challenge the complainant's credibility.

The court applied the rigorous "exceptional circumstances" and "clearest of cases" test for vacating a guilt adjudication, incorporating the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence.

The court found that the proposed evidence could have been obtained with due diligence prior to trial and that the application was an attempt to reverse tactical decisions made by the defence.

The application was dismissed, as the test for reopening the trial or declaring a mistrial was not met.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon and criminal harassment arising from the dissolution of an intimate relationship.

The Crown proceeded on six counts, later withdrawing two counts of possession of cocaine.

At trial, the Crown further withdrew a charge of forcible confinement and a charge of criminal harassment dated March 18, 2019.

The court found the accused not guilty of assault with a weapon (thrown bar stool on March 14, 2019) and criminal harassment (repeated communications on March 29-30, 2019).

The court found insufficient evidence of mens rea for the assault charge and reasonable doubt regarding the accused's knowledge that his communications constituted harassment.

The defendant, Kevin Deonath, was charged with second-degree murder following the shooting death of Roy Khan.

The court examined whether the Crown proved the requisite intent for murder and disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence indicated a struggle ensued after Khan pointed a loaded handgun at Deonath.

The court found that while an inference of intentional firing was available, another reasonable inference was that the gun discharged unintentionally during the struggle as Deonath defended himself.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove intent for murder and failed to disprove lawful self-defence.

Deonath was acquitted.

The court addressed submissions regarding the anonymization of its decision and the inclusion of a warning, in light of existing publication bans from underlying criminal and family court proceedings.

The Crown sought to protect victim identities through initialization and a substantial warning.

Post Media agreed to initials, while CBC opposed anonymization, citing the open court principle and lack of evidence for harm.

The court ultimately decided to initialize the principal parties in its decision and attach a modified warning to comply with publication bans while upholding the open court principle.

The Crown brought a motion to compel undertakings from "paper trail" affiants of the respondent media corporations during cross-examinations related to an upcoming civil contempt application.

The respondents argued that cross-examinations are narrower than discoveries, affiants are fact witnesses, and the requested inquiries were irrelevant or potentially incriminating.

The court found the questions regarding the authors' knowledge of publication bans and the CBC's system for tracking such bans to be relevant.

It ordered the affiants to make the requested inquiries, noting that the information appeared readily available and not unduly onerous to obtain.

The Minister of Transportation (MTO) applied for a warrant to remove trailer signage located within 400 meters of Highway 400, arguing it violated the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act and the MTO Corridor Signage Policy.

The respondents, including 2523654 Ontario Inc. (252), opposed the removal and brought a counter-application for a declaration that the signage was not prohibited.

The court found that the trailer signage constituted billboard signage not related to the property, thus contravening the Act and Policy.

The court also determined that legal opposition constituted "resistance or opposition" under the Act, justifying the warrant.

MTO's application was granted, and 252's counter-application was dismissed.

The paternal grandmother of a four-year-old child in child protection proceedings brought a motion seeking state-funded counsel pursuant to sections 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The child had been apprehended at birth following the death of an older sibling, and the Society sought to place the child in extended care with adoptive foster parents.

The grandmother sought to present an alternative plan for the child's placement with her.

The Court found that while the grandmother did not have standing to claim a remedy based on a breach of the child's own Charter right, the child's section 7 right to security of the person was engaged and would be infringed without state-funded counsel for the grandmother.

The Court ordered the Attorney General to provide state-funded counsel to the grandmother to ensure a fair hearing and to allow the Court to properly assess the child's best interests, considering the child's connections to kin and culture.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff and her expert witness to produce extensive financial and medical records, and additional expert materials, during cross-examinations for a class action certification motion.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding the requested information irrelevant and disproportionate to the certification issues under the Class Proceedings Act.

The court emphasized that a representative plaintiff's personal financial or medical circumstances are not generally relevant to certification, nor are an expert's draft notes or unrelated academic works that were not relied upon in their report.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and personal liberty offenses.

The Crown's case for identification relied solely on grainy surveillance video footage.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Nikolovski, found that the video lacked sufficient clarity and quality to identify the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, especially considering the accused's changed appearance since the incident and the absence of corroborative evidence from a police search.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with Over 80 and brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The Crown had stayed an Impaired Driving charge.

