Jeffrey Alan Costain

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test readings of 136 and 131 milligrams and expert evidence extrapolating the accused's blood alcohol content at the time of driving.

The court found that while the arrest was supported by reasonable and probable grounds, the Crown failed to prove the absence of bolus drinking, rendering the expert opinion unreliable.

Additionally, the evidence of impairment was inconsistent and frail, with minimal evidence of bad driving.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction and sentence for fraud under $5,000, arising from the installation of a skimming device on an ATM.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, the reasons were insufficient, and a discharge should have been granted.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and the sentence was fit and not contrary to the public interest.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly assess whether the arresting officer’s belief of impairment was objectively reasonable, improperly relied on the refusal to provide a breath sample, and placed undue weight on demeanor evidence when comparing in-court testimony to video evidence.

The court held that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for reasonable and probable grounds and that the factual findings—odour of alcohol, slurred speech, presence of alcohol, and difficulty opening the glove compartment—supported the officer’s belief of impairment.

The court also held that refusal evidence was admissible and could support an adverse inference under the Criminal Code.

The appeal court found no reversible error in the credibility findings or evidentiary assessment.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown conceded the impaired charge.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel, arguing the accused was not afforded privacy during her telephone consultation with duty counsel in a hospital emergency room.

The defence also argued the first breath sample was obtained after two hours had elapsed from the time of driving, contrary to s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights and that the breath samples were obtained within the statutory time limit.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being found asleep in the driver's seat of his vehicle at a traffic light.

The Crown relied on observations made by the arresting officer at the roadside, including the smell of alcohol, red eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness.

However, observations made at the police station approximately 23-25 minutes later showed no signs of impairment, and the breath technician's observations approximately 1 hour and 23 minutes later similarly showed no impairment indicators except for watery, red-rimmed eyes.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, noting that the discrepancy between roadside and station observations, combined with the absence of any evidence of actual vehicle operation, created reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the symptoms observed at the roadside could have been attributable to extreme tiredness rather than alcohol impairment.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The central issue at trial was whether the officer's reliance on an approved screening device (ASD) test result was objectively reasonable, given the defence argument that the officer should have waited 15 minutes before conducting the test to rule out mouth alcohol.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD test and reasonable grounds for the approved instrument tests.

The defence failed to prove a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The breath tests confirmed blood alcohol levels over 80 milligrams, and the accused was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm had been caused and being reckless as to whether death resulted.

The victim, a 19-year-old cyclist, died from blunt force head trauma after being struck by the accused's vehicle on an unlit road.

The accused initially fled the scene and misrepresented the incident to his father before surrendering to police the following day.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence, a 2-year driving prohibition, and a 2-year probation order with conditions including community service and counselling.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence against the accused's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following observations by a York Regional Police Sergeant.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving based on the defendant's erratic driving, evasive conduct, and physical indicators of impairment.

However, the court found a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights due to an unacceptable delay of 5 to 6 minutes in providing rights to counsel.

Despite this breach, the breath test evidence was admitted under the R. v. Grant analysis.

The defendant was ultimately found not guilty of impaired driving due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment, though the breath test showed a blood alcohol level of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused, a 62-year-old man, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his granddaughter.

The alleged incident occurred during a family gathering at the complainant's home.

The complainant testified that the accused entered her bedroom at night and placed her hand on his exposed genitals on two occasions.

The accused denied all allegations and testified that he never entered the complainant's bedroom.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including material discrepancies with her prior statements, inconsistencies with corroborating witnesses regarding timing and details, and concerns about potential reinforcement of her testimony through discussions with her parents.

The court also noted the implausibility of the alleged conduct given the crowded household, the presence of multiple adults, the cluttered bedroom layout, and the accused's health limitations.

The accused was acquitted.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing at a social event.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment for second degree murder with no parole eligibility for 13 years, and a concurrent 8-year sentence for attempted murder.

The court considered the unprovoked nature of the attack and the severe impact on the victims as aggravating factors, balanced against the offender's lack of a prior criminal record and positive employment history.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her intimate partner.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted to a sentence of six years imprisonment.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it appropriate given the circumstances.

The offence occurred in a domestic context, which was significantly aggravating.

However, the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, substantial rehabilitation efforts including four years of sobriety, and strong family support were mitigating factors.

The court imposed a six-year sentence with credit for time served on a 1.5:1 basis, resulting in approximately five years and one month remaining to be served.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, an issue arose regarding a potential conflict of interest after counsel for one accused had previously represented a co‑accused on an unrelated impaired driving matter years earlier.

