Lenard Kotylo

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for unpaid flooring invoices on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant argued the invoices were part of an ongoing construction contract and that the discoverability principle should apply.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's finding that there was no ongoing contract and that the invoices, which did not specify a payment date, were demand obligations.

The appeal was dismissed as the claim was commenced more than two years after the date of the last invoice.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the Defendants' successful motion to strike the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or alternatively, as an abuse of process.

The parties were unable to agree on costs.

The court applied principles from the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. decision, to fix costs.

The Defendants were awarded costs slightly higher than partial indemnity, considering the Plaintiff's conduct prolonged the proceedings by not making concessions earlier.

The defendants, the City of Richmond Hill and two employees, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim without leave to amend under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or alternatively, to dismiss the action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d).

The plaintiff alleged harassment, threats, family division, damage to reputation, and malicious prosecution related to zoning contravention charges against his family members.

The court found that the alleged torts were not recognized in Ontario law or were improperly pleaded without sufficient material facts.

Furthermore, the claims against individual municipal employees failed due to statutory immunity under the Municipal Act, 2001, as bad faith was not adequately pleaded.

The court also determined the action constituted an improper collateral attack on concluded Planning Act proceedings against the plaintiff's family members, to which the plaintiff was a stranger.

Both branches of the motion were granted.

The applicant brought an unopposed motion for an extension of time to serve and file a Notice of Appeal from a Small Claims Court decision.

The delay was short, caused by counsel's inadvertence, and the applicant had formed a timely intention to appeal.

Finding no prejudice to the respondent, the court granted the motion and extended the time by 15 days.

The defendant, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance, moved for an order requiring the plaintiff, Mario Parravano, to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(c) and (e).

The motion was based on Parravano's failure to pay over $310,000 in costs from two previous unsuccessful lawsuits against the same insurer, and the defendant's contention that the current action, claiming $60 million for bad faith, was frivolous and vexatious and statute-barred.

The court found the action could not succeed because the insurer's prior denials of claims had been determined meritorious by the Court of Appeal, precluding a bad faith finding.

Furthermore, the action was barred by both the two-year discoverability limitation period and the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiff, having had legal counsel, ought to have known of the claim earlier.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $220,000 in security for costs in installments and pay the defendant's motion costs.

This is a costs endorsement following a six-day trial concerning parenting and support arrangements.

The applicant mother sought over $30,000 in trial costs and additional costs for an urgent motion.

The respondent father sought dismissal of the mother's costs and his own costs for the urgent motion.

The court found the mother's offer to settle was more favourable than the trial outcome on several key issues (decision-making, parenting time, child support, spousal support, government documents), presumptively entitling her to full recovery of costs on those issues under Rule 18(14).

However, the court exercised its discretion to deny costs on the relocation issue due to the mother's unreasonable self-help tactics and also considered the time spent on her handwriting expert whose report was not admitted.

The father's unreasonable conduct, including failure to provide financial disclosure and respond to offers, was also noted.

Considering all factors, including the father's modest means, the court fixed the mother's trial costs at $18,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable monthly.

Costs for the urgent motion were denied to both parties, as the motion, while not urgent, led to beneficial temporary parenting orders.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment entered against them after they failed to attend a virtual trial.

The appellants had requested an adjournment, citing a desire for an in-person trial and their agent's presence in Florida, which the trial judge refused.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion to refuse the adjournment, noting the appellants' reasons were illogical and lacked detail.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant grandmother brought a motion for temporary access to her 11-year-old non-biological granddaughter.

The respondent mother had arbitrarily terminated the grandmother's access after a dispute over the choice of the child's godmother, despite the grandmother having had regular access for nine years.

A Voice of the Child Report indicated the child had a positive relationship with the grandmother and wished to resume contact.

Applying the test for grandparent access, the court found the mother's decision to terminate access was arbitrary and imperilled a positive relationship.

The court granted the grandmother's motion and ordered a graduated schedule of temporary access.

