Peter S. Carlisi

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding concerning her grandchild, R. The Children's Aid Society and the mother opposed the motion, while the father supported it.

The court applied the legal principles for adding a party under subrule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, considering the child's best interests, potential for delay, necessity to determine issues, viability of the grandmother's plan, and legal interest.

The court found that the mother had a viable plan supported by the society, adding the grandmother would cause undue delay and expose the child to further conflict, and the father could adequately present the grandmother's plan as a witness.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant grandmother brought a motion for temporary access to her 11-year-old non-biological granddaughter.

The respondent mother had arbitrarily terminated the grandmother's access after a dispute over the choice of the child's godmother, despite the grandmother having had regular access for nine years.

A Voice of the Child Report indicated the child had a positive relationship with the grandmother and wished to resume contact.

Applying the test for grandparent access, the court found the mother's decision to terminate access was arbitrary and imperilled a positive relationship.

The court granted the grandmother's motion and ordered a graduated schedule of temporary access.

The applicant father sought to resume parental access to his child following the respondent mother's suspension of access in January 2020.

The mother sought to maintain the suspension citing COVID-19 pandemic concerns.

The court found that the mother had not established legitimate medical reasons for the suspension and that she was using the pandemic as a pretext to withhold access.

The court ordered the resumption of access with modifications to comply with public health directives, including restrictions on third-party contact during exchanges and no additional household members during access visits.

The court also expressed concern about the escalating parental conflict and the mother's weaponization of the pandemic.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent denied the claims, arguing the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) and were subject to the $3,500 limit.

The applicant argued his sciatica removed him from the MIG.

The Tribunal found the applicant failed to provide medical evidence establishing his physical injuries were anything but predominantly minor.

Consequently, the claimed treatment plans were not reasonable and necessary.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendants moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff, who alleged back injuries due to improper treatment.

Despite four years of litigation and multiple extensions, including a specific timetable set by a previous judge, the plaintiff failed to serve any expert report to establish the standard of care or causation.

The defendants, conversely, provided expert reports asserting that the standard of care was met and that the plaintiff suffered no discernable back injury.

The court dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue requiring trial due to the absence of necessary expert evidence from the plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, but were reduced by half due to the plaintiff's personal hardships.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' Rule 21 motion to strike the statement of claim, the successful plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $13,324.96.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting the motion was not unreasonable given the poor drafting of the statement of claim.

Costs were fixed at $6,500 all inclusive.

The defendant 3Gen Development Group Inc. brought a motion under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, or alternatively, for a determination that it was no longer a party to the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and not vicariously liable for the co-defendant's conduct.

The plaintiff alleged negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation and vicarious liability related to an amendment to a real estate agreement that substituted the original purchaser with a numbered company.

The court, applying a generous reading to the poorly drafted statement of claim, found that it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiff could not succeed in her claims.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

In this status review application under the Child and Family Services Act, the Children's Aid Society sought to place a 12-year-old child in the custody of her maternal aunt, with restricted supervised access to her father.

The father opposed the application and sought custody of the child.

The court found that the child had achieved stability and thriving development in the aunt's care since July 2016.

The father's conduct, including attempts to undermine the child's placement, emotionally abusive communications, and failure to comply with court orders regarding negative messaging, had seriously damaged his relationship with the child.

The court granted custody to the aunt with supervised monthly access to the father, subject to the child's wishes, and dispensed with the father's consent for the child to travel outside Canada.

This is an evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of child hearsay statements in a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act.

The applicant society sought to place a 12-year-old child in the custody of her maternal aunt and sought only supervised monthly access for the respondent father.

The respondent sought custody or significant access.

The court held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of over 250 child statements made to two society workers.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, examining both procedural and substantive reliability.

The court admitted most statements made pursuant to the state of mind exception and most statements for the truth of their contents, with the exception of historic allegations of abuse that the child had recanted.

The City of Toronto moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiffs for injuries sustained by Selome Aemoro Walelegne after tripping on a sidewalk discontinuity.

The court applied the Hyrniak v. Mauldin framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The City met its minimum maintenance standards for patrolling and inspecting sidewalks under O. Reg. 612/06 and was protected by the statutory defences in the City of Toronto Act, 2006, as it took reasonable steps and could not reasonably have known about the specific defect.

Furthermore, the plaintiff was found to have contributed to her own injury by walking off the intended path.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action dismissed.

The Applicant and Respondent, who were together for over 15 years and have three children, separated in January 2014.

This endorsement addresses cross-motions for interim relief.

The Respondent sought temporary custody, increased child support, temporary spousal support, and release of all condominium sale proceeds.

