Jeffrey Alan Costain

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown proceeded on the basis of care and control rather than actual operation.

The court found that while the accused was in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and was impaired, the vehicle was truly inoperable due to severe structural damage that prevented it from moving or being started.

The court distinguished between an "immovable" vehicle (stuck but potentially drivable) and an "inoperable" vehicle (incapable of being driven).

Finding the vehicle inoperable and thus incapable of creating a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, the court acquitted the accused despite the presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

During a jury trial for homicide, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address referenced conduct allegedly prohibited by a prior ruling on discreditable conduct evidence.

The defence argued that references to the disposal and sale of the deceased’s clothing improperly introduced prejudicial material.

The court held that the earlier ruling primarily addressed illicit drug use and trafficking evidence, and that the Crown’s reference to the clothing described post‑disappearance conduct that could reasonably be interpreted in different ways by the jury.

The court found the opening address was not inflammatory and did not breach the prior evidentiary ruling.

The defence motion for a mistrial was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking admission of discreditable conduct evidence in a murder prosecution involving allegations that the accused killed and dismembered his partner.

The Crown argued that various incidents involving drug activity, relationship conflict, and theft of tools were necessary to provide narrative context, establish motive, and demonstrate access to tools capable of dismemberment.

The court applied the governing principles for admission of discreditable conduct evidence, including the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court admitted evidence from one witness concerning the accused’s theft and pawning of a chainsaw, finding it relevant to access to tools and disposal methods potentially linked to the alleged dismemberment.

Evidence from other witnesses relating primarily to drug use, drug sales, and minor incidents of conflict was excluded as irrelevant to the issues of identity, motive, or the alleged offences and as posing significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice.

The accused applied to introduce evidence of three alleged alternate suspects in a homicide trial, including an unidentified stalker, an acquaintance from Alcoholics Anonymous, and a contractor connected to a property where the victim’s remains were found.

The court reviewed the governing principles for third‑party suspect evidence, requiring a sufficient evidentiary nexus between the proposed suspect and the crime and an “air of reality” capable of supporting a reasonable doubt.

After examining the proffered evidence, the court concluded that none of the proposed suspects had a demonstrable connection to the homicide, motive, or opportunity sufficient to meet the admissibility threshold.

The proposed evidence would invite speculation and risk sending the jury on a “wild goose chase.” The application to introduce alternate suspect evidence was therefore dismissed.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 523 of the Criminal Code seeking release from custody on charges of second degree murder and committing an indignity to a human body.

The defence argued that 19 new Centre of Forensic Sciences reports showing no DNA linking the accused to the offence constituted a material change in circumstances since the original bail hearing.

The court held that the absence of DNA evidence had already been recognized in the original decision and therefore did not amount to a material change.

The proposed release plan relied on the same sureties previously rejected and did not address prior concerns about their ability to control the accused.

The application for release was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile while having excess alcohol in his blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the officer complied with the requirement that an approved screening device (ASD) test be administered "forthwith." The defendant was detained for approximately 19 to 21 minutes after the officer formed reasonable suspicion before being given an opportunity to comply with the ASD demand.

During this period, the defendant was not informed of the reasons for detention or provided with his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found multiple Charter breaches and excluded the breath test results, leading to dismissal of the charge.