The applicant sought directions on whether certain materials in his possession relating to the complainant trigger the third party disclosure regime under section 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The materials at issue were a photograph of the applicant and complainant taken together at a bar and a cell phone video recording of the complainant leaving the applicant's premises following an alleged sexual assault.

The court found that neither item constitutes a "record" within the meaning of section 278.1 of the Criminal Code, as neither contains the requisite personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Both items were permitted to be tendered as evidence at trial.

The moving party mother brought a motion to change a final consent order regarding parenting and child support.

She sought full custody, retroactive and ongoing child support, and payment of section 7 expenses, arguing a material change in circumstances because the adult child and minor child were residing primarily with her.

The court found a material change in circumstances, ordered the responding party father to pay his share of section 7 expenses, ongoing and retroactive child support, and varied the residential schedule to reflect the children's actual living arrangements.

The mother brought a motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a final order in a child protection proceeding.

The court first addressed a jurisdictional issue regarding whether an appeal from a final Ontario Court of Justice order lies to the Superior Court of Justice or the Divisional Court following the expansion of the Unified Family Court.

The court concluded that the appeal lies to the Superior Court of Justice and that the judge had jurisdiction to hear the motion.

On the merits, the court denied the motion to extend time, finding that the mother failed to demonstrate a firm intention to appeal within the required time, failed to adequately explain the delay, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The court also found that further delay would be prejudicial to the child's best interests.

The respondent mother, S.A.P., appealed a final disposition order that placed her children in the custody of the respondent father, M.I., following a child protection application.

The appeal raised six grounds, including alleged errors in law regarding the mother's position on the children's need for protection, the test for future emotional harm, the consideration of services provided to the mother, the consideration of less disruptive alternatives, the weight given to the father's criminal record and behaviour, and the mother's willingness to maintain ties between the children and the father.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's decision based on the children's best interests, emphasizing the importance of continuity of care and deference to the trial judge's factual findings and weighing of evidence.

The appellant appealed an eviction order and review order from the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing he did not receive notice of the hearing and was not a tenant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had actual notice of the hearing and chose not to attend.

The Court also held that the Board's finding that the appellant was a tenant was reasonable and entitled to deference.

This is a motion for summary judgment in a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act.

Native Child and Family Services of Toronto sought an order making two young children (ages 5 and 3) crown wards without access for purposes of adoption.

The mother, who had previously lost four other children to the child protection system, opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The father, with a significant criminal history and mental health issues, also opposed the motion.

The court found that the parents' plan for care was not viable and did not raise a genuine issue for trial.

The court granted summary judgment and made orders for crown wardship without access to either parent, finding that the children required certainty, finality, and permanence.

The appellant father appealed a child support order made at a case conference in the Ontario Court of Justice that imposed final child support based on imputed income.

The appellate court considered whether the case conference judge had jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules to make a final order where the responding party had notice only of a request for a temporary order.

While the father had failed to comply with disclosure orders and provided inconsistent financial information, the court held that the case conference judge exceeded jurisdiction by making a final order far beyond the relief requested in the conference brief.

The proper order was limited to the temporary child support amount sought in the brief.

The final order was therefore set aside and replaced with a temporary order pending further proceedings.

The appellant appealed an order refusing a motion to extend the time to appeal a child protection order and dismissing the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was an unexplained delay in ordering transcripts and no merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized that delay is of particular concern in child protection proceedings where expeditious resolution is in the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding compensation to the complainant for alleged sexual and physical abuse.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for preferring the complainant's uncorroborated evidence over conflicting evidence, and by relying on a medical report that was never disclosed to the appellants.

The Board's decision was quashed and costs were awarded to the appellants.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary child support and rescind arrears totalling $21,343.40, alongside ongoing support of $425 per month.

The Divisional Court considered whether it had jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, given the combined amount in issue exceeded $25,000.

The court held that the monetary limit applies to the total amount in issue across all subclauses, concluding it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal.