Paul Warren Cooper

The father brought a motion to vary an interim parenting schedule, which was dismissed.

The mother sought costs of $11,063.26 as the successful party.

The court found the mother was the successful party and rejected the father's request to reserve costs to the trial judge.

However, the court reduced the quantum sought, noting the motion was not complex and the hourly rates claimed for counsel and law clerks were excessive for the nature of the proceeding.

Costs were fixed at $5,000, payable within 90 days, and were not made enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office as they did not relate to support.

This was a costs endorsement following a three-day family trial concerning parenting and child support for two children.

The court held that the mother was more successful overall, particularly on child support and decision-making responsibility, although success was divided on several other issues.

The court analyzed the parties' offers to settle under the Family Law Rules and found that only the mother's offers attracted subrule 24 (12) consequences on the issue of decision-making responsibility, while the father's offers did not meet the technical requirements or were not as favourable as the result.

After considering proportionality, settlement efforts, unreasonable conduct, rates, the successful party's bill of costs, and the father's ability to pay, the court fixed costs at $16,950 payable by monthly instalments.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to vary a temporary care and access order regarding four children.

Previously, the two older children were placed with the mother under supervision, and the two younger children with the paternal grandmother.

The Society sought to vary the placement of the older children after the mother breached a condition prohibiting her partner from residing in the home or having contact with the children.

The court found a material change in circumstances.

One older child was placed with the paternal grandmother, while the other older child, who expressed strong views against living with the paternal grandmother due to past disclosures, was placed in the temporary care of the Society.

Access arrangements were also varied to occur primarily in Toronto, with one visit per month in the Niagara region.

The court also criticized the Office of the Children's Lawyer for failing to meet with the older children for several months during a critical period.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a temporary, without-prejudice parenting order to expand his parenting time and alter exchange protocols.

The court found that the temporary order had crystallized into a status quo, requiring the father to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the father failed to establish a material change, as the alleged increase in conflict did not occur at parenting exchanges and the existing structure already minimized parental interaction.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed variation was not in the best interests of the child, who has special needs, particularly while an assessment by the Office of the Children's Lawyer was ongoing.

The motion was dismissed.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 involving four children (ages 9, 8, 4, and 1) with a history of exposure to intimate partner violence, non-accidental injury, adult conflict, and caregiver instability.

The court determined that both parents posed risks requiring removal from their sole care.

The older children were placed with the mother under supervision with strict conditions, while the younger children were placed with the paternal grandmother under supervision.

All parties received supervised access with the children, with the mother's partner prohibited from any contact.

The decision emphasizes the need for meaningful behavioral change and compliance with supervision orders before unsupervised access or return of children can be considered.

The Applicant Father sought an order for the immediate return of the five-year-old child to Brazil under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention by the Respondent Mother in Canada.

The child, a dual Canadian and Brazilian citizen, had lived primarily in Brazil but had been residing and attending school in Canada since September 2023.

The court dismissed the Hague Application, finding that the child was habitually resident in Canada immediately prior to the alleged abduction.

The decision emphasized a child-focused approach to determining habitual residence, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and rejected the Father's claim that the parents intended to return to Brazil permanently.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order regarding parenting time.

The court considered the children's strong and consistent views, their maturity, and the father's failure to take responsibility for past family violence.

The court granted the mother's request, ordering that contact with the father be at the children's sole discretion and initiative, and dismissed the father's requests for joint decision-making, compelled psychological assessments, and police enforcement of contact.

The appellant mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) for a second appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, which became moot after the CAS withdrew its protection application in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case involved conflicting interim orders between the two courts and concerns about the CAS's conduct in investigation and presentation of its case, including failing to meet with the mother and withholding relevant information from the OCJ.

The court found the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, justifying a costs award, despite the general exception for government agencies in child protection cases.

The father initiated a motion to change, seeking modifications to prior consent orders regarding parenting.

The mother responded with claims for child support, including retroactive support from January 2015, and imputation of income to the father.

The court found the father engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to provide financial disclosure and not paying support for many years, despite a history of violence that caused the mother to withdraw previous support claims.

The court imputed income to the father for the years 2015-2020 and ordered retroactive child support from January 1, 2015, deviating from the presumptive three-year retroactivity period due to the father's conduct and the mother's understandable delay.

The respondent challenged the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction to make 2013 temporary child and spousal support orders, arguing neither party was ordinarily resident in Ontario for a year prior to the application.

The court agreed it lacked jurisdiction under the Divorce Act but found it had jurisdiction under the provincial Family Law Act.

The court upheld the validity of the 2013 orders and refused to order a retroactive refund.

However, because the parties obtained a valid divorce in Scotland in 2019, the court terminated the respondent's ongoing spousal support obligation prospectively.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion for temporary spousal support.

