Paul Warren Cooper

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 involving four children (ages 9, 8, 4, and 1) with a history of exposure to intimate partner violence, non-accidental injury, adult conflict, and caregiver instability.

The court determined that both parents posed risks requiring removal from their sole care.

The older children were placed with the mother under supervision with strict conditions, while the younger children were placed with the paternal grandmother under supervision.

All parties received supervised access with the children, with the mother's partner prohibited from any contact.

The decision emphasizes the need for meaningful behavioral change and compliance with supervision orders before unsupervised access or return of children can be considered.

The Applicant Father sought an order for the immediate return of the five-year-old child to Brazil under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention by the Respondent Mother in Canada.

The child, a dual Canadian and Brazilian citizen, had lived primarily in Brazil but had been residing and attending school in Canada since September 2023.

The court dismissed the Hague Application, finding that the child was habitually resident in Canada immediately prior to the alleged abduction.

The decision emphasized a child-focused approach to determining habitual residence, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and rejected the Father's claim that the parents intended to return to Brazil permanently.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order regarding parenting time.

The court considered the children's strong and consistent views, their maturity, and the father's failure to take responsibility for past family violence.

The court granted the mother's request, ordering that contact with the father be at the children's sole discretion and initiative, and dismissed the father's requests for joint decision-making, compelled psychological assessments, and police enforcement of contact.

The appellant mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) for a second appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, which became moot after the CAS withdrew its protection application in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case involved conflicting interim orders between the two courts and concerns about the CAS's conduct in investigation and presentation of its case, including failing to meet with the mother and withholding relevant information from the OCJ.

The court found the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, justifying a costs award, despite the general exception for government agencies in child protection cases.

The father initiated a motion to change, seeking modifications to prior consent orders regarding parenting.

The mother responded with claims for child support, including retroactive support from January 2015, and imputation of income to the father.

The court found the father engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to provide financial disclosure and not paying support for many years, despite a history of violence that caused the mother to withdraw previous support claims.

The court imputed income to the father for the years 2015-2020 and ordered retroactive child support from January 1, 2015, deviating from the presumptive three-year retroactivity period due to the father's conduct and the mother's understandable delay.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion for temporary spousal support.

The applicant sought $6,138 in costs, while the respondent argued for no costs.

The court applied the four purposes of modern costs rules (indemnification, settlement encouragement, discouraging inappropriate behaviour, and ensuring justice) and considered factors under Family Law Rules subrule 24(12), including success, conduct, and offers to settle.

The applicant was deemed the more successful party, and the respondent's conduct, including contesting spousal status and making unsupported allegations, increased the motion's difficulty.

The court awarded the applicant $5,085 in costs, payable in installments, noting the respondent's ability to pay and poor payment history.

This motion concerned the amount of temporary spousal support payable by the respondent to the applicant.

The respondent initially disputed entitlement but later conceded, seeking support within the low to mid-ranges of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG).

The court determined the respondent's income by drawing an adverse inference due to his failure to provide updated financial disclosure.

The court found strong compensatory and non-compensatory grounds for spousal support, noting the applicant's economic disadvantage from the relationship and the respondent's financial irresponsibility.

Despite the respondent's significant parenting time, the court ordered spousal support at the higher end of the SSAG range.

This case involved a dispute between separated parents regarding decision-making authority, parenting time, child relocation, and child support for their daughter, S.E., who has Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).

The mother had relocated with the child to Nanaimo, British Columbia, from Ontario, initially under a temporary court order to return.

The mother sought to remain in B.C., arguing it was in the child's best interests due to better access to specialized services and her consistent care.

The father opposed the relocation, sought joint decision-making, and specific parenting time, while also disputing his income for child support.

The court applied the newly amended Children's Law Reform Act, found the mother to be the primary caregiver and advocate for the child's special needs, and noted the child's significant progress in B.C. The court found the father's evidence lacking, particularly regarding his substance abuse, engagement with the child's services, and failure to exercise parenting time.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority, permitted the child to remain in B.C., and imputed the father's income for child support due to insufficient disclosure and underemployment.

This is a sentencing ruling following a finding that the Applicant father was in contempt for failing to facilitate access between the parties' 11-year-old son and the Respondent mother.

The court considered the principles of contempt sentencing in family law, aiming for remedial and punitive outcomes while prioritizing the child's best interests.

The court ordered make-up access for the child with the Respondent mother, to continue until in-person school classes resume, and a monetary penalty of $5,000.00, along with costs.

The court balanced the need to enforce court orders and punish contempt against the child's stability, particularly regarding schooling.

The respondent brought a motion to change a final custody and access order made in 2014 that provided for joint custody and a shared parenting schedule.

The applicant had unilaterally moved from Scarborough to Markham, enrolled the child in a new school, and removed the child from daycare without the respondent's consent.