The trial was scheduled for March 29, 2017, with the charge arising from August 16, 2015.

The court applied the post-Jordan framework for analyzing delay and found that while the net delay of 15 months and 1 week exceeded what would have been considered reasonable under the previous Morin framework, it fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court attributed approximately 4 months and 4 days to defence delay, primarily due to the defence's failure to conduct timely pre-trials despite having sufficient disclosure to proceed.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test readings of 136 and 131 milligrams and expert evidence extrapolating the accused's blood alcohol content at the time of driving.

The court found that while the arrest was supported by reasonable and probable grounds, the Crown failed to prove the absence of bolus drinking, rendering the expert opinion unreliable.

Additionally, the evidence of impairment was inconsistent and frail, with minimal evidence of bad driving.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown conceded the impaired charge.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel, arguing the accused was not afforded privacy during her telephone consultation with duty counsel in a hospital emergency room.

The defence also argued the first breath sample was obtained after two hours had elapsed from the time of driving, contrary to s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights and that the breath samples were obtained within the statutory time limit.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being found asleep in the driver's seat of his vehicle at a traffic light.

The Crown relied on observations made by the arresting officer at the roadside, including the smell of alcohol, red eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness.

However, observations made at the police station approximately 23-25 minutes later showed no signs of impairment, and the breath technician's observations approximately 1 hour and 23 minutes later similarly showed no impairment indicators except for watery, red-rimmed eyes.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, noting that the discrepancy between roadside and station observations, combined with the absence of any evidence of actual vehicle operation, created reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the symptoms observed at the roadside could have been attributable to extreme tiredness rather than alcohol impairment.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The central issue at trial was whether the officer's reliance on an approved screening device (ASD) test result was objectively reasonable, given the defence argument that the officer should have waited 15 minutes before conducting the test to rule out mouth alcohol.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD test and reasonable grounds for the approved instrument tests.

The defence failed to prove a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The breath tests confirmed blood alcohol levels over 80 milligrams, and the accused was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm had been caused and being reckless as to whether death resulted.

The victim, a 19-year-old cyclist, died from blunt force head trauma after being struck by the accused's vehicle on an unlit road.

The accused initially fled the scene and misrepresented the incident to his father before surrendering to police the following day.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence, a 2-year driving prohibition, and a 2-year probation order with conditions including community service and counselling.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence against the accused's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following observations by a York Regional Police Sergeant.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving based on the defendant's erratic driving, evasive conduct, and physical indicators of impairment.

However, the court found a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights due to an unacceptable delay of 5 to 6 minutes in providing rights to counsel.

Despite this breach, the breath test evidence was admitted under the R. v. Grant analysis.

The defendant was ultimately found not guilty of impaired driving due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment, though the breath test showed a blood alcohol level of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused, a 62-year-old man, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his granddaughter.

The alleged incident occurred during a family gathering at the complainant's home.

The complainant testified that the accused entered her bedroom at night and placed her hand on his exposed genitals on two occasions.

The accused denied all allegations and testified that he never entered the complainant's bedroom.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including material discrepancies with her prior statements, inconsistencies with corroborating witnesses regarding timing and details, and concerns about potential reinforcement of her testimony through discussions with her parents.

The court also noted the implausibility of the alleged conduct given the crowded household, the presence of multiple adults, the cluttered bedroom layout, and the accused's health limitations.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her intimate partner.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted to a sentence of six years imprisonment.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it appropriate given the circumstances.

The offence occurred in a domestic context, which was significantly aggravating.

However, the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, substantial rehabilitation efforts including four years of sobriety, and strong family support were mitigating factors.

The court imposed a six-year sentence with credit for time served on a 1.5:1 basis, resulting in approximately five years and one month remaining to be served.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, an issue arose regarding a potential conflict of interest after counsel for one accused had previously represented a co‑accused on an unrelated impaired driving matter years earlier.

The court considered whether the prior representation created a risk of misuse of confidential information or an appearance of conflict under the principles in MacDonald Estate v. Martin.

Although the risk of prejudice was assessed as minimal and both affected accused were willing to waive any conflict, the court emphasized the unpredictability of a multi‑accused criminal trial and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The judge permitted counsel to continue acting subject to strict conditions, including written waivers, restrictions on cross‑examination of the former client, and prohibitions on accessing or using any prior confidential information.