Maria N. Sirivar

Following a successful motion for the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation, the applicant residual beneficiary sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis personally against the named estate trustee.

The estate trustee had failed to apply for a certificate of appointment, failed to provide information to beneficiaries, failed to file responding materials on the motion, and failed to attend the hearing.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $20,708.74 payable personally by the estate trustee, finding that his conduct as a fiduciary warranted an elevated cost order and that an award from the estate would unfairly burden the beneficiaries.

The respondent's informal, late, and analytically deficient cost submissions were rejected entirely.

The moving parties sought a final parenting order granting primary care, decision-making responsibility, and related tax-benefit relief for two children.

The court declined to grant the requested final order, finding concerns about the validity and informed nature of the consent, the responding party’s apparent capacity, service and party-composition deficiencies, and insufficient evidence on child support and financial arrangements.

The court held that legal representation must be appointed for the responding party as a potential special party under the Family Law Rules.

The matter was directed to return promptly, with additional service and evidentiary steps ordered.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add a maternal aunt as a party to a child protection proceeding, arguing that a Court of Appeal decision made it mandatory.

The child had been placed in the maternal aunt's temporary care.

The child's mother opposed the motion, expressing concerns about family division.

The maternal aunt tearfully withdrew her consent, stating she had not received independent legal advice and felt pressured by the Society.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society's application of the cited case could have constitutional implications and that the process for adding parties must ensure procedural fairness, including proper notice, opportunity to respond, and independent legal advice for the proposed party.

The court also rejected the Society's argument that the temporary order should be deemed "with prejudice" due to the passage of time.

The Respondent Mother brought a motion seeking police enforcement of a final order and supervised parenting time for the Applicant Father.

She alleged the Applicant Father overheld the child in Montreal, contrary to a previous order, and has a history of disobeying court orders, including a restraining order and prior parenting time orders that required police intervention.

The Applicant Father argued his actions were justified by concerns about the child being taken to Cambodia and that his past breaches were irrelevant or excusable.

The court found the Applicant Father's history of non-compliance and threatening behaviour constituted family violence, demonstrating a pattern of coercive and controlling conduct.

The motion was granted, ordering supervised in-person parenting time for the Applicant Father due to concerns about his trustworthiness, the child's emotional safety, and threats made.

The Respondent Mother moved to set aside the financial terms of a separation agreement, alleging unconscionable circumstances, lack of financial disclosure, material misrepresentation of income, and undue pressure by the Applicant Father.

The Applicant Father resisted, arguing the agreement was valid and enforceable.

The court found that the Respondent Mother had, with the assistance of experienced counsel, bargained away her right to financial disclosure and failed to establish unconscionability or exploitation of vulnerabilities.

The motion was dismissed.

The Applicant grandmother sought a contact order with her grandson, Mason, following the tragic deaths of his father and paternal uncle by suicide.

The Respondent mother, though noted in default, had engaged with the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL), which produced a Voice of the Child (VOC) report.

The VOC indicated Mason did not have a close relationship with his grandmother and did not express a desire for contact.

Applying the "best interests of the child" principle under the Children's Law Reform Act and the principle of parental autonomy from Chapman v. Chapman, the court found the Applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the mother's decision regarding contact should be respected.

The court noted the lack of detailed evidence regarding the grandmother's pre-existing relationship with Mason and the absence of information about the relationship between the parties.

Consequently, the application for a contact order was dismissed.

The Applicant Father sought decision-making responsibility for the parties' child's vaccinations.

The Respondent Mother opposed, arguing she was uniquely suited due to her chiropractic background and research, and raising concerns about the child's genetics and potential adverse reactions.

The court qualified the Applicant's medical experts (pediatrician/geneticist and pediatric infectious disease specialist) but rejected the Respondent's proposed experts due to lack of relevant expertise, novel science reliability issues, and bias.

The court found the child to be in good health with no contraindications to vaccination and determined the Applicant's approach of consulting medical professionals was in the child's best interest.

The Applicant Father was granted sole decision-making responsibility for all vaccinations, including the Covid-19 vaccine.

The Native Child and Family Services of Toronto brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three children (Au.

B., Aa.

B., and M.P.) due to chronic neglect, poor home conditions, hygiene issues, and the mother's inability to manage her mental health and parenting.

The mother (A.B.) opposed, seeking the children's return.

The court granted the Society's motion, placing Au.

B. and Aa.

B. in the Society's temporary care and custody, and M.P. in his father's (L.P.) temporary care subject to Society supervision.

The court emphasized the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in foster care and the need for culturally appropriate support, finding that the children could not be adequately protected by a supervision order alone given the complex issues and the Society's past ineffective supervision.

The Applicant Mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought motions for restraining orders against the Respondent Father under s. 46 of the Family Law Act.