The court considered whether the prior representation created a risk of misuse of confidential information or an appearance of conflict under the principles in MacDonald Estate v. Martin.

Although the risk of prejudice was assessed as minimal and both affected accused were willing to waive any conflict, the court emphasized the unpredictability of a multi‑accused criminal trial and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The judge permitted counsel to continue acting subject to strict conditions, including written waivers, restrictions on cross‑examination of the former client, and prohibitions on accessing or using any prior confidential information.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains by dismemberment, relating to the death of his common-law partner.

The victim's body was discovered three years later in plastic pails hidden under a cottage where the accused worked.

The court considered the egregious nature of the murder, the subsequent dismemberment, and the domestic context as significant aggravating factors.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 17 years for the murder, and a concurrent 5-year sentence for the indignity to human remains.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown proceeded on the basis of care and control rather than actual operation.

The court found that while the accused was in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and was impaired, the vehicle was truly inoperable due to severe structural damage that prevented it from moving or being started.

The court distinguished between an "immovable" vehicle (stuck but potentially drivable) and an "inoperable" vehicle (incapable of being driven).

Finding the vehicle inoperable and thus incapable of creating a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, the court acquitted the accused despite the presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a defence motion seeking to exclude proposed Crown evidence relating to a necklace fragment and a mark on a carport floor at a property where the accused had previously worked.

The Crown argued the evidence could support an inference connecting the homicide victim to the property and thereby implicate the accused.

The court held that there was no evidentiary foundation linking the necklace fragment or the unidentified mark to the victim.

Without proof connecting the items to the victim or the alleged crime scene, the evidence lacked relevance and probative value.

The court further held that allowing the jury to speculate about ownership of the necklace or the nature of the mark would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused.

The proposed evidence was therefore excluded.

During a jury trial for homicide, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address referenced conduct allegedly prohibited by a prior ruling on discreditable conduct evidence.

The defence argued that references to the disposal and sale of the deceased’s clothing improperly introduced prejudicial material.

The court held that the earlier ruling primarily addressed illicit drug use and trafficking evidence, and that the Crown’s reference to the clothing described post‑disappearance conduct that could reasonably be interpreted in different ways by the jury.

The court found the opening address was not inflammatory and did not breach the prior evidentiary ruling.

The defence motion for a mistrial was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking admission of discreditable conduct evidence in a murder prosecution involving allegations that the accused killed and dismembered his partner.

The Crown argued that various incidents involving drug activity, relationship conflict, and theft of tools were necessary to provide narrative context, establish motive, and demonstrate access to tools capable of dismemberment.

The court applied the governing principles for admission of discreditable conduct evidence, including the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court admitted evidence from one witness concerning the accused’s theft and pawning of a chainsaw, finding it relevant to access to tools and disposal methods potentially linked to the alleged dismemberment.

Evidence from other witnesses relating primarily to drug use, drug sales, and minor incidents of conflict was excluded as irrelevant to the issues of identity, motive, or the alleged offences and as posing significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice.

The Crown applied to introduce several pre-death statements made by the deceased victim in a homicide trial.

The statements were sought to be admitted for their truth, as part of the narrative, or to demonstrate the deceased's state of mind.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, assessing the necessity and reliability of each statement.

Necessity was established due to the declarant's death.

The court admitted statements that were specific, reliable, and relevant to the deceased's state of mind, while excluding others that lacked detail, were too remote in time, or carried prejudicial effects outweighing their probative value.

The accused applied to introduce evidence of three alleged alternate suspects in a homicide trial, including an unidentified stalker, an acquaintance from Alcoholics Anonymous, and a contractor connected to a property where the victim’s remains were found.

The court reviewed the governing principles for third‑party suspect evidence, requiring a sufficient evidentiary nexus between the proposed suspect and the crime and an “air of reality” capable of supporting a reasonable doubt.

After examining the proffered evidence, the court concluded that none of the proposed suspects had a demonstrable connection to the homicide, motive, or opportunity sufficient to meet the admissibility threshold.

The proposed evidence would invite speculation and risk sending the jury on a “wild goose chase.” The application to introduce alternate suspect evidence was therefore dismissed.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 523 of the Criminal Code seeking release from custody on charges of second degree murder and committing an indignity to a human body.

The defence argued that 19 new Centre of Forensic Sciences reports showing no DNA linking the accused to the offence constituted a material change in circumstances since the original bail hearing.

The court held that the absence of DNA evidence had already been recognized in the original decision and therefore did not amount to a material change.

The proposed release plan relied on the same sureties previously rejected and did not address prior concerns about their ability to control the accused.

The application for release was dismissed.