The Applicant sought to decrease child support, dismiss spousal support, and divide proceeds equally with credits.

The court confirmed the Applicant's income at $51,556 for temporary child support, dismissing both parties' requests to change it.

Temporary spousal support was declined, though the Respondent was found entitled in principle, pending further medical disclosure regarding her ability to work.

Temporary custody was granted to the Respondent by consent.

A portion of the Applicant's share of the condominium sale proceeds was ordered to be paid to the Respondent for special expenses and ongoing child support.

A settlement conference was scheduled.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against one defendant, the court addressed costs of both the motion and the underlying action.

The successful defendant sought full indemnity costs alleging delay and unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff during the litigation and costs process.

The court held that while some conduct was questionable, it did not reach the exceptional threshold required for full indemnity costs.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reduced the amount claimed and ordered a lump sum costs award covering both the motion and the action.

In a motor vehicle accident action, the plaintiff sought damages after a multi-vehicle collision and later moved to add the lessee of a rented vehicle as a defendant after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period.

The added defendant brought a summary judgment motion asserting the claim was statute‑barred.

The court held that the defendant’s failure to oppose the earlier motion to add him as a party did not estop him from raising a limitation defence.

Applying the discoverability provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002, the court found the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying the lessee despite knowing the vehicle was rented.

The evidence demonstrated minimal investigative steps within the limitation period.

The action against the lessee was therefore dismissed as statute‑barred.

The applicant father sought the involvement of the Children's Lawyer to ascertain the views and preferences of three children (ages 15, 14, and 10) regarding a motion to change a final access order that had denied him access for over three years.

The respondent mother opposed the involvement of the Children's Lawyer, asserting the children did not wish contact with their father.

The court granted the motion, finding that given the ages of the children and the significance of the access decision to their lives, credible evidence of the children's wishes from a neutral source was necessary before deciding the summary judgment motion.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for Crown wardship with no access for a 6.5-year-old child with severe behavioural and mental health needs, arguing he was adoptable.

The grandmother sought the child's return or, alternatively, access.

The court found the child could not safely be returned to the grandmother and ordered Crown wardship.

However, the court rejected the Society's plan for adoption, finding the child required long-term residential treatment and was not currently adoptable.

The court granted access to the grandmother and sister, finding the relationship was meaningful and beneficial, and that access would not impair foreseeable opportunities for adoption.

This is a dispositional phase decision in a child protection matter involving two children, J.C. (age 6½) and N.Y. (age 11), who were apprehended from their grandmother's care.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for J.C., arguing he was adoptable.

The grandmother sought return of J.C. to her care or, alternatively, access if Crown wardship was ordered.

The court found that J.C. had serious behavioral and mental health issues requiring long-term residential treatment and was not adoptable in the foreseeable future.

The court made J.C. a Crown ward but granted access to his grandmother and sister, finding that such access would not impair future adoption opportunities and that the familial relationships were meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision to proceed with an uncontested trial after his pleadings were struck by pretrial orders.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal consisting of evidence he would have adduced had the trial been contested.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge and holding that the appellant could not satisfy the due diligence requirement for admitting fresh evidence.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of the parties' child, no access for the respondent father, and a restraining order.

The father cross-applied for custody or access, alleging the mother's new partner was physically and sexually abusing the child.

The court held a voir dire on the admissibility of the child's out-of-court statements tendered by the father, finding they did not meet threshold reliability under the principled exception to hearsay or the business records exception.

Finding no credible evidence of abuse and noting the father's extreme, uncontrolled hostility and abusive behaviour, the court granted sole custody to the mother, denied the father access, rescinded child support arrears due to inability to pay, and issued a final restraining order.

A custody and access application brought by the mother against the father regarding their daughter Emily.

The mother sought sole custody, no access to the father, child support, a restraining order, and permission to travel and obtain identity documents.

The father cross-applied for custody or alternatively reasonable access.

The court found no credible evidence of sexual or physical abuse by the mother's new partner despite the father's allegations.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, denied all access to the father, rescinded child support arrears, and imposed a restraining order.

The decision turned on the father's uncontrolled anger, hostile behavior, and unreliability as a witness.

The applicant, who had pre-existing mobility and health issues and used a motorized scooter, was involved in two motor vehicle accidents.

She applied for non-earner benefits from the insurers, claiming a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant experienced pain and some functional limitation for a few months, she continued to live basically the same life as she had prior to the accidents, including driving her scooter, relying on meals on wheels, and eventually returning to social activities.

The application for non-earner benefits was dismissed, as the applicant failed to meet the stringent statutory test of being continuously unable to engage in substantially all of her pre-accident activities.