The motions sought to restrain the father from coming within 500 metres of the mother's home and the children's locations, and from communicating with them.

The court reviewed the history of family violence, including the father's criminal charges and breaches of recognizance, and a period of attempted reconciliation.

The court accepted the children's expressed views and preferences, which indicated fear and distress regarding the father.

The court found that the father's repeated breaches constituted a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, amounting to family violence, and that there were reasonable grounds to fear for the safety of the mother and children.

The motions were granted.

The applicant mother sought an order for substitute service of an application for sole custody on the respondent father, who resides in Saudi Arabia.

The applicant sought to serve the respondent by email, citing financial constraints as a legally aided litigant and her inability to hire a process server.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to satisfy the evidentiary requirements under the Family Law Rules.

The court held that legally aided litigants are not relieved of their obligations to comply with service requirements and that the applicant did not provide detailed evidence of steps taken to serve the respondent or demonstrate that email service would reasonably bring the application to the respondent's attention.

The applicant father sought leave to bring a motion to change a final custody and access order that prohibited him from having access to his two youngest children and from coming within 100 meters of their residence, school, or daycare.

The father argued that his criminal proceedings had ended and he had completed an anger management course.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father failed to establish either an arguable case of material change in circumstances or that allowing the motion would not constitute an abuse of process.

The father continued to engage in the conduct that formed the basis of the original order, including posting derogatory comments about the mother on social media, breaching multiple court orders, and displaying hostile and aggressive behavior in court.

A young person was charged with multiple firearms offences following the discovery of a loaded semi-automatic firearm and ammunition in a satchel upon his person.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the firearm on the basis that it was obtained in violation of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Crown and defence agreed that if the evidence was admitted, the accused would be found guilty; if excluded, he would be acquitted.

The court found that the investigative detention was arbitrary, the searches were unlawful, and the accused was denied his right to counsel.

The court concluded that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the firearm, resulting in acquittal on all counts.

A family law trial concerning access, safety protocols, and section 7 expenses for a child born to unmarried parents who separated in 2013.

The applicant sought orders regarding timely access exchanges, safety protocols for farm access, reunification therapy, and contribution to section 7 expenses.

The respondent, a veterinarian living on a farm, sought removal of penalty clauses and an order for the applicant to attend counselling for alleged interference with access.

The court imposed limited terms for access resumption, rejected the proposed safety protocols, declined to order counselling for the applicant, and awarded partial contribution to counselling expenses.

The applicant father sought to resume parental access to his child following the respondent mother's suspension of access in January 2020.

The mother sought to maintain the suspension citing COVID-19 pandemic concerns.

The court found that the mother had not established legitimate medical reasons for the suspension and that she was using the pandemic as a pretext to withhold access.

The court ordered the resumption of access with modifications to comply with public health directives, including restrictions on third-party contact during exchanges and no additional household members during access visits.

The court also expressed concern about the escalating parental conflict and the mother's weaponization of the pandemic.

A mother sought to vary an order placing her son in extended society care by obtaining increased and unsupervised access.

The child, who sustained an acquired brain injury resulting in physical and cognitive impairment, severe attention deficit, and behavioral challenges, had been made a Crown Ward in 2015.

The mother proposed expanded access for rehabilitation purposes, claiming the foster parents were not adequately addressing the child's physical rehabilitation needs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the mother had not demonstrated a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant variation.

The mother continued to lack insight into the child's behavioral needs, focused exclusively on physical impairments while dismissing the child's own preferences, and had not demonstrated the ability to work cooperatively with the child's caregivers or recognize the risks posed by unsupervised access.

The respondent brought a motion to change a final custody and access order made in 2014 that provided for joint custody and a shared parenting schedule.

The applicant had unilaterally moved from Scarborough to Markham, enrolled the child in a new school, and removed the child from daycare without the respondent's consent.

The applicant sought to vary the parenting schedule to accommodate the move.

The court found that the applicant's self-help tactics breached the joint custody order and failed to respect its spirit and letter.

The court restored the status quo, ordering that the child reside primarily with the respondent and attend school in Scarborough, with the applicant having access three out of four weekends per month.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking resumption of court-ordered access to his child, make-up access, permission to amend his response to seek sole custody, transfer of residence if access continued to be denied, police enforcement of access, disclosure of Children's Aid records, and costs.

The respondent mother had denied all access since September 16, 2018, claiming the child had made allegations of mistreatment.

The Children's Aid Society investigated but did not verify the allegations.

The court found the mother in breach of the April 25, 2017 order and applied Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules to impose sanctions.

The court granted make-up access on specified dates, permission to amend the response, and allowed the applicant to serve the Children's Aid Societies for disclosure.