The applicant sought $6,138 in costs, while the respondent argued for no costs.

The court applied the four purposes of modern costs rules (indemnification, settlement encouragement, discouraging inappropriate behaviour, and ensuring justice) and considered factors under Family Law Rules subrule 24(12), including success, conduct, and offers to settle.

The applicant was deemed the more successful party, and the respondent's conduct, including contesting spousal status and making unsupported allegations, increased the motion's difficulty.

The court awarded the applicant $5,085 in costs, payable in installments, noting the respondent's ability to pay and poor payment history.

This motion concerned the amount of temporary spousal support payable by the respondent to the applicant.

The respondent initially disputed entitlement but later conceded, seeking support within the low to mid-ranges of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG).

The court determined the respondent's income by drawing an adverse inference due to his failure to provide updated financial disclosure.

The court found strong compensatory and non-compensatory grounds for spousal support, noting the applicant's economic disadvantage from the relationship and the respondent's financial irresponsibility.

Despite the respondent's significant parenting time, the court ordered spousal support at the higher end of the SSAG range.

This case involved a dispute between separated parents regarding decision-making authority, parenting time, child relocation, and child support for their daughter, S.E., who has Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).

The mother had relocated with the child to Nanaimo, British Columbia, from Ontario, initially under a temporary court order to return.

The mother sought to remain in B.C., arguing it was in the child's best interests due to better access to specialized services and her consistent care.

The father opposed the relocation, sought joint decision-making, and specific parenting time, while also disputing his income for child support.

The court applied the newly amended Children's Law Reform Act, found the mother to be the primary caregiver and advocate for the child's special needs, and noted the child's significant progress in B.C. The court found the father's evidence lacking, particularly regarding his substance abuse, engagement with the child's services, and failure to exercise parenting time.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority, permitted the child to remain in B.C., and imputed the father's income for child support due to insufficient disclosure and underemployment.

This is a sentencing ruling following a finding that the Applicant father was in contempt for failing to facilitate access between the parties' 11-year-old son and the Respondent mother.

The court considered the principles of contempt sentencing in family law, aiming for remedial and punitive outcomes while prioritizing the child's best interests.

The court ordered make-up access for the child with the Respondent mother, to continue until in-person school classes resume, and a monetary penalty of $5,000.00, along with costs.

The court balanced the need to enforce court orders and punish contempt against the child's stability, particularly regarding schooling.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after striking the victim with a baseball bat during a confrontation, causing the victim to fall down stairs and die.

The offender had a precarious medical condition, including a cerebral aneurysm, making incarceration potentially fatal.

The court accepted a joint submission from the Crown and defence, sentencing the offender to a 20-month conditional sentence of imprisonment after crediting 24 months for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

This is a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning two young children who were brought into the care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto in August 2018 due to parental substance abuse, domestic violence, and risk of harm.

The mother proposed placing the children with former foster parents under a supervision order.

The court found that the children remain in need of protection and that the former foster parents' plan was not in the children's best interests due to credibility concerns, undisclosed health issues, and the foster mother's failure to address the children's developmental needs.

The court ordered extended society care with monthly access to the mother and no access to the father.

The respondent brought a motion to change a final custody and access order made in 2014 that provided for joint custody and a shared parenting schedule.

The applicant had unilaterally moved from Scarborough to Markham, enrolled the child in a new school, and removed the child from daycare without the respondent's consent.

The applicant sought to vary the parenting schedule to accommodate the move.

The court found that the applicant's self-help tactics breached the joint custody order and failed to respect its spirit and letter.

The court restored the status quo, ordering that the child reside primarily with the respondent and attend school in Scarborough, with the applicant having access three out of four weekends per month.

Caitlin Johannes sought certiorari to quash a committal order for trial on charges of possession of cocaine and marihuana for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The application challenged the preliminary inquiry judge's inferences regarding possession, particularly wilful blindness, based on circumstantial evidence from a shared residence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the inference of wilful blindness was speculative, other inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge regarding knowledge and control were reasonable and logically supported by the evidence, thus providing sufficient evidence for committal to trial.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a custody and access order from October 2016, seeking primary residence, a week-about schedule, child support set-off, and proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion to dismiss the mother's motion and sought sole custody, limited access for the mother, child support, and 50% of special expenses.

The court found the mother failed to establish a material change in circumstances warranting variation of the custody order.

The court found the father established a material change in circumstances based on the parties' inability to co-parent and the mother's non-adherence to the access schedule.

The father's motion was granted, establishing sole custody with the father, modified access for the mother, and child support obligations for the mother.

In a pre-trial ruling for a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied to exclude security video surveillance recordings obtained by police from the common areas of his apartment building.

The accused argued the warrantless seizure violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the 246-unit building.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the case.