The applicant sought to vary the parenting schedule to accommodate the move.

The court found that the applicant's self-help tactics breached the joint custody order and failed to respect its spirit and letter.

The court restored the status quo, ordering that the child reside primarily with the respondent and attend school in Scarborough, with the applicant having access three out of four weekends per month.

Caitlin Johannes sought certiorari to quash a committal order for trial on charges of possession of cocaine and marihuana for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The application challenged the preliminary inquiry judge's inferences regarding possession, particularly wilful blindness, based on circumstantial evidence from a shared residence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the inference of wilful blindness was speculative, other inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge regarding knowledge and control were reasonable and logically supported by the evidence, thus providing sufficient evidence for committal to trial.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a custody and access order from October 2016, seeking primary residence, a week-about schedule, child support set-off, and proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion to dismiss the mother's motion and sought sole custody, limited access for the mother, child support, and 50% of special expenses.

The court found the mother failed to establish a material change in circumstances warranting variation of the custody order.

The court found the father established a material change in circumstances based on the parties' inability to co-parent and the mother's non-adherence to the access schedule.

The father's motion was granted, establishing sole custody with the father, modified access for the mother, and child support obligations for the mother.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final child support order made in October 2015, seeking to reduce ongoing child support to zero and to rescind accumulated arrears of approximately $91,000.

The applicant mother sought to dismiss the motion and strike the father's pleadings due to his failure to comply with financial disclosure orders.

The court found that while the father had established a change in circumstances following an Achilles tendon injury in July 2015, he had failed to provide adequate financial disclosure to support his claims.

The court declined to strike the pleadings due to the high threshold in family law cases involving access issues, but proceeded on the documentary record.

The court found the father capable of earning minimum wage income from his painting business and imputed income accordingly.

The court fixed total arrears at $48,862 and ordered ongoing child support of $604 per month for three biological children, with arrears to be paid at $250 per month.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused was arrested in his vehicle in his driveway after police observed him attend a residence believed to be a drug stash house.

A search incident to arrest yielded 0.2 grams of cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe the accused was in possession of a controlled substance, rendering the arrest unlawful and the search unauthorized.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with conspiracy and importation offences relating to a shipment of automotive tire-changing machines from Panama containing 50 kg of cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on the accused's involvement in arranging the shipment, intercepted communications, and his presence at the warehouse during the controlled delivery.

The accused testified that he was duped by his co-accused and had no knowledge of the cocaine.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial evidence did not eliminate reasonable doubt regarding the accused's knowledge of the illicit contents, despite credibility concerns about the accused's testimony.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The trial commenced in January 2015 and evidence was completed in June 2016, with final submissions heard in November 2016.

The accused's application was brought following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the net delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling, it was justified by exceptional circumstances and the transitional exceptional circumstance applicable to cases substantially completed before Jordan was released.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a voluntariness voir dire.

The accused opposed admission, arguing the statements resulted from improper inducements or oppressive circumstances.

The court found no oppression, characterized certain inducements as minor, and determined the accused maintained meaningful choice throughout the interviews.

The court ruled the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused understood the seriousness of the situation and was selective in his responses to police questioning.

The applicants, Greg Guthrie and Delon Griffith, sought an order for severance of charges in a multi-count indictment related to cocaine importation and conspiracy.

Guthrie applied to be tried separately on counts one and four from counts two and three, while Griffith sought to sever counts two and three from counts one and four.

The court considered the legal and factual nexus between the counts, the applicants' intention to testify on some counts but not others, and potential prejudice.

The court found a sufficient factual and legal nexus, concluding that the Crown's theory of an ongoing enterprise was reasonable.

It dismissed concerns about testimonial intention and prejudice, emphasizing that a properly instructed jury could consider each count separately.

Both severance applications were dismissed.

The accused Jankovic and Formusa applied for directed verdicts of acquittal following a trial on charges of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, involving a shipment of tire changing machines from Panama containing approximately 50 kg of cocaine.

Formusa was observed at the warehouse receiving the shipment and was arrested while unloading it.

Jankovic arrived in Canada shortly before the delivery and had communications with Formusa and Avanes.

The court allowed Jankovic's application for directed verdict, finding insufficient evidence to establish his participation in the conspiracy or knowledge of the controlled substance.

The court dismissed Formusa's application, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a conviction on all counts.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) travel history documents relating to the accused Drago Jankovic, which showed his arrival at Pearson International Airport on August 23, 2013, from Amsterdam.

The Crown relied on the common law business records exception to the hearsay rule, as it did not comply with the Canada Evidence Act.

The accused challenged admissibility on Charter grounds, probative value, and personal knowledge grounds.

The court admitted the documents as business records, finding they were created in the ordinary course of business, were necessary and reliable, and that the testifying CBSA officers had sufficient knowledge of the systems and procedures involved.